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 The city of Shanghai was transformed from a treaty port of around half a million people 
when the British first arrived after the end of the Opium War to become the most populous, 
prosperous, and cosmopolitan metropolis in China by the early 20
th
 century. The development of 
public transportation systems contributed significantly to the urban expansion and growth of the 
city, as well as in reshaping the city‟s identity. This dissertation examined the impact of public 
transportation on the urban landscape of Shanghai by focusing on three major issues: “tradition 
versus modernity”, state and society relations, and the relationship between technology and 
society. As a divided city governed by three separate political jurisdictions, Shanghai offered a 
unique perspective in understanding the roles public transportation and urban planning played in 
changing a city‟s layout. This dissertation addressed the specific differences in the development 
of urban infrastructure and its impact on population growth, mobility and accessibility, and 
economic prosperity of the British controlled International Settlement, the French Concession, 
and the Chinese city. 
 The first half of the dissertation analyzed the roles in which “traditional” man-powered 
vehicles such as the wheelbarrow, sedan chair, horse-drawn carriage, and rickshaw played, 
before delving into the arrival of “modern” machine-powered vehicles such as automobiles, 
trams, trolleys, and buses in the early 20
th
 century. Each form of transportation vehicle is 
discussed for its specific role, and the type of clientele it catered. This dissertation argued that 
man-powered vehicles and machine-powered vehicles did not necessarily compete with each 
other for passengers, as each type of vehicle served its specific purposes and clients.  
xiii   
 
Public transportation; just like food, clothing, or housing is a form of material culture 
where one‟s socioeconomic or class status is revealed by the type of transport one chooses. 
Because the different types of vehicles did not directly compete with each other, they all saw 
significant increases in ridership. The „tradition versus modernity” theme is aimed at addressing 
the bigger picture of “continuity and change”, where Shanghai was transformed by foreign 
influences yet at the same time it still retained traditional Chinese characteristics to form a 
complex identity. 
 The second half of the dissertation dealt with state and society relations, and the 
relationship of technology and society. The issue of public versus private responsibility is 
addressed with historical analysis of government orchestrated urban planning and the private 
sector providing the services to fulfill the people‟s needs and demands. In focusing on these two 
themes, this dissertation argued that technology has inherent political agenda attached to it, as 
government policies specifically created areas of the city which had better public transportation 
infrastructure, which led to these parts of the city being more commercially prosperous and 
vibrant than others. Routes, lines, and stops were designated with specific political purposes in 
mind, and public transportation accessibility contributed to the uneven economic developments 
across the city.  
The Greater Shanghai Project of 1927-1937 was a specific attempt by the Chinese 
government to create a new city center that could shift the population away from the foreign 
concessions into the Chinese territories. This dissertation argued that this campaign would not 
have been feasible even without the Japanese attack due to insufficient public funds. The 
findings in this dissertation will hopefully add to the scholarship on the history of Shanghai and 




























The history of modern Shanghai has been a fascinating trajectory of growth and 
expansion from a treaty port created in 1843 following the Treaty of Nanjing that resulted from 
China‟s defeat in the Opium War to become China‟s most populous,  prosperous and 
cosmopolitan city in less than a century had been a remarkable achievement and transformation. 
The creation, development, expansion, and upgrades in urban infrastructure had been among the 
most important and influential aspects of the making and remaking of the “New Shanghai”, a 
modern and international cosmopolites that featured both traditional Chinese and Western 
lifestyles. The creation of urban infrastructure and the rapid population increases could not have 
occurred without the planning, facilitation, and implementation of a modern public transportation 
system unique to Shanghai that served as the necessary catalyst for the transformation of the city. 
The development of the public transportation systems mirrored other aspects of Shanghai‟s 
complex and fascinating evolution and identity as a city; where ancient traditional forms of man-
powered forms of transport could coexist side by side with modern machine-powered vehicles 
from the West symbolized the greater complexity and dynamicity of a city with multiple 
governances, cultures, and identities.  
 The history of Shanghai did not begin with the Treaty of Nanjing. The beginning of 
Shanghai can be traced back to 1074 during the Song dynasty (960-1279). The two Chinese 
characters for the name “Shanghai” means “up” and “sea”, which dated to the Song Dynasty 
during the 11
th
 century where there was already a river flowing by a town. According to 
Shanghai historian Linda Cooke Johnson, the commonly abbreviated name of Shanghai in 
Chinese, known as hu, is derived from the name Hu Du, which was the name of an ancient 





The origin of the name “Shanghai” could have meant either “the upper reaches 
of the sea”, because due to the changing coastline, during the Tang Dynasty, Shanghai was 
literally on the sea or “to go onto the sea”, which suggested the original seaport status of the city. 
2
  
 In Shanghai: From Market Town to Treaty Port, 1074-1858, Johnson chronicled the 
transition of Shanghai from being elevated in status from a fishing village (cun) to a market town 
(zhen) during the reign of Song Emperor Shenzong in 1074, marking its first appearance as a 
recognized town on the Song Dynasty‟s map of China. In 1172, a second sea wall was built to 
stabilize the ocean coastline, to strengthen an earlier dike. After the fall of the Song, Shanghai 
officially became a city for the first time in 1297 during the Mongol ruled Yuan Dynasty (1271-
1368), in which the area around Shanghai was designed as a county (xian) to be administered by 
the Songjiang Prefecture. Johnson noted that two important events helped upgrade Shanghai‟s 
status during the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644). A city wall was built for the first time in 1554 in 
order to protect the town from raids by sea pirates. In 1602, Shanghai received a symbolic and 
spiritual boost from the construction of a City God Temple known as cheng huang miao. This 
temple statue is usually built in larger cities such as a prefectural capital, and was normally not 
built for a county town like Shanghai had been. During the Ming Dynasty, Shanghai began to 
grow in importance and stature due to its geographic location. 
3
 
 The city of Shanghai is located in a favorable geographic location due to its close 
proximity to the mouth of the Yangzi River flowing into the Yangzi Delta region. The Yangzi 
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Delta region is a natural site for a coastal port, given its gateway location to the Jiangnan region 
where much of China‟s wealthiest agricultural lands are located and where much of the grain, 
cotton, tea, and silk are produced. Shanghai‟s location, as a basin at the confluence of Suzhou 
Creek and the Huangpu River can be easily protected from storms and attacks from the sea, yet 
offers easy access to the Yangzi River and the interior. Given that nearby Suzhou was already 
considered a pre-industrial manufacturing center and an important inland port, Shanghai 
functioned as a gateway port that linked the coast to the interior. During the Manchu ruled Qing 
Dynasty (1644-1911), Shanghai served as the connecting point between the circulation of 
commerce and goods from the interior with the coastal ocean shipping routes. In 1732, Emperor 
Yongzheng moved the customs office (hai guan) for Jiangsu province from the prefectural 
capital city of Songjiang to Shanghai, and gave Shanghai exclusive control over customs 
collections for all foreign trade in Jiangsu province. By 1735, Shanghai had essentially become 
the major trade port for the entire lower Yangzi River Delta region, despite being a low 
administrative level county town.  
4
  
 The strategic importance of Shanghai grew quickly in the 19
th
 century, as the city‟s 
geographic position made it an ideal location for increasing trade with foreign powers from the 
West. By 1840, Cooke Johnson estimated that Shanghai‟s population could be ranked among the 
twenty or so largest cities in China. 
5
 After China‟s defeat in the Opium War (1839-1842), the 
consequential Treaty of Nanjing would forever change the urban identity of Shanghai and 
transform the city into a dynamic metropolis in the late 19
th
 to early 20
th
 centuries. It is here in 
1843, when Shanghai would become a treaty port designed for foreigners, first the British and 
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later the French that radical urban transformations would take place, and this city would be 
different from any other city in mainland China.  
 This dissertation will begin in 1843 with the history of the “new modern Shanghai” and 
conclude on the eve of the Chinese Communist Party‟s takeover of the city in 1949. In a span of 
a century, Shanghai witnessed a tenfold population increase, the creation of three separate zones 
of governance (including two sections ruled by foreign powers), and the complexity of an urban 
society that featured both traditional Chinese lifestyles and Western influences. My research will 
examine the impact of technology on public transportation in Shanghai‟s urban expansion and 
population growths to become a major metropolitan city of international prominence by the early 
20
th
 century. The American historian of technology Langdon Winner argued that technology 
contains inherent political artifacts and represents the political agenda of those who intend to use 
technology for their own purposes. 
6
 The urban infrastructure and public transportation systems 
in Shanghai were not designed just to alleviate traffic congestion, to allow the city to expand 
outward into the suburbs to deal with a high population density, or to merely improve and 
upgrade existing infrastructure in place. Public transportation technologies and development 
contained both direct and indirect political agenda, which allowed both Westerners in foreign 
controlled territories of the International Settlement and the French Concession, and the Chinese 
in Chinese controlled sections of the city to implement their own political authorities.  
 This dissertation will attempt to show that public transportation technologies had far 
more practical intentions and symbolic meanings than just the mass transit of people from one 
section of the city to another, but rather these technologies were designed and implemented to 
support the political powers at the time, in order to strengthen and justify their claims of political 
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legitimacy under the name of economic and social development. During this period of the 
introduction of new transport devices and vehicles, public transportation became a form of social 
economic expression and class identity. Residents and commuters utilized different forms of 
public transportation options available to public indicate and express their social class 
backgrounds. Public transit became a part of the growing material culture, just as food, clothing, 
and housing had been; where how one traveled and what type of methods one traveled publicly 
revealed one‟s social and class standing. 
 My dissertation will focus on three major themes. The first is on “tradition vs. 
modernity”. There has been much recent scholarship among Chinese historians discussing on 
whether China and particularly Shanghai was really backward. A critical part of this debate 
centered on the exact time period that China supposedly fell behind Western Europe; and the 
specific factors that contributed to China‟s inability to match European colonial powers in 
technological innovations. Joseph Needham and Benjamin Elman, prominent scholars of Chinese 
science and technology have shown in their works that Chinese cities had developed advanced 
and sophisticated urban infrastructure and political governance earlier than most Western 
countries up until the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644). 
7
Chinese historians Philip Huang and Kenneth 
Pomeranz‟s heated debates in the Journal of Asian Studies in 2002 argued over when exactly did 
China fall behind Europe, the specific reasons behind this, and how this gap continued to widen 
over time. Pomeranz argued that in his comparison of the Yangzi Delta region where Shanghai is 
located, the divergence with Great Britain occurred only after 1800, and it was the prevalence 
and availability of coal and oversea colonies abroad that gave Britain labor and valuable natural 
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resources that propelled Britain to surpass China. 
8
 Huang disagreed and pointed out that China‟s 
high population density had resulted in agrarian involution, or significant marginal decreases in 
productivity in rural lands. Despite China‟s rapid population growths during the late Ming and 
Qing Dynasty, China remained an overwhelmingly rural and agrarian society where the majority 
of the Chinese populations were subsistence peasants while Britain became much more 
urbanized through the process of proto-industrialization. 
9
 
 It is in this backdrop of historical events following China‟s humiliating defeat to the 
British in the Opium War and the subsequent treaties that Shanghai was turned into a foreign 
controlled treaty port in 1843. Given Shanghai‟s unique geographic and environmental 
conditions, which had differed significantly from major European cities, roads were much more 
narrow and winding, and alleyways connecting into residential neighborhoods were much more 
common. Shanghai‟s urban layout during the 19
th
 century was much more suited for nimble, 
small-scaled man-powered vehicles such as the wheelbarrow and the sedan chair than the horse-
drawn carriages that had appeared in the streets of European cities. When the British, and later 
the French arrived in Shanghai to carve out their own concession territories, they had to modify 
and adjust their blueprint models of the urban city to accommodate Shanghai‟s physical layout. 
Western technologies such as machine-powered vehicles arrived in Shanghai at around the turn 
of the 20
th
 century, as new roads had to be built and old roads widened, electrification had to be 
installed, and safety measures had to be assured before motorized vehicles could be driven on 
Shanghai‟s streets. 
 After the arrival of Westerners, the city of Shanghai was divided into three separate 
zones, and controlled by three different governments. Foreign influences merged with or 
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incorporated with local influences and geography, and Shanghai became an intersection of 
Western and Chinese cultural influences. While foreigners brought about the introduction of 
modern technologies in public transportation, they had to learn to adapt and accommodate these 
technologies to fit into Shanghai‟s local context. Technological diffusion took place whereas 
Westerners had to learn from the Chinese in how to best utilize their technologies in order to 
meet Shanghai‟s specific geographic and environmental needs. 
 Even after the arrival of machine-powered motorized vehicles, the traditional forms of 
transportation such as the wheelbarrow and the sedan chair were not replaced or wiped out, but 
continued to coexist with more modern forms of public transportation. Shanghai‟s case went 
against Joseph Schumpter‟s theory of creative destruction, where new technologies will 
inevitably replace old technologies as the natural progression of economic change. 
10
 Instead, 
Shanghai‟s traditional Chinese transportation devices managed to coexist peacefully with newer 
forms of motorized vehicles on the same roads and streets of the city. Shanghai‟s urban history 
defied Schumpter‟s creative destruction theory and showed that tradition and modernity did not 
necessarily have to conflict with each other, and that people did not necessarily have to replace 
the old with the new. 
 Why did the traditional and modern features of urban transport coexist in Shanghai? This 
thesis will show that given Shanghai‟s tenfold population increase in a span of a century, and the 
huge diversity in socio-economic status of Shanghai residents, each mode of transportation had 
its own customers and did not have t compete directly with each other for passengers. Public 
transportation became a form of public expression of an individual‟s social status and financial 
standing. Just as what kinds of food you ate, what types of clothes you wore, what type of house 
or dwelling you lived in, and how much formal education you received, how an individual 
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traveled in public and how you got from one section of the city to another revealed your social 
class. The wealthy residents comprised of foreigners living in the concessions, and well-to-do 
Chinese residents traveled by automobiles and taxis. Middle class residents traveled by bus, 
trams, trolleys, or rickshaws; depending on the location and distance of their destinations. Poor 
residents used cheap forms of transport such as third class with no seating on public vehicles, or 
the wheelbarrows which could balance multiple persons. 
 Passenger psychology is an important aspect of the emergence of public transport as part 
of Shanghai‟s material culture. How did passengers feel about being seen public using whatever 
mode of transport they choose? Did wealthy passengers look down at poorer passengers who 
could not afford to buy first or second class tickets with seating, or had to use cheaper forms of 
transport? Did poor commuters look at wealthy passengers who rode in comfortable automobiles 
or sat in first class seats with jealousy, envy, or resentment? What were the Chinese‟ attitudes 
and viewpoints toward foreign technologies? Were they in awe of Western technologies or were 
they despised for its foreign ways? This thesis will examine the transition and changing 
perspectives of Chinese attitudes toward witnessing foreign technologies such as machine-
powered vehicles that were introduced into China by Westerners. Initially, there had been 
suspicion and skepticism about how foreign technologies could be successfully applied to and 
implemented in Shanghai. The numerous incidents of traffic accidents and safety concerns 
alarmed the Chinese and prevented them from fully embracing foreign modes of motorized 
transportation. However, gradually as foreign vehicles were able to improve their safety and 
efficiency, and successfully adapt to Shanghai‟s urban terrain, the Chinese began to accept and 
eventually embrace foreign transportation vehicles. Ensuring safety, both for passengers who 
rode in motorized vehicles, as well as for pedestrians walking on the streets and sidewalks had 
10 
 
been the critical factor in the Chinese acceptance for foreign vehicles. While the earliest tram, 
trolley, bus, and taxi companies had been foreign, by the early 20
th
 century, many Chinese 
entrepreneurs (hua shang) began to purchase these vehicles from Westerners and started Chinese 
owned businesses. Inquisitive and alert Chinese businessmen learned about the opportunities to 
make significant profits in providing mass transit for residents, and learned from the Western 
owned companies‟ operations and management strategies of efficiency, costs, and profitability. 
 Annual statistics and data on the number of different types of man-powered and machine-
powered vehicles in operation, the number of workers and laborers involved in the public 
transportation occupations, the prices of tickets, fares, and fees for each type of vehicle, the 
speeds and distances in which each mode of transportation traveled, and the number of passenger 
ridership for each form of transportation will be included and thoroughly analyzed. A key aspect 
of understanding the reasons behind the coexistence of “traditional” and “modern” forms of 
transportation will be looking at annual and decade increases in each type of transportation 
vehicle or device. While the numbers of all vehicles increased over time, certain types of 
vehicles increased faster in a certain time period or were more commonly used by commuters. 
The wide range of choices and methods of transportation will be compared to and analyzed 
against the annual and decade increases in the populations and demographics of Shanghai from 
the late 19
th
 to early 20
th
 centuries. The relationship between increases in each form of transport 
vehicles and the population increases, as well as the relationship between costs of each form of 
transportation in ticket prices or fares to average annual personal incomes of various occupations 
and social classes in Shanghai over time will be examined and discussed. These statistical data 
will better explain and interpret the factors that allowed “traditional” and “modern” 
transportation methods to exist side-by-side.  
11 
 
 In describing the introduction, implementation, and eventual expansion of new 
technologies, it is important to ask whose perspectives are being brought into the light. When 
machine-powered motorized vehicles were introduced into China by Westerners, the actors and 
players involved include the government politicians, the engineers, the builders and drivers, and 
finally the customers. The government politicians had the power and authority to issue laws and 
regulations for the construction of new roads, and determine where different types of vehicles 
could be driven. Laws regarding safety standards, licensing, speed regulations, and parking are 
determined by the government officials in power over the jurisdiction or area in which they had 
political legitimacy to rule over. The engineers designed the new technologies, and while they 
could rely on old blueprint models of what had worked in Western cities, they had to learn to 
adjust, adapt, and modify their blueprints to fit these new technologies into Shanghai‟s urban 
environment. The builders built the new roads and assembled the vehicles, while the drivers 
drove these new motorized vehicles. Who had been considered qualified to become builders and 
drivers, what types of training did they have to receive, what types of licenses were required to 
become a tram, trolley, bus, or taxi driver? What types of salaries did these drivers, who are 
considered skilled laborers, receive in comparison to other unskilled laborers such as rickshaw 
pullers? Lastly, what roles did the customers play in the shaping of the construction of public 
transportation? Besides paying fares or fees, what other impact did customers have on any 
changes, modifications, or upgrades in public transport? 
 Each of these groups of actors and players bring a different perspective and viewpoint to 
the understanding of the construction and development of public transportation in Shanghai. This 
dissertation will attempt to shed as much light as possible on each of these groups of actors and 
players, by providing as much background information as possible. However, given the archival 
12 
 
resources and materials available, it appears that the perspectives of government officials and 
politicians who had the power and authority to plan, implement, and alter or make changes to 
public transportation systems will be discussed more thoroughly and in more in-depth details. 
Since there are more government documents, statistics and data available, this dissertation will 
focus more on the roles of the government, in both foreign controlled settlements and in Chinese 
sections of the city in public transportation and urban infrastructure developments from the late 
19
th
 to early 20
th
 centuries. Government planning and government-directed initiatives contributed 
to the development and expansion of the public transport infrastructure, while government 
policies allowed for the coexistence of “traditional” and “modern” forms of transport options that 
catered to different segments of the population. 
 The second theme involves the state-society relationship. Shanghai is a complex city 
controlled by three different governments, each ruling a different section of the city. What were 
their relationships with each other? What were their policies of coordination between them? This 
thesis will look at the bargaining, negotiations, and compromises between the British controlled 
International Settlement, the French Concession, and the Chinese zones of the city. The Chinese 
learned about effective management and utilization of public transportation from the more 
developed and prosperous foreign controlled territories. Transportation and politics are 
inseparably linked in each political jurisdiction in Shanghai. The key issues are mobility and 
accessibility within the context of achieving specific political motives. Routes, lines, and stops 
were designated on purpose with specific political agenda in mind to ensure greater control over 




 An important part of this dissertation will focus on the Greater Shanghai Project of 1927-
1937, which was a state building planning initiative by the Guomingdang (known as the Chinese 
Republican Party in the West) political party. By 1927, the Guomingdang (GMD) had defeated 
most of the provincial warlords and had begun to strengthen their power over China. The 
national capital had been moved to Nanjing, about 300 kilometers from Shanghai in nearby 
Jiangsu province. This thesis will critically break down this attempted state-control initiative to 
analyze how the Guomingdang regime used urban development to consolidate and solidify 
power. The Greater Shanghai Project could be seen as either a state-controlling mechanism to 
solidify power to a more grassroots level or as a government-orchestrated movement of national 
liberation and modernization.  A key question is how did the Guomingdang government use 
nationalistic feelings among Shanghai‟s Chinese citizens to develop their own state building 
apparatus and control mechanisms? This dissertation will examine and discuss the idealistic 
goals and visions of the Greater Shanghai Project, which were twofold: 1)  to attempt to shift the 
Chinese population of Shanghai away from the foreign controlled territories to the newly 
designated Chinese controlled city center in sparsely settled Jiangwan in order strengthen GMD 
control over the Chinese parts of the city, and 2) to show foreigners in control of the 
International Settlement and French Concession that a Chinese government could effectively 
manage and govern a modern cosmopolitan city. Discussion and analysis of the Greater 
Shanghai Project will focus on the realities and challenges that the Guomingdang faced such as 
insufficient public revenues to fund such an enormous public works project, a succession of 
several Shanghai mayors whose viewpoints on urban development may have differed from the 
GMD central government, and the impending Japanese invasion that destroyed any attempts to 
continue this expensive, long-term project.  
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 Research here will focus on urban visual materials such as maps, photographs, statistical 
data and urban artifacts as evidence to examine how the Guomingdang regime utilized urban 
public transportation to carry out their plans for the Greater Shanghai Project. This dissertation 
will analyze the issues of urban space transformation from the impact of public transportation on 
legibility, and how government initiatives attempted to redesign and revamp an entire city‟s 
urban infrastructure. Notions of urban identity, space, power, status, modernity, agency, and 
material culture will be instigated within the contexts of how foreign inventions were adopted 
and implemented to fit the existing urban geographic conditions, and how government 
involvement in urban planning attempted to reconfigure and alter the existing dynamics of urban 
layout. Archival materials will present a vivid portrayal of the city‟s population density, the 
construction of new neighborhoods, commercial, industrial, and residential areas, and suburban 
expansions that highlighted the importance of the public transportation systems n meeting the 
changing needs of the city‟s growing population as they commuted from their home to work, for 
shopping and entertainment, and for other purposes. Public transportation choices became a part 
of the material culture and urban consumption through the class differences in their selection of 
transportation modes. 
 James Scott‟s Seeing Like a State had shown that state-building initiatives have not 
always been successful, and have often backfired throughout history. Scott‟s case studies showed 
that when central governments impose legibility upon their citizens through high-modernist 
campaigns under the name of national economic or social development, these campaigns have 
often resulted in negative and unintended consequences. Quite frequently, local knowledge, 
known as metis was completely ignored. Scott concluded that in order for government-planned 
schemes to become successful in transforming the lives of their people, they must take into 
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consideration local conditions and knowledge and avoid high-modernist approaches. 
11
 This 
dissertation will discuss whether the Guomingdang regime carefully examined and researched 
the population demographics, population needs, and differences in accessibility and mobility 
within Shanghai‟s residents when the Greater Shanghai Project was planned and implemented.  
 An important feature of the state-society theme is the public versus private relationship 
over who has the responsibility to provide certain goods and services for the people. For any 
government regime to acquire political legitimacy among its people, economic development such 
as improvement in the standard of living, more and better employment options, health care, 
education, leisure and entertainment, etc. must be addressed to appease the citizens‟ needs and 
wants. This is particularly important for an authoritarian regime, whereas improving the lives of 
the people the regime is attempting to control through large-scale development projects that 
actually addresses and answers the needs of the people would give the regime a sense of 
legitimacy in its governance. This dissertation will look at whether the Guomingdang‟s Greater 
Shanghai Project actually addressed the important needs of its people, which areas were over-
emphasized and which areas were not adequately emphasized. Based on the Guomingdang‟s 
political agenda, whether the interests of the people of Shanghai were correctly identified and 
addressed will be discussed.  
 While the Guomingdang planned and carried out their government initiatives to 
transform Shanghai, they only had the authority to govern the Chinese sections of the city: 
Nanshi, Zhabei and the sparsely settled district of Jiangwan that would later become their city 
center. The GMD was powerless to control the Chinese populations of the city that lived in the 
British controlled International Settlement and the French Concession. Given their limited power 
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and control over the city, their campaign could only target the population living in Chinese 
controlled areas. This greatly reduced and limited the scale and scope of their campaign. Since 
the GMD is an authoritarian regime based on a republican platform rather a Communist regime 
under a state-planned form of governance, the public versus private issue became an even more 
pertinent aspect of the Greater Shanghai Project. Chinese businessmen and entrepreneurs had 
already established Chinese owned tram, trolley and bus companies. While the GMD had the 
power to establish new laws, regulations, and rules as well as make decisions on where new 
roads would be constructed, the public transportation industry in the Chinese sections of the city 
depended on Chinese owned companies to provide public transit services to passengers. The 
relationship between the GMD and Chinese businessmen (hua shang) who operated and profited 
from the increasing demands of providing transport for passengers will be analyzed through the 
contexts of the complex public versus private paradigm. 
 State-society relations in China dealt directly between the central government and the 
Shanghai municipal government during this time period. After Shanghai was declared a “Special 
Municipality”, where the city would be given special attention by the GMD, in July 1927, 
several mayors governed Shanghai. What kinds of relationship did the GMD central government 
have with each mayor? Did these mayors agree with the GMD‟s Greater Shanghai Project 
initiatives? Or did the Shanghai mayors have their own personal agenda at stake that may have 
differed from GMD‟s plans? The backgrounds, motives, and tenures of each Shanghai mayor 
during the Greater Shanghai Project will be described, and the reasons behind their rise and fall 
will be assessed.  
 The third theme will be the society and technology relationship. What kind of impact did 
technology have on the development and progress of a society? How did a society‟s needs 
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trigger the technological inventions that responded to those demands? The perspectives of 
technological determinism versus social constructivism have been debated and argued by 
historians of technology for decades. This dissertation will ask and address the questions of 
whether Shanghai‟s rapid population growths from the late 19
th
 to early 20
th
 centuries was the 
direct results of the improvements made in public transportation, which facilitated expansion into 
suburban areas and made travel more convenient or accessible for residents? Or were Shanghai‟s 
enormous population growths and high population densities in certain areas the driving forces 
behind the development of a modern public transportation infrastructure in order to deal with 
urban population pressures? In connecting the third theme to my second theme, research will 
show how public transportation, like other forms of technology are embedded with political 
artifacts, and contains political agendas and motives. Key issues discussed will include who has 
the power to decide, design, implement, fund, and modify urban public transportation? What are 
their specific purposes or actions intended for? How public transportation technologies can be 
utilized to achieve specific politic, economic or social goals? In tackling the third theme, issues 
such as the residents‟ viewpoints of new changes in urban layout, their attitudes toward the 
reconfiguration of space, uneven accessibility and mobility, and their notions of material culture 
and consumption through public transport will be assessed.  
 Accessibility and mobility are critical issues here, since Shanghai‟s public transportation 
developments had been quite uneven. Certain areas that were better developed, or had been 
located closer to routes, lines, or stops became more accessible for residents, and in turn, those 
areas became more prosperous and vibrant. Other areas that had been neglected or were not 
located near routes, lines, or stops suffered as a result. Strategic planning was based on the 
political incentives of the government authorities in power rather than purely based on 
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geographic or environmental factors. Upgrades and improvements in public transportation made 
life easier and the city more accessible for commuters, but it also allowed the government 
authorities to strengthen their control. Maps or routes, lines and stops will illustrate the logic 
behind the government initiatives to indicate which areas of the city became the primary 
beneficiaries of strategic planning and which areas were left behind. 
 Society and technology relationship can also be directly linked to the first theme of 
“tradition and modernity”. Technological diffusion took place where foreign technological 
inventions in the form of machine-powered motorized vehicles appeared in Shanghai‟s roads and 
streets, but those vehicles had to adapted and modified to fit Shanghai‟s land terrain. Michael 
Adas‟s Machines as the Measure of Men addressed the diffusion of Western technologies into 
non-Western colonial territories. Adas‟s study of Western hegemony revealed that Western 
science and technology played significant roles in the creation of an ideology of Western 
superiority and advancement over non-Western peoples in the colonies. He concluded that this 
ideology of Western scientific and technological superiority became an integral part of the 
imperialistic civilization mission in European colonies and contributed to the rise of Western 
cultural hegemony. Adas‟s key points focused on the perceptions of backwardness among non-
Western peoples in the eyes of Westerners. Even when local technologies were perfectly suited 
for the local geographic or environmental conditions, Westerners labeled indigenous 
technologies as inferior based on their cultural norms or customs. When Western technologies 
did prove to be more effective or efficient, this technological progress was seen through the 
Western lens as a result of Western cultural superiority in their civilizing mission campaign. 
12
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 In Shanghai‟s case, the city can be considered as a semi-colony in that Westerners 
controlled much of the city but not all of it. As more Westerners began to relocate and settle in 
Shanghai, providing the notions of Western comfort and the lifestyles available in Western cities 
became an important aspect of colonial development in both the International Settlement and the 
French Concession. Western technologies had to be imported into Shanghai to make Westerners 
feel more comfortable to their new surroundings. Western technologies transformed the city into 
a complex and dynamic environment where the modern urban lifestyles of the West existed 
alongside traditional Chinese ways of life. The arrival of Western technologies alter the 
landscape of Shanghai and differentiated the city from the rest of China, making Shanghai the 
most “Westernized” city in mainland China. Nevertheless, traditional Chinese cultural practices 
and lifestyles remained, and in many ways continued on relatively untouched by foreign 
influences. These contrasting yet interconnected features of Shanghai left lasting images of the 
polar opposites of a city with multiple identities. As a result, Shanghai was known 
simultaneously around the world both as the financial center of the Far East, a city of modernity 
and progress, and as a city of extreme decadence and backwardness.  
 The first half of this dissertation will include a historical overview of modern Shanghai 
from 1843 to the eve of the Communist takeover in 1949, and the transition from the man-
powered vehicles to the machine-powered vehicles. The concept of “tradition and modernity” 
will be thoroughly analyzed and each form of transportation vehicle will be discussed for its 
advantages and disadvantages. Chapter 1 will provide the background on the history of modern 
Shanghai from the late Qing to the Republican era. Shanghai is introduced as a city with three 
governments, with two foreign controlled territories and one Chinese authority governing the 
Chinese zones. The history and backgrounds of the International Settlement, the French 
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Concession and the Chinese zones of Nanshi and Zhabei will be chronicled. Shanghai‟s specific 
geographic and environmental conditions such as roads and alleyways will be mentioned in 
details. The locations and reasons for the boundaries of the British controlled International 
Settlement, the French Concession and the Chinese sections will be emphasized to show the 
original plans for the future of the city. Major differences in urban infrastructure, city planning, 
and governance between foreign controlled territories and Chinese zones will be compared. 
 After the fall of the Qing Dynasty in 1911, a Republican government took power in 
China. A historical chronology and timeline of major events that took place in Shanghai, and the 
changes that occurred under Chinese jurisdiction will be presented. Population increases from 
both Chinese and foreigners arose quickly, and attention will be given to the reasons behind the 
population boom. The growth of the city‟s original boundaries will be introduced to portray an 
expanding city in both physical space and in population. 
 Chapter 2 will present the “traditional” aspect of public transportation. Traditional 
Chinese vehicles that had been utilized for centuries such as the wheelbarrow and the sedan chair 
will be critiqued for their usefulness and inconveniences. Notions of social class and the effects 
of the public display of personal travel will be examined through traditional man-powered 
vehicles invented in China. Chinese technological inventions will be assessed for their 
effectiveness and a brief history of China‟s scientific and technological advancements will be 
mentioned. The practicality and functions of the wheelbarrow and the sedan chair will be 
contrasted with each other to illustrate the opposite spectrum of the symbolic meanings of the 
“low class” wheelbarrow and the “high class” sedan chair before the arrival of foreign vehicles. 
 The introduction of the rickshaw from Japan had a profound impact on the urban 
landscape of Shanghai, both for practical and symbolic reasons. How the rickshaw, formerly 
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used as a vehicle to transport disabled people in Japan was modified and became popularized in 
China will be discussed. This form of technological diffusion and transformation highlighted the 
changing dynamics of Shanghai‟s population and her commuter‟s needs. The rickshaw would 
become the quintessential symbol of China‟s backwardness and the inhumane practices of 
exploiting cheap physical labor. Although the rickshaw had deep societal implications and 
symbolic meanings in that it was often seen as a sign of China‟s backwardness in the face of 
Western modernity, it created mass employment opportunities for the tens of thousands of poor 
rural migrants and allowed them to make a living in the city. The rickshaw could also be seen as 
an agent of social stability because without this form of public transport employment, the 
migrants and refugees that flooded Shanghai and significantly contributed to the city‟s massive 
population increases would have resorted to other means of survival, such as crime or begging 
that would be far worse for Shanghai‟s civil stability. Employment opportunities and exploitation 
will be discussed and examined, as man-powered public transportation provided an outlet for 
employment for many but also highlighted the cruelties of exploitation of cheap labor. 
 Chapter 3 will present the arrival of machine-powered vehicles during the turn of the 20
th
 
century. Different types of motorized vehicles such as automobiles, trams, trolleys, buses, and 
taxis all arrived on Shanghai‟s roads by the early 20
th
 century. How people used public 
transportation to indicate and validate their social and economic status, the different clients who 
catered to different vehicles to move around the city, prices and affordability of each type of 
vehicles will be described in detail to show that while numerous forms of public transportation 
vehicles (both man-powered and machine-powered) existed for residents, they did not 
necessarily have to conflict with each other and that all these modes of transportation could 
coexist at the same time because they each served a specific purpose and catered to their own 
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clientele. In analyzing prices and affordability, public transit costs will be compared to the 
average wages of different occupations in the city, and how the costs for different vehicles or 
modes of transport compared to other forms of material culture and consumption such as food, 
clothing, leisure, etc.  
 This chapter will focus on the arrival of foreign transport technologies, how the Chinese 
viewed them and later accepted them, and how foreign technology was modified and diffused in 
Shanghai. While foreign technologies had been brought to Shanghai by Westerners, and had 
been implemented in the city, they could not completely phase out or replace traditional Chinese 
vehicles. The questions asked are how did the Chinese view foreign technologies and the role of 
human agency in accepting these new forms of vehicles in both foreign controlled and Chinese 
areas of the city? While they were initially imposed by foreigners on Shanghai to satisfy the 
Westerners‟ concept of a modern city modeled after the blueprints of European cities, the 
Chinese gradually accepted these technologies when it became clear that foreign technologies 
could bring many benefits to the city. This acceptance by the Chinese can be seen in the 
increasing passenger ridership each year of each form of machine-powered motorized vehicles 
once the Chinese residents saw the time-saving convenience and effectiveness that these vehicles 
provided. By the early 20
th
 century, the Chinese incorporated foreign technologies to satisfy the 
demands and needs of their own interest in the creation of Chinese-owned companies. Western 
impact and native acceptance became a mutually beneficial relationship while the Chinese 
adopted foreign technologies to upgrade their existing infrastructure, and Westerners learned to 
modify their vehicles to better adapt to Shanghai‟s streets. Chapters 2 and 3 will provide detailed 
statistics and data on the number of each form of man-powered and machine-powered vehicles in 
operation on Shanghai‟s streets over time to look at patterns in increases, the number of 
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passengers who utilized each form of transport, the fares and costs for each vehicle, and the costs 
of the construction and maintenance of motorized vehicles. 
 The second half of this dissertation will focus on state-society relations, society-
technology relations, and how public transportation fit into these complex relationships. Chapter 
4 will deal with public transportation and politics. The key issues discussed will be of mobility 
and accessibility. Where were the new roads built, where were the location and placement of 
major routes and stops, and why were certain sections of the city better developed and more 
accessible than other areas? This thesis will show that the construction of new roads and the 
placement of routes and stops were designed with political intentions to designate certain areas 
of the city to be the commercial, industrial, or residential zones, and that road constructions and 
transit accessibility were instruments used to ensure that political agenda would be achieved. In 
both foreign controlled and Chinese controlled areas, the designation and placement of locations 
for routes, lines, and stops were designed with specific motives and intentions as considered to 
be beneficial by the government authorities in control of each section of the city. 
 Critical issues pertaining to public transport and politics such as the coordination between 
the three separate zones under three different governments, including how Chinese vehicles 
could navigate through foreign controlled territories; the bargaining, negotiations and 
compromises that were made, and how the foreign and Chinese territories learned from each 
other will be described to reveal the complexity of multi-governance in Shanghai. Licenses, 
regulations, and safety measures to reduce traffic accidents will be analyzed to support the thesis 
of the intertwined relationship between public transportation and politics. The public versus 
private relationship and responsibilities in the production of motorized vehicles became a critical 
feature of the state-society relationship. The passage of new traffic and safety laws, and 
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government licenses to drive and operate vehicles in each jurisdiction will be compared and 
contrasted with each other to look for similarities and differences between the International 
Settlement and the French Concession, and between foreign controlled and Chinese territories. 
The relationships between the private sector and the jurisdiction in which private companies 
reside in and operate their businesses will be observed. 
 Chapters 5 and 6 will focus on the Greater Shanghai Project of 1927-1937 under the 
Guomingdang during the Nanjing Decade. Chapter 5 will focus on the GMD‟s initiatives, and 
the coordination and cooperation between the central government in Nanjing and the Shanghai 
municipal authorities during the first half of the Greater Shanghai Project from 1927 to 1932. 
During the first five years of the project, significant improvements were made including the 
construction of new roads and buildings in the Jiangwan district: home of the new city center. 
Jiangwan was divided into the administrative, industrial, commercial, and residential sections 
comprised of buildings and infrastructure necessary for each section. Significant financial costs 
were needed for this project, and numerous bureaus such as the Bureaus of Land, Public Works, 
and Public Utilities were created by the GMD to deal with the urban planning and construction 
of their ambitious goal of a new Shanghai city center in Chinese controlled Jiangwan. 
Government financial revenues and costs year-by-year will be shown to reveal how the Greater 
Shanghai Project was funded, where the expenses came from, what were the costs involved in 
such a large-scale urban project, and how increasing costs affected the speed and scale of the 
project from year-to-year. Despite the high costs, the first half of the Greater Shanghai Project 
can be measured as somewhat successful for the GMD. The contributions of Shanghai‟s mayors 
will be looked at to study the relationship between the municipal authority and the central 
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government to look for levels of willingness within the municipal authority to cooperate with the 
GMD. 
 Chapter 6 will cover the second half of the Greater Shanghai Project from 1932-1937 
under the leadership of Mayor Wu Tiecheng, and discuss why the project failed to accomplish 
the goals and agendas that the GMD had envisioned. The Japanese invasion of 1931-32 and the 
enormous financial costs involved in the grandiose project proved to be too much for the GMD, 
and eventually their Greater Shanghai Project was abandoned in 1937 after the Japanese 
launched their full-fledged invasion of China. The ensuing Sino-Japanese War ended any 
attempts for the reconstruction of Shanghai during the GMD era. This chapter will attempt to 
tackle the question of whether the Greater Shanghai Project failed because of the Japanese 
invasion or whether this grand project would not have completely succeeded without the war due 
to insufficient finances and public revenues. According to population density statistics at the 
time, the GMD was unable to move large numbers of people away from the foreign controlled 
territories to the Chinese territories of the city. The chapter will explain why the GMD could not 
move supporting institutions necessary for a new city center to Jiangwan in such a short time 
period. Factors such as limited employment opportunities, as well as limited shopping and 
commercial venues, and schools discouraged Chinese residents to move away from the more 
densely populated and more prosperous International Settlement and French Concession into 
Chinese territories will be addressed to critique and understand why the GMD could not achieve 
their mission of population relocation. 
 Finally, the dissertation deals with society-technology relations, and will attempt to 
connect the theme of society and technology with earlier themes of “tradition and modernity” 
and state and society. Modern Shanghai‟s historical development will be placed within the larger 
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framework of the history of technology‟s debate between the concepts of technological 
determinism and social constructivism. Technological determinists argue that society‟s 
development and progress are largely driven by technological forces, where technology 
determines a society‟s cultural values and defines what is “modern” and “progressive”. However, 
social constructivists argue that technological artifacts are designed and utilized with particular 
meanings and intentions to fit into or attempt to satisfy society‟s cultural norms and values. The 
question asked in this chapter is whether developments in a modern public transportation system 





 centuries? Or whether it was the increasing population pressure and density that 
forced Shanghai to construct and develop a modern public transportation system in order to 
alleviate the high population growths and urban density by expanding outward into the suburbs 
and through more efficient and accessible mass transit? Looking back at Shanghai‟s public 
transportation history, development and governances through the perspectives of both 
technological determinism and social constructivism will be analyzed in order to better 
understand the impact both theories had on shaping Shanghai‟s urban landscape.  
 The conclusion will summarize the three major themes in Shanghai‟s urban transport 
history presented in the dissertation. The conclusion will attempt to answer the questions of 
Shanghai residents‟ cultural identity in the face of foreign influences; the transition in the 
Chinese reactions of suspicion, skepticism, awe, and acceptance of foreign machine-powered 
motorized technology over time; and the views on the Greater Shanghai Project as a state 
building plan versus actual reality. While, the Greater Shanghai Project was an attempted state 
organized project for more grassroots control, numerous difficulties and challenges prevented 
their plan from achieving its original goals and objectives. However, this thesis argue that the 
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Greater Shanghai project cannot be labeled as a complete failure because significant initial 
improvements were made, and the construction of new roads as well as upgrades in 
infrastructure were crucial to Shanghai‟s later developments. The plans for the Greater Shanghai 
Project was handicapped from the start because of poor timing, lack of complete Chinese control 
over the entire city, insufficient public revenues to finance such a large scale, long term project, 
and the Japanese invasion. Nevertheless, the Greater Shanghai Project indicated the potential or 
the possibility of developing a modern Chinese city under Chinese control given enough time, 
resources, and perhaps most importantly peace and stability. 
 The thesis of the political nature behind the creation and implementation of public 
transport technologies in shaping the development of Shanghai‟s urban infrastructure will be 
emphasized and reiterated in the conclusion. Access, availability, placement and location of 
public transport systems had been crucial in facilitating Shanghai‟s urban expansion and 
accommodating the tenfold population growths that took place. However, public transportation 
developments and resources had been uneven throughout the city, as certain sections of the city 
favored by the government authorities in power (both foreign and Chinese) became more 
prosperous and better developed, while other sections of the city considered unimportant were 
intentionally neglected and continued to lag behind. Public transportation systems had a direct 
impact on the growth and prosperity of the city, and in creating clear distinctions and disparities 
between different territories controlled by different political governances and jurisdictions in the 
evolution of Shanghai from a treaty port to a major cosmopolitan metropolis of international 
prominence from the 19
th
 to the 20
th
































A critical issue in modern Shanghai history from the mid 19
th
 century to the founding of 
the People‟s Republic of China in 1949 has been whose city is it? Is it a “foreign” city? Is it a 
Chinese city with “foreign” influences? Is it an international city? Since so many peoples from 
different nationalities have settled in Shanghai, the city has come to symbolize and represent the 
cultural diversity of the populations of people who call Shanghai “home”. Yet no one nation or 
government really controlled Shanghai; different sections of the city were controlled by different 
forces and maintained separate identities. Shanghai is a multi-dimensional city that reflected 
seemingly polar opposite cultural forces: traditional and modern, Chinese and Western, 
continuity and change, wealth and poverty, opulence and decadence. These polar opposite forces 
coexisted together for a century, and in turn they each claimed a part of Shanghai‟s legacy, and 
together they all created and reshaped the identity of this dynamic city. 
The International Settlement 
 China‟s defeat by the British in the Opium War (1839-1842) had finally revealed to the 
outside world the growing decay of the Qing Dynasty. The gap in economic wealth and political 
power between China and the West was growing far too significant by the mid-19
th
 century. 
From June 16-August 29, 1842, victorious British troops occupied Shanghai. The Treaty of 
Nanjing, signed on August 29 marked the end of the Opium War, and forced the Chinese to open 
several port cities near the coast, Shanghai being one of them, to European trade. The first 
official British delegation did not arrive in Shanghai until November 1843, more than a year 
later. 
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 The year 1843 would mark the transformation of Shanghai from a Chinese coastal 
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market town to an internationalized city ruled by three different governments, and divided into 
three separate jurisdictions. The history of modern Shanghai would begin here. 
On October 8, 1843, the Treaty of Bogue was signed by the British and Qing government 
in Humen (Tiger Gate) in Guangdong province that served as a supplement to the earlier Treaty 
of Nanjing. The treaty granted extraterritoriality and gave Britain most-favored nation status. 
These two treaties became the first of a series of “unfair treaties” that forced the weak Qing court 
to oblige to foreign demands. The significance of the Treaty of Bogue was that Britain would 
force the Qing to open five major ports: Shanghai, Ningbo, Xiamen, Fuzhou, and Guangzhou for 
British businessmen to reside in, and where British citizens who are charged with crimes cannot 
be tried under Chinese law. Britons living in China are to be governed by British law. 
Nevertheless, the Qing considered the treaty a victory because while they had conceded 
territories to the British, the treaty dictated that British citizens can only live and trade in these 
port cities. Foreigners were banned from traveling to and living in the interior regions of China. 
14
 
Shanghai had been conceded to the British in order to both appease their interests in trade 
and to prevent further encroachment of Chinese territories. Why was Shanghai selected as a 
treaty port? What attracted the British to want to reside and trade in this market town in the lower 
Yangzi Delta? British knowledge of Shanghai had been based on the reports of Chinese 
merchants and a small number of visitors during the 1830s. Shanghai first gained British 
attention in 1832 when Hugh Hamilton Lindsay, representing the East India Company stopped 
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by. In his report, Lindsay wrote positive descriptions of the city and called it “an important port 
with potential for trade”. 
15
 
Captain George Balfour, a commissioned officer in the British army led the first 
delegation to Shanghai. His delegation was met by Gong Mujiu, the most senior official in the 
Songjiang sub-prefecture where Shanghai was located. After an official reception, both sides 
officially declared the port as open for business on November 18, 1843. 
16
 The British had 
chosen Shanghai because of the city‟s proximity to Suzhou and access to China‟s interior, 
strategic location close to the mouth of the Yangzi, and a potential location for imports and 
exports from all over the Yangzi River. 
17
 
Balfour and the British consul designated the Settlement to be near the point where the 
Wusong River met the Huangpu River. The designated area would be about three-quarters of a 
mile north of the Chinese city. The site would be connected to the bank of the Huangpu to the 
east, and bounded near the Wusong River, called “Suzhou Creek” by the British to the north, 
with an adjacent plot known as Lijiachang between the Settlement and the creek. The boundary 
to the south covered the area to Yangjing bang, near the city wall. The western boundary was 
moved to a ditch known as “Defense Creek”. The area between Suzhou Creek and Huangpu 
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Prior to the British arrival, the physical space of Shanghai, excluding rural counties had 
been quite small. The total surface area was about 31.8 square miles (82.4 square km), with the 
main part of the city covering only 13 square miles (33 square km). The British Settlement had 
covered much of the core of the city with an area of about 470 acres (0.7 square miles). 
19
 While 
Shanghai County could be considered a fairly populous area with a population of around 540,000 
by the mid 19
th
 century, about half of the population lived in villages and small towns outside of 
Shanghai‟s county wall. In the area that the British chose for their settlement in the northern 
suburbs of the town, only around five hundred inhabitants live there. 
20
 Shanghai in the 1840s 
was not considered large in geographic size or in population density. The British realized that 
there would be plenty of room to expand, and many more people could be accommodated. The 
strategically desired location in this fertile area of the Yangzi Delta region would be crucial for 
potential development and expansion.  
After the settlement territory had been identified, the next stage would be to encourage 
more settlers to come. The Shanghai Land Regulations, signed on July 11, 1845 officially 
legalized the British controlled International Settlement in their designated area. Afterwards, lots 
were measured and roads were marked out for British merchants to purchase. Individual 
merchants who wished to acquire land for themselves in the settlement had to make an 
application to the British consul, which then consulted with the individual. The individual had to 
explain to the consul what the purpose and use of their acquired land would be, and once 
approved, the merchant would put down cash a deposit and pay rent, or land tax for the lease. 
Merchants were allowed to build residence homes, storage facilities, churches, cemeteries, 
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hospitals, schools, shops, and charity houses on their acquired land as long as they agreed not to 
destroy any Chinese graves in the area. 
21
 
While Shanghai had been located in a desirable area, the British quickly found the local 
environment to be unsuitable for their standard of living. Europeans had been very concerned 
with the natural and physical landscape of the city, which had contained diseases, difference in 
climates, and lacked clean sanitation. According to Karrie MacPherson, to Westerners who 
arrived in the mid 19
th
 century, Shanghai was seen as “a wilderness of marshes”. The lack of a 
modern public health system and medical infrastructure had been a major British concern that 
they believed would discourage British merchants from settling in Shanghai. 
22
 The British were 
determined to use their up-to-date scientific and medical knowledge to build the necessary 
medical and sanitary infrastructure, and hospital facilities to control epidemic diseases. Their 
goal was to turn Shanghai into “the largest and most cosmopolitan city in the East”. 
23
  
The Shanghai Municipal Council was formed in July 1854 as the governing body that set 
forth laws and regulations for the International Settlement. British authorities faced tremendous 
challenges in their attempt to “modernize” their new concession. The first major task was to 
secure fresh water supply for pure drinking water. The waterworks project took ten years and 
required the assistance of experienced British civil and hydraulic engineers. Cholera had been a 
major health concern. The Municipal Council ordered the implementation of preventive 
medicine and institutionalized health care. British trained physicians were brought in to advise 
the Municipal Council on how to tackle these urgent and immediate health and sanitation issues. 
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Once cholera was under control, measures were taken to relocate slaughter houses, to abolish 
dirty unsanitary butchers‟ shops from operating, and later the Municipal Council prohibited the 
sale of uninspected milk and dairy products. The British focused their attention to the creation 
and functions of Shanghai‟s hospitals. In 1844, the London Mission Hospital, known as the 
“Chinese Hospital” began operation as the first foreign hospital in Shanghai. British practicing 
physicians arrived to train new doctors and nurses, including many Chinese to treat patients with 
Western medicine. Other hospitals and clinics sprang up in the settlement, and the Shanghai 
General Hospital, which had been a charity hospital for Europeans only, was eventually 
converted into a semi-public hospital that treated all patients: European and Chinese. 
24
 The 
British had to learn about the specific details and nature of Shanghai‟s geographic environment 
and local health care before being able to treat and control these diseases. The lack of clean 
sanitation had been a primary reason for the spread of diseases before. While British physicians 
constructed European style hospitals and treated patients with Western medicine, they had to 
take into account local knowledge, or what James Scott called metis 
25
 to successfully implement 
their health care system. Chinese physicians and nurses trained in these hospitals during the mid-
late 19
th
 century were among the first group of Chinese to be exposed to Western medicine, and 
their knowledge of their local surroundings assisted British physicians in being able to diagnose, 
treat, and heal patients. Chinese physicians and nurses were able to give feedback on how their 
Chinese patients responded to certain types of Western medicine in order to better diagnose 
various types of sickness and ailments. 
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The British were not the only foreigners to inhabit the settlement. Foreign citizens from 
other countries, such as the French and the Americans began arriving in search for commercial 
opportunities in Shanghai. These foreign nationals were not subjected to the authority of the 
British consul. As more Americans landed in Shanghai, a new site was selected for the U.S. 
consulate in 1847 on the other side of Suzhou Creek, outside of the British settlement. This new 
area, called Hongkou, would be known as the American Settlement. Nevertheless, many 
Americans continued to acquire land and build houses and godowns in the British Settlement. In 
1854, as the international population grew more diverse in nationalities, a new code of 
regulations was approved to create the Shanghai municipality that would be split up into the 
British, American, and French territories. 
26
 The Westerners controlled a total of 3,806 Chinese 
mu (~2.5373 square km or 627. 018 acres). The French Concession was included in the total area 
of the municipality but governance was administered separately. The boundaries of the 
International Settlement and the French Concession extended from Suzhou Creek in the north to 
the moat around the Chinese city in the south, and from the eastern boundary at the Huangpu 
River to the western boundary at Huchengpang creek. 
27
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Figure 2.1: Map of British Settlement (1854) 
This was the original boundaries between the British Settlement and the Native City. The borders 
of the International Settlement were Suzhou Creek to the east and Huangpu River to the south.  
Source: The North China Daily News, April 4, 1864. 
 
In 1852, ten years after the British first arrived in Shanghai; there were a total of about 
500 foreigners in the settlement. Despite being only a tiny percentage of the city‟s total 
population, foreigners congregated in the settlement area. In this concession zone, foreigners 
were beginning to replace local Chinese residents. 
28
 Henry Shearman, a Briton living in 
Shanghai felt a weekly newspaper that could provide news, advertisements, and ways for other 
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foreigners to exchange information would be necessary. On August 3, 1850, the first issue of the 
weekly newspaper The North China Herald was printed and distributed to foreigners in the 
settlement. With the expansion of commercial activities on Shanghai‟s coast, the newspaper 
began to publish a supplement entitled Daily Shipping News in 1856. This supplement edition 
provided foreign residents with information on when the next ship would arrive in Shanghai, 
when other foreign settlers would arrive, and if any resident decided Shanghai was not the place 
for them to stay, when the next ship back to Britain would be. As the newspaper began to 
become lengthier and covered more news, the name was changed to The North China Daily 
News on July 1, 1864. This name change resulted from the editors‟ viewpoint that it should 
combine the first two title words of the weekly Herald and the first and last title worlds of the 
Daily Shipping and Commercial News supplement. Published by the same company, the North 
China Daily News began to enjoy much more popularity and readership than its previous weekly 
newspaper The North China Herald. From July 1, 1864 to its last edition on March 31, 1951, 
nearly two years after the People‟s Republic of China was founded, the North China Daily News 
was the preeminent English speaking newspaper in China. No other foreign language newspaper 
had as long of a publishing history, which spanned three periods of political change in modern 
China: the Manchu Qing dynasty, the Guomingdang Republican period, and the People‟s 
Republic. The North China Daily News covered the lifestyles of foreigners in Shanghai and the 
internal political development of China through weekly updates on events, activities, and 
breaking news that occurred there. 
29
 
The availability and sale of land to individuals or families looking for a house had been 
frequently posted in the North China Daily News. As more British settlers moved into the 
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settlement, the newspaper provided information on where they could acquire land and build 
homes, as well as lease homes for those intended for a short-term stay in Shanghai. In the July 7, 
1866 edition, a column titled “Houses and Land” and “Land for Sale” described available 
options for the newly arrived. 
The listings under “Houses and Land”  included:  
“To Be Let: Two Chambers in Yuen Ming Yuen Road. Apply to J.R. Eames, dated 
Shanghai, June 30, 1866.”  
 
“To Let-The Dwelling House and Godown in Peking Road, adjoining “Washing” 
compound on the East, lately in the occupation of E.A. Reynolds, Esq. A large double-
storied Godown with Chinese dwelling houses in front on Keangsoo Road, in the rear of 
“Washing”. Apply to R. Frances, Shanghai, Jan. 17, 1866.” 
 
“To Let-The premises in Szechuan Road now in the occupation of Messrs Dow and Co. 
Apply to Smith Kennedy Co. Shanghai, June 2, 1866.” 
 
“To Be Let or Sold- The house and business premises of present occupied by 
Undersigned. Possession can be given on December 1. Apply to Balance & Hallam, 
October 18, 1865.” 
 
Under “Land for Sale”, listings included: 
“By order of the Trustees of Lindsay & Co‟s Estate: Valuable building land, situated in 
the most central part of the English Settlement. To be sold in lots to suit purchases, all 
that large compound on which Quong-Loong Hong stands. Further particulars may be 
obtained. The Trustees of Lindsay & Co.‟s Estate at Quong Loong Hong. Shanghai, May 
16, 1866.” 
 
“Dwelling house with all necessary offices and servants‟ rooms, stabling, with or without 
godown, in the most central part of English settlement. For particulars, apply to The 
trustees of Lindsay & Co.‟s Estate at Quong Loong Hong. Shanghai, April 25, 1866.” 
 
“To be let-with immediate possession: A large office, a tea or silk room, two 
compradore‟s rooms, and a treasury, situated in the Hong Kong Road, in front of the 
premises of the occupation of I. Hancock, Esq. For further particulars apply to Cowie & 
Co., Shanghai, May 26, 1866.” 
 
“To be let-with immediate possession: The dwelling house and premises lately in the 
occupation of Messrs, Oxford & Co. On the ground floor, are large offices and a godown, 
on the upper floor, a drawing room, dining room, silk room, and six bedrooms, servants‟ 
office at the rear. For further particulars, apply to Cowie & Co. Shanghai, May 28, 1866.” 
30
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“To Let: From October 1
st
. The dwelling house known as Bird‟s Bungalow, situated on 
the North side of the Bubbling Well Road, opposite Mr. Myburgh‟s. Apply to Hower, 
Hanbury & Co. Shanghai, August 30, 1867.” 
 
“For Sale: All the desirable property situated in the Foochow Road, immediately opposite 
the premises in our own occupation, consisting of eight mows of land or thereabouts 
(purchasing about 400 feet frontage to the Foochow Road and 150 feet to the Shantung 
Road and the following buildings there on. 1: A large foreign built dwelling house, facing 
south, with a large garden in front, and containing four rooms on the ground floor and 
four on the upper floor. 2: A block of 26 native buildings producing at present a monthly 
rental of 78 pounds. For further particulars, apply to Cowie & Co. 27 Foochow Road. 
Shanghai, August 14, 1867.” 
 
“To Be Let: The premises lately in the occupation of Messr, Glover & Co. situated in 
Macao Road, consisting of dwelling house and offices, with 4 rooms on the ground floor, 
3 rooms, pantry, and compradore‟s office on the first floor. One two storied godown and 




This section in the newspaper was listed in the advertisement section. By facilitating 
information on where open spaces were, where housing could be found, and whether the land 
could be sold or leased, the North China Daily News helped newly arrived British settlers feel 
more comfortable and settled in their transition to Shanghai. Gradually real estate agents or firms 
began to take a more active role in advertising available real estate property as they saw a 
demand for housing from new settlers and an opportunity to make profits. Descriptions of houses 
and land available to be sold or leased became longer and more detailed.  
Besides land and houses, other information such as the opening of new firms and stores 
were also published in the weekly paper. The North China Daily News became a public forum 
where information could be exchanged.  
“E. Aurbach & Co: Ship chandlers, storekeepers and auctioneers. E. Aurbach & Co. beg 
to inform masters of vessels and others visiting that they have establishment a branch of 
their business at that port, and trust by attention and a well assorted stock to merit their 
support. Dec. 1, 1865.” 
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“The Shanghai Gas Company: Tenders are invited for loans for one or more years, on the 
security of the land, plant, and buildings belonging to the company. Cowie & Co. Agents 




“Benson‟s Watches: Clocks, jewelry, silver, and electro plate. Wholesale and retail. 
Watches: adapted for every class, climate, and country.  Clocks: drawing, dining, and 
bedroom.” 
 
“Wellington Knife Polish: John Oakey & Sons. Manufacturers of emery, black bond, 
cabinet glass pape, emery and glass cloth. For cleaning and polishing silver, electro plate, 




“China Fire Insurance Company. Agencies are established in the several ports in China 
and Japan. All communications on the business of the company to be directed to the 
secretary. Office hours, 10 to 4 o‟clock. F.E. Gwyn, Secretary. Shanghai, June 18, 1866.” 
 
“Notice: Liverpool, London and Globe Fire Insurance Company. The undersigned are 
authorized to grant policies against fire on buildings and their contents in this port. Dow 




The Shanghai Land Regulations of 1845 stated that Chinese residents could not rent 
property from foreign controlled territories. Gradually, Chinese residents were evacuated and the 
foreign controlled areas were to be exclusively reserved for foreigners. 
35
 This policy of 
segregation was geared toward preventing racial or ethnic riots between foreigners and Chinese 
due to their differences in language, culture, and ways of life, as well as to prevent foreigners 
from moving deeper into Chinese territory. The Chinese believed that if foreigners were happy 
and content living where they were in their concession settlement, they would not want to 
expand further and penetrate deeper into the Chinese interior.  
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Segregation between Chinese and foreigners lasted from 1845 to 1853. The British 
population was still relatively small. However, a riot turned uprising by a Fujian-based secret 
society called the Small Swords attacked neighboring counties near Shanghai. The ensuing 
seventeen month war between the rebels and the Qing officials resulted in tens of thousands of 
rural villagers who fled to Shanghai in search of safety. Many of these refugees sought protection 
and shelter in the International Settlement where they felt they would be safe. Suddenly, the 
previously decreed segregation policy could not resist such a large refugee population. Within 
two years, the population of the settlement soared from around 500 foreigners in 1853 to more 
than 20,000 in 1855.  
The foreigners were divided on their opinions of the Chinese migrants. Foreign 
merchants saw the arrival of the Chinese as an opportunity to make money. Refugees needed 
places to stay and there were plenty of open space available. Many of the refugees that fled had 
been wealthy merchants or landlords themselves. Other Westerners were quite concerned and 
worried that an influx of Chinese inhabitants would threaten their ways of life. 
36
 Eventually 
British consul Sir Rutherford Alcock decided in July 1854 to appease the merchants and allowed 
Chinese inhabitants to reside in the settlement. Evicting and preventing any further Chinese 
migrants into the area would not be possible since the foreigners would always be greatly 
outnumbered. Western businessmen had sensed the opportunity to capitalize on such a large and 
desperate Chinese migrant population. 
37
 The settlement was very sparsely populated and had 
plenty of room to grow. This decision by Alcock would have a profound impact on the future of 
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Shanghai, and set the course for the end of forced segregation between foreigners and Chinese, 
and the beginning of the mixed residence that characterized Shanghai for the next century.  
Given the large influx of population that flocked to the settlement, the British consulate 
decided that order needed to be restored, and that the settlement needed to expand and grow. A 
police department with thirty employees was established to maintain law and order, and remove 
any criminals from the area. To prevent the settlement from gaining a bad image, the British 
authority quickly removed questionable Chinese houses, brothels, opium dens, and fire hazards. 
City planners decided to build the necessary infrastructure to better accommodate the growing 
population. Rectilinear design of the streets and its architectonic design effectively separated 
private residences and public spaces.  
“The Bund”, an area along the edge of the Huangpu River and the streets where 
commercial buildings were located became public spaces, open for anyone: Westerner or 
Chinese to walk on. The British race course, where horse racing contests could be held and the 
Public Garden were considered public spaces in practice. Commercial buildings, wharves, 
godowns, shipyards, shops, and other working places were private property since these areas 
were owned by private capital, but public access during working hours were allowed. The area 
behind the Bund where private homes and gardens were located became residential areas. 
Churches, cemeteries, and mission buildings were considered sacred spaces, and access was only 
allowed for church or mission members, or families of the deceased buried in the cemeteries. 
The International Settlement became an oasis amidst a Chinese city where European architects 
designed their concession based on the design of European cities: where leisure space was 
separated from commercial space, residential areas separate from industrial areas such as 
43 
 
shipyards and docks. 
38
 Though only a small minority in their own concession territory, 
Europeans could enjoy the layout and surroundings similar to the cities back home; and with 
more commercial and leisure infrastructure in place, Westerners living in Shanghai could live 
more comfortably, and enjoy the lifestyles they had in their home countries.  
The Taiping Rebellion that engulfed China from 1850-1864 brought about tens of 
thousands of more refugees from other provinces fleeing the violence and terror of the civil war 
between Hong Xiuquan‟s Taiping forces and the Qing government. In 1865, after the Taiping 
revolt had been defeated and peace had been restored, the population of the International 
Settlement grew to 92, 884. 
39
 Despite constant new arrivals, the number of foreigners remained 
small compared to the total population. It was estimated that 97 percent of the population was 
Chinese. 
40
  In a population census conducted in 1865, a total of 5, 129 foreign citizens were 
found to have lived in Shanghai during the past year. Of those, 2,297 were considered permanent 
residents in that they had homes there. The others were temporary settlers who stayed in 
Shanghai short-term including many sailors and soldiers. Of the foreigners, there were 3,996 
Britons (77.90% of the foreign population), 407 Americans (7.94%), 240 Germans (4.68%), 131 
Danes (2.55%), 118 Spaniards (2.30%), 38 French (0.74%), and 199 citizens from other 
countries (3.88%). 
41
 It is imaginable to assume that many Chinese residents moved to the 
foreign controlled territories not only for safety and protection, but because the foreign 
settlement had better infrastructure and facilities, and provided a higher standard of living than 
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the Chinese sections of the city. Since the concession was controlled by foreigners, Western laws 
governed the jurisdiction of the area. Chinese citizens living there would be exempt from 
Chinese laws that governed the rest of the city, and would instead follow foreign legal 
institutions.  
The British represented the majority of the foreign residents in the International 
Settlement. Since the British and the Americans spoke the same language: English, 
communication and dialogue between the British and American consulates have been easy. 
Given the small number of Americans, and practical matters such as joint policing, the American 
Settlement was incorporated into the British International Settlement in September 1863. The 
1869 revised Shanghai Land Regulations would serve as the legal document that officially 




The settlement provided an ironic twist: a Western controlled and governed territory in 
the midst of a Chinese city that was overwhelmingly populated by Chinese citizens. Western 
merchants were able to capitalize and make profits over the growing population of Chinese 
residents in search of housing, food, utilities, and transportation. While some Chinese interacted 
with and learned about Western culture and lifestyles from the foreigners, many Chinese had few 
contacts with Westerners. Chinese inhabitants of the settlement lived their lives and raised their 
families just like they had before, and most had seldom if any direct contacts with foreigners.  
 What was the relationship between the Shanghai municipal officials and the foreigners in 
the creation of the concessions? How did the Chinese officials run the Chinese city? The critical 
person that served as the intermediary between the Qing imperial court in Beijing and local 
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Shanghainese residents had been the Shanghai taotai. The taotai ranked below provincial level 
officials, such as governors, or governor-generals. But the taotai was considered to be the most 
important and influential Chinese political figurehead in Shanghai, outside of the foreign 
territories. There had been eighty men who occupied the position of taotai between 1730 and 
1911. The Shanghai taotai‟s roles had been to bridge the gap between central and local political 
interests, and they had often been caught between the forces of “tradition” and “modernization”, 
or between the ideas of foreign commerce and Chinese culture. By conceding territory and 
allowing for Western commerce, Shanghai taotai Gong Mujiu believed that the foreigners would 
be satisfied with their limited space as a treaty port. After all, it was only a small area and only a 
few hundred Europeans lived there. Gong and his succeeding taotais did not feel small foreign 
concession areas could affect the rest of Shanghai. 
43
 However, as more European settlers 
arrived, and the large number of Chinese refugees and migrants into foreign controlled 
territories, the Chinese areas of the city began to lose influence and status.  
 The increasing population growth in the settlement caused the British to build more roads 
and houses to accommodate the rising number of residents. By 1865, twenty six major roads had 
been constructed in the settlement, with thirteen roads going from south to north. These roads 
were Yangzi Road, Yuanming Yuan Road, Sichuan Road, Jiangxi Road, Henan Road, Shandong 
Road, Shanxi Road, Fujian Road, Zhejiang Road, Hubei Road, Guangxi Road, Yunnan Road, 
and Xizhang Road. The other thirteen major roads went from east to west, and were named 
Suzhou Road, Hong Kong Road, Beijing Road, Xiamen Road, Ningbo Road, Tianjin Road, 
Nanjing Road, Qiujiang Road, Hankou Road, Fuzhou Road, Guangdong Road, Wuhu Road, and 
Songjiang Road. These roads were all named after the names of provinces and cities throughout 
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China. In 1864, after the merger of the British and American Settlements, two new roads were 
constructed to link the two zones together. These two new roads: Wusong Road and Bailaohui 
Road allowed transportation to flow to and from the newly merged settlements. 
 In 1854, paved roads covered only about 0.0784 square km or about 14.2% of the total 
area. After heavy investments during the late 1850s and early 1860s, paved roads had covered 
about 23% of the total area, which was much higher than any other Chinese city. 
44
 In the eastern 
section of the International Settlement, the typical road was about 22-30 inches wide, which was 
considerably narrower than the main streets of major European cities. The British faced problems 
from the lack of lighting on the roads and the inability to get ride of wastes or install an efficient 
sewage system. Wider roads, such as North Yunnan Road (1868), Niuzhang Road (1881), Beihai 
Road (1882), and Kunshan Road (1883) were constructed to link existing roads to each other. A 
series of measures were implemented to make the roads more efficient for use. In 1866, British 
civil engineers arrived to install lights on major roads so settlers would not be afraid to go 
outside after dark. Hydraulic engineers began working on installing a city water sewage system. 
By the early 1870s, a sewage system capable of getting ride of wastes was completed. In 1870, a 
decree was issued that newly constructed roads should have a width of at least 40 inches. 
 After the completing of major roads, bridges were built on top of rivers to link the 
settlement together. On November 1872, the construction of a bridge on top of Suzhou Creek 
began. The project was finished in just seven months, and was named “Park Bridge”. In 1875, 
another bridge was built on top of Henan Road, and throughout the 1880s, bridges were 
completed on top of Fujian Road, Zhejiang Road, and Jiangxi Road. The growth of the 
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International Settlement saw the transformation of previously rural land that was very sparsely 
populated into well-designed commercial and residential areas. 
45
 Foreigners, especially the 
British had managed to turn a spartan piece of land within a treaty port into a modern and 
prosperous colonial oasis, where Westerners could begin to enjoy comforts similar to back home. 
It took about fifty years of continuous investments, improvements and upgrades in urban 
infrastructure before Shanghai became one of the leading cities of the East. By 1893, Shanghai‟s 
International Settlement had been transformed into a modern metropolis. Kerrie MacPherson 
attributed Shanghai‟s rise in global status to “improved health and sanitary conditions had 
contributed directly and substantially to a dramatic alteration in the ordering and conduct of 
communal social life”. 
46
 Half a century after Westerners had arrived, they had established a new 
city that catered to their ways of life and satisfied their quality of living. Shanghai had been 
transformed during the late 19
th
 century, and the 20
th
 century would take Shanghai to the 
forefront as the leading place of commerce and trade in Asia.  
The French Concession 
 Unlike the Americans, who willingly incorporated into the British controlled 
International Settlement, the French were absolutely insistent on having their own piece of 
territory as their own concession. There were several major reasons behind this. The French had 
been rivals with the British in the race for overseas colonies. As the British claimed new colonial 
territories throughout the world, and acquired the nickname “the sun never sets on the British 
Empire”, the French competed aggressively but often times France looked at Britain with envy. 
Just like elsewhere in Africa and Asia, the French wanted to prevent the British from having a 
                                                          
45
 Xiong Yuzhi,  Zhou Wu and Er Dongqiang, eds. Shanghai: Yizuo Xiandaihua Doushi De Biannian Shi, (Shanghai: A 
Modern City’s History), Shanghai: Shudian Chubanshe, 2007: p. 181-183. 
46
 MacPherson, Kerrie. A Wilderness of Marshes: The Origins of Public Health in Shanghai, 1843-1893. Hong Kong: 
Oxford University Press, 1987: p. 267. 
48 
 
political monopoly on the colonies. Whenever Britain acquired new colonies, the French quickly 
followed, not wanting to be left behind in this great scramble for colonial territories. In Shanghai, 
the French watched the British seize control of the International Settlement and build their 
community there. France demanded to have their own territory within Shanghai.  
 Beside the colonial rivalry, the French differed from the Americans in that they spoke a 
different language from the British. Since they did not speak English, the French settlers did not 
want to be ruled by “Land Regulations” or other treaty documents written in English. They 
wanted to use French as the official language of governance. The French also differed from the 
British in that France was a predominately Catholic country. The French wanted to build 
Catholic churches, set up Catholic missions and schools in China. Living in the British controlled 
territory would prevent them from speaking their own language and practicing Catholicism. 
47
 
 The French consulate in Shanghai was instituted by M. Charles de Montigny in January 
1848. The newly appointed consul asked the presiding Catholic bishop for a loan of land. After 
the bishop agreed to loan him one of the unoccupied houses on the north-wall site, the French 
consul proclaimed the beginning of the French Concession. The Chinese taotai Gong Mujiu 
believed that any and all foreigners should be treated the same and be governed by the British 
consulate. This greatly angered de Montigny, and after unsuccessfully trying to lease more land 
from the British, he threatened to ask the French government to bring in French gunboats. The 
Chinese authorities eventually gave in to the French demand. 
48
  
 A Chinese official named Lin Gui designated the boundaries of the French concession: 
south of Yangjingbang and north of the moat skirting the city wall, bounded on the east by the 
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Huangpu River and the Chaozhou Huiguan, and the on west by the Guandi Temple and the 
Zhoujia Bridge. On April 6, 1849, the French Concession in Shanghai was officially established. 
Modeling after the British‟s Shanghai Municipal Council, on May 1, 1862, the French Municipal 
Council was created under the authority of the French consul-general as the official governing 
body of the French Concession. 
49
 French expatriates were delighted that they had their own 
territory, and that their concession would not be subjected to the Land Regulations. While 
initially an exclusively French area, the flood of Chinese refugees from the Small Swords 
Rebellion and later the Taiping Rebellion overwhelmed the French. Around 50,000 Chinese 
migrants flocked to the French Concession, just like they had in the International Settlement in 
search for peace and safety. In all, more than 110,000 Chinese migrated to the foreign controlled 
territories at the end of the Taiping revolt in 1865. 
50
 Like the British, the French were living 
among the overwhelmingly Chinese majority in their own concession.  
 To deal with the growing population from both French and Chinese settlers, the French 
needed to construct urban infrastructure to support their concession. Much of the construction in 
the French Concession was centered around the Xuhui district. One major street was named 
Shengmu Road, since the Catholic cathedral was located there. Other French names roads 
included Geluo Road, Luban Road, Mintiniying Road, Aitang Road, Huagenie Road, Baicaini 
Mengmalang Road, Jialei Road, Huacheng Road, Annajin Road, Pingjili Road, Aolihe Road, 
Weiermeng Road, Mengzifu Road, Moliai Road, Lagena Road, etc. The naming of the roads in 
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the French Concession clearly sowed the French Municipal Council‟s colonial attitudes toward 
making sure French citizens feel at home in Shanghai. 
51
 
 Compared to the International Settlement, far fewer French citizens moved to Shanghai 
than the British. There were only a total of about 460 foreigners living in the French Concession, 
out of about 50,000 people total. Foreigners made up less than 1% of the population there. The 
French numbered 259 (56.30% of the foreign population), the Americans 64 (13.91%), the 
Germans 42 (9.13%), British 19 (4.13%), Greeks 16 (3.48%), Portuguese 14 (3.04%), Turks 14 
(3.04%), Dutch 12 (2.61%), Austrian 10 (2.17%), and ten others (2.17%). 
52
 Just as they had in 
the International Settlement, most Chinese residents had very few if any contact with foreigners 
in the French Concession. The Chinese migrants were attracted to the French Concession not 
only for safety and protection from the Chinese civil war that ravaged much of the country 
during the mid 19
th
 century, but also because the French Concession had better infrastructure and 
appeared wealthier and better maintained than the Chinese parts of the city. 
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Figure 2.2: Boundaries between the International Settlement, French Concession and Chinese 
City (1918) 
This map showed that the International Settlement and French Concession had far more roads 
than the Chinese city, even though the foreign territories only comprised a small portion of the 
entire city. 
Source: MacPherson, Kerrie. A Wilderness of Marshes: The Origins of Public Health in 
Shanghai, 1843-1943. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002: p.ii-iii. 
 
The Chinese City 
 The Chinese city remained fairly static throughout the second half of the 19
th
 century. 
The only major substantial change to the city‟s layout was the location of the north gate being 
shifted in order to link up the main north-south road, known as Henan Road that crossed from the 
French Concession to the International Settlement. In this reconfiguration, the plan of the 
Chinese city slightly shifted to conform to the European patterns of linear design of major 
52 
 
streets. At the center of the Chinese city remained its government buildings. The magistrate‟s 
yamen was rebuilt after the Small Swords Rebellion, but the sub-prefecture‟s offices remained at 
their original locations inside the walled city. The City Temple remained a major site of 
importance, where the magistrate and other city officials continued to pay respects to each year. 
Confucian and Buddhist temples and shrines were common inside and outside of the walled city. 
In the late 19
th
 century, commercial, handicraft manufacturing, and proto-industrial activities 
moved away to the suburbs. 
 Shanghai‟s population census showed that in 1852, there was a total population of 544, 
413 living in both the Chinese city and the concessions. All but a few hundred foreign residents 
were Chinese. By 1865, the population of Shanghai swelled to 691,919, largely due to Chinese 
migrants and refugees from the Small Swords Rebellion and the Taiping Rebellion. The 
population of Shanghai increased 27.10% in thirteen years. 
53
 Shanghai‟s population breakdown 










City & Suburbs  (%) 
691, 919 92,884      (13.42%) ~50,000      (7.23%) 549,035  (79.35%) 
 
 
 Almost 80% of the population still lived in the Chinese city and suburbs. While the 
International Settlement and French Concession made up slightly more than 20% of the 
population of Shanghai, 97% of the International Settlement and 99% of the French Concession 
were Chinese residents. Foreigners from all nationalities comprised less than 1% of the total 
population of Shanghai in the late 19
th
 century. 
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 The major distinction in urban planning in and around the Chinese city was between the 
city proper and the suburbs, which was separated by the city walls. The city‟s commercial 
activities mostly took place in the suburbs; where workshops, handicraft factories, boat yards and 
godowns operated. Residential areas were mixed; while many inhabitants who owned their own 
homes lived in the city proper, most rental housing was located in the suburbs to accommodate 
migrants and refugees from the Chinese countryside. There were significant differences in the 
public funding of the Chinese city and the foreign controlled territories. The Europeans began to 
tax their citizens on the basis of spatial use in the concessions. The Chinese continued to tax on 




In terms of urban infrastructure, the Chinese city developed much later than the 
International Settlement and French Concession. In the foreign controlled territories, efforts to 
widen roads, install sewers, gas lines, and street lighting for electrification in order to reproduce 
the facilities of European cities began immediately. Funding came from tax revenues. 
55
 In the 
Chinese city lights were not installed on the main streets until 1873, and much of the city 
remained in darkness at night. During the late 1880s, Chinese authorities began to focus their 
development on the districts of Nanshi and Zhabei to prevent more foreign encroachment. Road 
construction followed the trends in the foreign controlled territories about one or two decades 
later. Due to limited funds, the construction of new roads put a lot of constraint on public 
revenue. Since population density was already quite high in Nanshi district, it would be 
impossible to evacuate all the residents and tear up the old roads to build new, wider roads. 
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Much of the new city construction consisted of linking existing roads together, and building 
smaller roads into residential areas in order to improve accessibility for the residents. Despite the 
late start, the Chinese districts of Nanshi and Zhabei learned from the urban planning methods 
and technologies used in the International Settlement and the French Concession. They were able 
to incorporate some of the foreigners‟ strategies to provide better accessibility and reduce 
congestion.  
However, the financial discrepancies between the foreign controlled territories and the 
Chinese city was quite significant. The lack of funding from public revenues prevented the 
newly built roads in the Chinese zones to have the same quality as those built in the International 
Settlement and French Concession. 
56
 The end of the 19
th
 century saw the dramatic 
transformation of the urban landscape of Shanghai in all three locations, as construction of new 
roads, buildings, homes, and other facilities greatly altered the physical makeup of the city. 
Better public transportation, more accessible roads, as well as streets and bridges that could link 
major roads to each other helped accommodate the growing population and helped facilitate the 




 At the beginning of the 20
th
 century, the International Settlement had witnessed rapid 
growth in population and size. The new changes to the Shanghai Land Regulations gave the 
settlement new territories to expand. The total size of the settlement grew to 33, 503 mu 
(~22.335 square km or 5,519.439 acres). The settlement was now more than 8.8 times larger than 
it was in 1854! In a population survey conducted in May 1900, the International Settlement had a 
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total of 407,050 people, with 61,774 foreigners constituting 15.18% and 345,276 Chinese 
making up 84.82% of the population. 
57
 
 The arrival of the 20
th
 century saw the expansion in population size and physical space of 
the foreign territories. Newspaper ads in the North China Daily began to display more 
information beyond buying or renting homes, or the services of banking and insurance firms. 
Advertisements toward providing services that catered to a more prosperous and even luxurious 
lifestyle became more common. Non-British companies began to place ads in the English 
speaking North China Daily News, since circulation of the newspaper extended to the entire 
Western ex-patriot community. 
 “Hatch, Mansfield & Co., Ld. CHAMPAGNE: De Cremensay Et Cie. Monopoly for 
 China and Hong Kong.  
 Grand Vin  Vintage: 1898  Per doses bottles: $42  Per 2 doses & bottles: $44 
 Private Cuvee Vintage: 1898  Per doses Bottles: $31 Per 2 doses & bottles: $33 
 These two wines were brought directly from the producers in the Champagne Country.  
 After repeated tastings, the De Cremenay has been classed with the Extra Quality of the 
 Leading brands, quoted in China at $55 per doz, and the Veuve Victoire with the First 
 Quality of the same brands, quoted in China at $42 per doz. Ilbert & Co., Agents, 
 Shanghai, July 13, 1903. 
 
 “Open for Business: The New German Butchery & Sausage Factory. 1106 Broadway,  
 Opposite Grand Oriental Hotel. Wilhelm Futterer, Proprietor. 
 Rolled Boiled Ham, especially prepared for this climate. 
 Smoked Ham, best quality. Bacon, only from young pigs, unsurpassed. 
 Lard, guaranteed doubled refined and absolutely pure. 
 Corned and Smoked Ox Tongues. Minced and Corned Pork and Beef. 
 Sausages, Liver, Ham, Pork, Cervelas, Vestphalish, Bologna, Tongue, Black Pudding,  
 Vienna and Frankford Assorted Pastry. Delivery to any address free of charge. 
 Shanghai, October 26, 1903.” 
 
 “Just Unpacked, A lot of Axminsler and Brussels Carpets, Rugs, Artserges, Chinella and   
 Tapestry Curtains, Stoves, etc. Vanel & Co.”  
 
 “K.A.J. Choterwall & Co. 1105 Broadway. Dealers in Silk, Embroidered Dresses,  
 Sandalwood Silk, Embroidered Fans, and Coloured and White, Indian, Muslim Silk  
 Velvet, Embroidered Table Covers, Borders, Cushions and Doyly‟s. Best Rampooro,  
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 Chadars and Kashmir Shawls, and a fresh lot of Ponjee Silk and Swatow drawn work. 





 “Bosnian Regie Cigarettes. Pur Turkish Tobacco. Under control of the Austro-Hungarian 
 Government. Fully equal to the best Egyptian Brands! A first rate at very modest cost! 
 “Obmanli” (large size)…Price: $2.00 per tin of 100. “Flor” (small size)…Price: $1.50 per  
 tin of 100. Fresh supplies always kept in Stock. Hugo Schwer & Co, Ld., Sole Agents,  
 9A Hankow Road.” 
 
 “Hall, Holtz Limited, Tailoring Department. Just to hand. Summer suitings; flannels in all  
 shades; blue, black and greys coatings for summer wear. Latest designs in trouserings,  




 As the urban infrastructure in the settlement became more modernized, and the expat 
community became wealthier, more expensive and upscale goods and services were found in the 
advertisements of The North China Daily News. New trendy shops opened up as businessmen 
and merchants seized the opportunity to satisfy the demands of a growing and more prosperous 
society. Westerners living in Shanghai had found that they could live in the East and still enjoy 
many of the benefits and lifestyles that had been available back home. For the adventurous 
foreigners, Shanghai seemed like a fun and happening place to be, either for short-term or long-
term stay.  
In 1911, China‟s last imperial dynasty: the Qing fell from power. The Guomingdang 
Party, under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen established a Republican government in China that 
would last for the next thirty eight years. During the last decades of the Qing, China had been 
plagued by internal strife, civil war, and famine. Compared to the rest of China, Shanghai had 
been relatively stable and well-off, even in the Chinese parts of the city. The attractiveness of 
Shanghai became more apparent when hundreds of thousands of rural peasants migrated to the 
outskirts of Shanghai fleeing famine, drought, or political turmoil in their home villages. Many 
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of these rural peasants come from neighboring Jiangsu province. The peasants from the northern 
part of Jiangsu came to be known as the “Subei” people. They took up work in Shanghai‟s 
lowest paying and dirtiest jobs, and usually lived in the shack slums that made up the vast 
shantytowns in the city‟s exterior. Native Shanghai residents looked down upon “Subei” people, 
and labeled them as inferior for their “inferior culture” and “low intelligence”, as their coarse 
language, poor personal hygiene, and dirty clothing made them stand out. The Subei migrants 
became more prevalent during the 1910s and 1920s as deteriorating conditions in their home 
province, as well as the prospect of earning far more money doing the low-paying, dirty work 
native Shanghai inhabitants did not want to allowed them to send money back home to their 
families in the rural villages. Most Subei migrants did not mind being exploited or doing the 
low-status jobs because any job in the city made far more than a rural peasant could. 
60
 
Shanghai residents, who had been primarily descendants of the wealthier Jiangnan region 
looked down on Subei rural migrants, and considered these outsiders to be inferior. Shanghai 
historian Emily Honig noted that “to the extent that foreigners portrayed all Chinese as 
uncivilized and backward…Jiangnan natives may have more desperately than otherwise needed 
to create “an-other”. 
61
 Native Chinese residents of Shanghai did not object to the arrival of 
masses of rural migrants. These rural migrants could do the cheap labor that the Shanghainese 
did not want to do. But even more than cheap laborers they could exploit, the masses of rural 
migrants allowed native Shanghai residents in the Chinese parts of the city to develop a sense of 
their own “superiority complex”.   
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While Chinese residents had been envy of the Western colonial elites that lived far better 
and enjoyed a much higher standard of living, they had been powerless to prevent Western 
territorial encroachment nor could the Chinese develop comparable economic or financial 
institutions that could match the foreigners‟ wealth. The arrival of rural Chinese migrants 
allowed native Shanghai residents to distinguish themselves from other Chinese. They were 
“superior” to the rural Chinese migrants because they had been born in Shanghai. Through their 
eyes, there were three classes of people in Shanghai: the foreigners at the top who had the 
political power and wealth to rule the foreign concessions; the native Shanghainese who were 
wealthier and more sophisticated than other Chinese living in interior provinces were in the 
middle; and the migrant Chinese, who had brought with them their backward and poor ways of 
life from the rural villages were at the bottom. 
More construction and upgrades in the International Settlement continued into the 20
th
 
century. On May 8, 1913, new road extensions and widening were approved. 
“Arrangements had been concluded with Mr. S.J. Solomon whereby compensation will 
be paid for two pieces of unregistered land north and south of East Hanbury Road, near  
the scheduled junction with the extension of Arthur Road, at the rate of Tls. 6,000 and  
Tls. 5000 per mow (mu)  respectively, plus 10 per cent. 
Kuling Road-The claim of Messrs, Davis & Thomas has been accepted for the surrender  
 of this strip of Lot 99 required for the widening of this road for a the sum of Tls. 396 
 for an area of Mow. 0.066. 
 Shanhaikuan Road-The whole of this land for this extension having been approved.  
 Upon recommendation of the Engineer to make payment of a sum of Tls. 1,440 for, 
 the removal of three groups of houses which at present prevent through access, and to  
 make up and metal the road with a 12 foot strip of maesdam at a cost of Tls. 3,729. 
 Warren Road-It has been decided that the new road connecting the Hungjao and Brenan 
 Roads which had been referred as the Fahua Road shall be renamed Warren Road. With 
 respect to the triangular piece of land at the north end of the road, an offer of sale by the  
 Chinese owner has been accepted at the rate of Tls. 400 per mow or Tls. 2,780 for Mow 
 6.951. This area will be turfed and laid out with paths and shrubberies in a similar manner 
 to Brenan Road. 
 Permanent Paving-With respect to the programme of permanent paving work to be  
 carried out this year for an appropriation of Tls. 35,000 was included in this budget. It 
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has been decided to proceed with the completion of Szechuan (Sichuan) Road south of 
the Maloo. The Engineer reports favourably upon the Lithofalt blocks at the Canton Road 
corner which under heavy traffic have shown no measurable sign of wear during a period 
of twelve months; at the same time certain blocks made locally of which a section adjoins 
the Lithefalt in Szechuan Road appear to be wearing satisfactorily while the laid down 
cost is below that of imported blocks. It has been decided, therefore to extend the strip of 
local blocks to the Foochow (Fuzhou) Road to lay an experimental section of 10,000 cork 
asphalt blocks, and to continue with the Lithofalt paving up to the Nanking (Nanjing) 
Road. 
 
“Public Lighting: Chengtu (Chengdu) Road-Upon the recommendation of the Engineer, 
the lighting of the Chengtu Road in the section south of Weihaiwei Road will be carried 




When decisions were made to rebuild or reconstruct roads and streets, the Shanghai 
Municipal Council paid the owners or firms that had resided on the land. Experienced engineers 
were assigned the tasks of the road extensions and widening. Notifications of decisions to build 
new roads or upgrade existing urban infrastructure were announced in the newspaper. 
“Tenders for Public Works and Other Requirements: Conditions Governing Municipal 
Tenders. 1. The Council reserves to itself the right to accept the whole or part of any  
Tender. 2. The Council does not bind itself to accept the lowest or any tender or to pay 
any expenses which the tenderer may incur in lendering. 3. The contractor, whose tender 
is eventually accepted may be required to give satisfactory security for the performance 
of the contract. 4. The names of tenderers, with prices quoted will be published in the 
Municipal Gazette. 5. A fee may be charged for specification, to be returned upon receipt 
of a bona fide tender. 6. Tenders scaled and labeled on the outside to their contents 
should be forwarded, preferably by chit book or registered letter, to “The Secretary,  





The Municipal Gazette, which covered major news and transactions in the International  
Settlement posted the summary of foreign and Chinese properties and rental fees from 1911 to 
1913: 
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Summary of General Municipal Rate, Foreign, March Quarter 
     
Year 1913 1912 1911 
  No. of Rental (Tis) No. of Rental (Tis) No. of Rental (Tis) 
  House Assessment House Assessment House Assessment 
Central District      683 2,195,509 659 2,280,920 675 2,762,889 
Northern 1,076 884,958 1,080 379,423 1,080 892,157 
Eastern 618 771,568 612 791,780 598 784,294 
Western 836 1,016,916 836 994,752 807 967,304 
Outside Limits 403 261,727 384 241,416 401 264,348 
Total                     3,616 5,130,678 3,601 5,188,291 3,561 5,170,992 
Tax Collected       
Central   58,939   57,286   55,339 
Northern    24,551   23,906   22,387 
Eastern   21,099   20,693   19,438 
Western   26,558   26,304   23,685 
Outside Limits   3,280   3,253   3,124 










Table 2.2 Continued 
Summary of General Municipal Rate, Chinese March Quarter 
 
1913 1912 1911 
  No. of Rental (Tis) No. of Rental (Tis) No. of Rental (Tis) 
  House Assessment House Assessment House Assessment 
Central District      12,115 4,219,166 12,228 4,115,421 12,285 4,199,250 
Northern 16,154 2,183,181 16,023 2,107,822 16,050 2,136,310 
Eastern 13,633 1,005,011 13,409 965,676 13,313 959,656 
Western 10,910 1,100,360 10,691 1,034,777 10,508 1,034,769 
Outside Limited 1,035 86,812 3,566 323,188 4,366 385,266 
Total                     57,463 13,994,072 59,518 13,998,059 60,083 14,134,389 
Tax Collected 
      Central  123,385  118,836  112,270 
Northern    63,151   59,842   56,330 
Eastern   28,077   26,442   24,900 
Western   31,556   29,540   26,111 
Outside Limits   1,245   1,973   5,329 




 In British controlled International Settlement, most of the houses were rented out or 
leased to Chinese residents. Comparing the rental fees received for the total number of houses 
rented out, the foreigners lived in much more expensive homes than the Chinese. However, due 
to the overwhelming majority of the settlement‟s population being local Chinese, much more 
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rental fees were collected from the Chinese residents than from foreigners. The Shanghai 
Municipal Council did not object to leasing or renting land to the Chinese, as long as the Chinese 
could afford the payments. Foreign real estate developers and businessmen were delighted to be 
able to profit from Chinese renters, many of whom were landlords in their rural villages and had 
brought money with them when they moved to Shanghai.  
 Westerners in the settlement began to advertise other previously considered “Western” 
items to Chinese clients and customers, as they sensed the small but increasingly prosperous 
Chinese population. The North China Daily News began to circulate among Chinese readers, 
some of whom wanted to learn English. This provided the English newspaper with a new 
population of subscribers. 
“Weihaiwei School: An English School in British Territory. Preparation by experienced 
and qualified teachers for schools in England, or for commercial life in the East. School 
house with Recreations: Sea bathing, boating, cricket, football, etc.  




 English language schools for Chinese children became more popular, as the British 
wanted to use education as a venue to instill Western language and culture in Chinese youths 
from elite or wealthy families. Many well-to-do Chinese families eagerly sent their children to 
foreign owned English language schools because the facilities and quality of education was 
much better than local schools. St. John‟s University (renamed 1905), originally founded by the 
Anglican missionaries in 1879 in Suzhou Creek as St. John‟s College became the leading 
university in Shanghai. The language of instruction was in English, and St. John‟s was 
considered to be the most prestigious and elite university in China. Many of the leading Chinese 
politicians, businessmen, and scholars sent their sons to the English-speaking Anglican 
university, which granted European equivalent bachelor‟s degrees. Given the language 
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instruction and academic rigor of the university, many English language preparatory schools 
such as “Weihaiwei School” was set up to prepare the sons of Shanghai‟s Chinese elites for 
admission to St. John‟s University, and afterwards graduate or professional school in Britain or 
the United States. 
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 By the 1910s, the North China Daily targeted their advertisements for expensive and 
luxury entertainment to foreigners and Chinese alike in the settlement. Examples included: 
 “Shakespeare Recitals-Marshall Darrach in Palace Hotel at 9:15 o‟clock. Monday June 9: 
“The Comedy of Errors”. Wednesday, June 11: “Midsummer Night‟s Dream”. Friday 
June 13: “Hamlet”. Course tickets (3 recitals)-$5.00. Single tickets (1 recital)-$3.00. 
Booking at Robinson‟s Music Store.” 
 
“Lyceum Theatre Shanghai. Last 2 Nights Only. To-Night! To-Night! The New 
Bandman Opera Co. Friday June 6-Important Revival with New Scenery. Costumes and 
Effects of Mr. George Edwards‟ early Success. “The Geisha” from Daly‟s Theatre. 
Saturday June 7, (The Last Night) “The Runaway Girl”.  




House rentals and land leases continued to take up the advertisement sections of the 
North China Daily News, for everyone: 
 “House to Let. Loans of Mortgage of Real Estate. Apply Shanghai Real Estate Agency, 
 No. 1 Sikang Road.” 
  
 “Land for Sale in the Western District. One lot, 11 Mow. One Lot, 4 Mow. 
 Land Wanted Other Districts. Apply Newman & Co., Ltd. 64 Hong Kong Road. 




 The Shanghai Municipal Council approved plans to build new residential buildings to 
accommodate the increasing number of Chinese settlers: 
 “Plans of New Buildings Approved. 
  
Cad lot Road Applicant Description 
7255 Lahore General Conference Corporation 2 houses 
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of Seventh Day Adventists 
7070   2 houses and school 
E of 7070    
2425 Yangtzepoo B. J. Muller Cotton Mill and Latrine 
2645 BubbTing Well Chinese 1 house 
611 Kweichow, Ningpo 
and Yannan 
Chinese 1 house 
633  N. Honan H. Lester 47 houses 
807 Tiendong Probst, Hanbury & Co.,Ld.  11 houses 





 “Plans of New Buildings Approved.” 
  
Card lot Road Applicant Description 
939 Haining Chinese 1 houses 
N of 538 Broadway East Chinese  5 Shed 
No of 917 Carter Chinese 5 houses 
S. of3030 Carter Chinese 3 sheds 
S of 4703 Macao Chinese 13 houses 
N of 1873 Chengtu P. Tilley 6 houses & printing works 






The Shanghai Municipal Council had no qualms about approving new buildings to be 
built for Chinese buyers as long as the Chinese could afford it. The increasing number of 
Chinese in the settlement brought new sources of business and profits for Western businessmen. 
Foreigners‟ general attitudes toward the Chinese who migrated to the International Settlement 
was as long as they could afford to live there, and there were additional opportunities to do 
business with the Chinese, there were no problems with the Chinese living in the foreign 
concession.  
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 Throughout the early 20
th
 century, Shanghai‟s population in all three sections 
(International Settlement, French Concession, and Chinese City) skyrocketed. The population 
table below shows the trajectory of population increases from 1852 to 1931:  
Table 2.3 
 
1852-1931 Shanghai Population Statistics 
Year Chinese City International Settlement French Concession Total City 
1852 544,413       
1855   20,243     
1865   92,884 55,925   
1866 543,110       
1870   76,713     
1876   97,335     
1879     33,660   
1880   110,009     
1885   129,338     
1890   171,950 41,166   
1895   245,679 52,188   
1900   352,050 92,268   
1905   464,213 96,693   
1909 671,866       
1910   501,541 115,946   
1914 1,173.65       
1915   638,920 149,000   
1920   783,146 170,229   
66 
 
  Table 2.3 Continued   
1925   840,226 297,072   
1927 1,503,922       
1928 1,516,090   358,453   
1929 1,620,187       
1930 1,702,130 1,007,868 434,807 3,144,805 
  
54.1% of 
Total  32.05% of Total 13.83% of Total   
1931 1,836,189 1,025,231 456,012 3,317,432 







Shanghai‟s population had increased tenfold from 1852 to 1949. The percentage of the 
city‟s population residing in the Chinese section of the city had gradually dropped to slight over 
half. While the increasing number of foreign settlers contributed slightly to the rise in the 
population of the settlement and concession, the majority of the population increase came from 
rural migrant Chinese. The Chinese migrants often preferred living in the International 
Settlement or the French Concession because of better living conditions, more modern facilities, 
and more job opportunities. 
Table 2.4 
1865-1942 Percentage of Shanghai Residents by Area 
Year Chinese City International Settlement French Concession 
1852-1853 99.91% 0.09%   
1865-1866 78.50% 13.40% 8.10% 
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  Table 2.4 Continued  
1909-1910 52.10% 38.90% 9.00% 
1914-1915 58.50% 34.10% 7.40% 
1925-1927 57.00% 31.80% 11.20% 
1930 53.90% 32.20% 13.90% 
1935 55.10% 31.40% 13.50% 
1936 56.50% 31.00% 12.50% 








Figure 2.3: Central Shanghai (1930) 
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This map showed the enlargement of the International Settlement and French Concession since 
the 19
th
 century.  
Source: Dong, Stella. Shanghai 1842-1949: The Rise and Fall of a Decadent City. New  
York: HarperCollins Publisher, 2000: p.xii-xiii. 
 
Gradually over time, the Chinese city‟s share of the total population of Shanghai began to 
decrease, while the foreign territories‟ share of the population increased. The major reasons were 
the territorial expansions of both the International Settlement and the French Concession, where 
through a series of expansions, the geographic areas of the settlement and the concession became 
much larger than the original boundaries had dictated. Since the British controlled International 
Settlement had developed earlier, and was considered more “international”, there were much 
more people of all nationalities that resided in the settlement than the French Concession. Better 
infrastructure, public transportation access, employment opportunities, as well as entertainment 
and leisure all contributed to the growing share of Shanghai‟s population moving toward the 
foreign controlled territories. During the early 1940s, due to the outbreak of World War II, many 
Chinese fled to the settlement and concession for safety and protection. By that time, the Chinese 
city had less than half of the city‟s total population, with the International Settlement being the 
most populous area. 
 Not all the Westerners who came to Shanghai were wealthy businessmen in search of 
adventures or oversea opportunities for commercial profit. Many Russians who flocked to 
Shanghai worked as prostitutes or beggars. 
73
 There was also a large Jewish contingent who fled 
anti-Semitism in Europe and settled in Shanghai. The Jewish population reached a peak during 
World War II, as tens of thousands of Jews landed in Shanghai fleeing the Nazi terror in 
continental Europe. It was estimated that over 20,000 European Jews from all nationalities lived 
in Shanghai during the late 1930s to the early 1940s. Jewish refugees found Shanghai‟s 
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International Settlement to be a welcoming place because given its status as an “international 
zone”, people from all nationalities were welcome there. No visa or passport was required for 
entry, and the settlement was a mixture of Western and Chinese culture and lifestyles. The 
thriving Jewish community in Shanghai grew prosperous as Jews built their own businesses, 
stores, and shops to cater to their own people. Some successful Jewish merchants such as the 
Sassoons and the Hardoons became the wealthiest families in Shanghai. 
74
 
 Compared to the rest of China, Shanghai provided much higher wages for its workers 
than any other city. Chinese migrants from other provinces were attracted to and sought out 
employment as laborers in Shanghai for the higher wages. 
Table 2.5 
 
Average Wages in Shanghai in 1930 (Chinese Workers) 











Max Min Most Freq. Max Min Most Freq. 
Shanghai 262,894 50 8 15.28 24 7 12.5 
Canton  239,365 30 7.5 10.62     7.5 
Hankow 168,992 41 8         
Wusih  70,685 30 7.77         
Soochow  58,814 35 7         
Shunteh 54,449 18.83 5         
Tsingtao  26,428 24 8         
Wuchang 23,974 30.25 9         
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Table 2.5 
Continued     
Nanking (Capital)  17,877 30 6.5 10.8       
Fushan 17,855 48.12 6.67 12.5     6 
Wutsin 16,219 34 5.5 14 13.97 7.5 11.5 
Hangchow  16,171 38 7.2 13.5       
Foochow  16,032 33 12         
Wuhu  15,835 35.6 4         
Nantung  12,627 35 6         





      
 
 Shanghai had more workers and higher average monthly wages than all other Chinese 
cities. This “city of opportunity” inevitably drew migrants, laborers, rural villagers, landlords, 
and Chinese merchants from all over the country to Shanghai in search of a better life for 
themselves and their families.  
 Shanghai by the early 20
th
 century had been called a city of extreme contrasts. Known 
throughout the world for her opulence and decadence, the city was called “Paris of the East”, 
“Sickman of Asia”, and “Emporium of China”. There were no income taxes, and visitors from all 
over the world came for short-term stay or for long-term permanent residence. All nationalities, 
races, ethnicities, religions, and lifestyles were represented in the city. Shanghai became a safe 
haven for both Chinese migrants fleeing poverty or famine in rural villages and for foreigners 
escaping from political tyranny or unrest in their home countries. After the Bolshevik 
Revolution, tens of thousands of Russians, and later in the 1930s, thousands of Jews found their 
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new home in Shanghai. Economic policies in Shanghai‟s International Settlement and French 
Concession followed a laissez faire system. The Shanghai Municipal Council and the French 
Municipal Council‟s primary responsibilities were to 1) administer justice and protection for all 
citizens living under their territory, 2) maintain a police force, and 3) undertake public works 
projects such as the construction of roads, traffic laws to ensure passenger safety, harbor patrol, 
and dredging the Huangpu River that connected Shanghai to the mouth of the Yangtze River.  
 Under limited government, low taxes, and economic laissez faire policies, Shanghai 
became the most prosperous city in East Asia. The standard of living, including that of Chinese 
residents in the Chinese administered city was by far the highest in China. Private and public 
colleges and universities that served both Westerners and Chinese came into existence during the 
early 20
th
 century. Shanghai became China‟ leading center for higher learning with the 
establishment of both Chinese and foreign educational institutions, including St. John‟s 
University (British Anglican in 1879), Tongji University (German in 1907), National Chiao-tung 
(Jiaotong) University (Chinese government in 1896), and Fudan University (Chinese private in 
1905).  
 Shanghai was a multi-faceted city. With growing prosperity and wealth came crime, 
prostitution, and drugs. Chinese gangsters such as the infamous Green Gang controlled and 
terrorized the Chinese population for extortion, racketeering, and drug dealing. Every socio-
economic group existed in Shanghai, and each had their own ways of life. The “collision point of 
cultures” made possible by the multi-faceted nature of Shanghai‟s governance allowed for 
exchanges of new ideas, cultures, traditions, and lifestyles to take place in this vibrant and 
complex city. 
76
 In Nanjing Road, designated as the major commercial street in the International 
Settlement, a distinctive and modern Shanghai-style commercial culture, known as haipai 
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emerged in the 1930s. More and more wealthy Chinese customers began to frequent Western-
style department stores to shop. The large number of stores had to compete with each other, and 
had to create new marketing tools and creative displays of their goods to attract increasingly 
picky Shanghai shoppers. The British American Tobacco Company only succeeded in tapping 
into Shanghai‟s Chinese customer market by translating English items and slogans into a local 
idiom portraying images from traditional Chinese artwork. 
77
 Shanghai-style came to be known 
as a merger or mixture of Western and Chinese commercial cultures. The most successful and 
profitable companies and stores produced the mingling of Western and Chinese cultures and 
symbols, with Western features in adaptations to Chinese customs. This process was described as 
“dubbing”, where a foreign product is translated into a Chinese saying, or when foreign film is 
translated and shown to Chinese audiences with Chinese subtitles. 
78
 Western businessmen had 
discovered that to be successful in Shanghai‟s market, which had been overwhelmingly Chinese, 
Western products had to be modified or adjusted to fit the Chinese customers‟ preferences and 
tastes. Only by clever marketing that catered to the needs and tastes of the Chinese, could foreign 
products be welcomed and accepted by Chinese customers.  
During the first half of the Guomingdang Party‟s Republican era, provincial and regional 
warlords controlled much of China‟s interior. While the GMD had been established as the 
legitimate government of China, they had limited, if any control over many parts of the country. 
It wasn‟t until 1927, when Chiang Kai-shek took over the leadership of the GMD and defeated 
the regional warlords that the GMD would focus their attention to Shanghai. In July, 1927, 
Shanghai was created as a special municipality, and the Greater Shanghai Project was launched 
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under Mayor Huang Fu. The ten year plan to transform Shanghai ended in 1937 as the full 
fledged Japanese invasion of China derailed any further attempts to rebuild Shanghai.  
 
Figure 2.4: Shanghai (1937) 
The Chinese areas of Nanshi in the south and Zhabei in the north were cut off by the  
French Concession and International Settlement, making transport and travel difficult. 
Source: Wakeman, Frederic. Policing Shanghai: 1927-1937. Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1995: p.4-5. 
 
By November 1937, Japanese forces had occupied the Chinese city of Shanghai. In 
December 1941, Japanese troops occupied the International Settlement, causing many foreigners 
to leave Shanghai. Since China had been a crucial ally of the Allied Forces in fighting the 
Japanese in World War II, the International Settlement was officially abolished by the Britain 
and the United States in January 1943, and control was given back to the Chinese government. 
Japan‟s unconditional surrender and the end of World War II formally restored the settlement 
back to Chinese sovereignty in September 1945. The French Concession was occupied by 
74 
 
Japanese forces in July 1943 until Japan‟s defeat in September 1945. However, the concession 
was not formally restored to China by France until February 1946. After the end of foreign 
occupation, the GMD and the Chinese Communist Party engaged in a bitter civil war for the 
control of all of China. The civil war lasted from 1945-1949, ending with Communist victory in 
1949. Shanghai was “liberated” by the CCP in May 1949, and the new People‟s Republic of 
China was officially formed on October 1, 1949. 
79
 
A critical question that can be asked is how did Shanghai manage to stay in one piece? 
How did such a diverse and divided city, governed under three different jurisdictions and settled 
by such an international population not split up into several different cities? What was it about 
Shanghai‟s collective identity that managed to tie people from different nationalities, ethnicities, 
and cultures together? To understand what held the city together for so long, it would be crucial 
to examine the role of middlemen and social networks that existed in Shanghai. Chinese 
middlemen, who benefitted and profited from serving as a link between the foreigners and the 
Chinese served critical roles through their complex and myriad of connections. These middlemen 
included Chinese government officials, businessmen and merchants, or educated Chinese who 
could speak English or French. They saw the need to help Shanghai as a divided city to function 
as a coherent whole. Through their social networks, both formal and informal, and through their 
contacts with foreigners and Chinese, they managed to bridge political, economic, and social 
boundaries through their networks that bound Shanghai together as one city. 
80
 Undoubtedly, 
many of these middlemen had huge stakes and personal interests to gain through their 
collaboration with both foreigners and Chinese. They saw profits to be made through business 
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deals and transactions, and they saw potential political power and influence. In their roles, they 
served as intermediaries between the foreigners that controlled the settlement and concession, 
and the rest of the Chinese population of the city. 
In the International Settlement and French Concession, the Chinese population remained 
the overwhelming majority despite the increasing arrival of foreign settlers. 
Table 2.6 
1865-1942 International Settlement Population Statistics 
Year Chinese % of Pop. Foreign % of Pop. Total Pop. 
1865 90,587 97.53% 2297 2.47% 92,884 
1870 75,047 97.83% 1,666 2.17% 76,713 
1876 95,662 98.28% 1,673 1.72% 97,335 
1880 107,812 98.00% 2,197 2.00% 110,009 
1885 125,665 97.16% 3,673 2.84% 129,338 
1890 168,129 97.78% 3,821 2.22% 171,950 
1895 240,995 98.09% 4,684 1.91% 245,679 
1900 345,276 98.08% 6,774 1.92% 352,050 
1905 452,716 97.52% 11,497 2.48% 464,213 
1910 488,035 97.30% 13,526 2.70% 501,561 
1915 620,401 97.10% 18,519 2.90% 638,920 
1920 759,839 97.02% 23,307 2.98% 783,146 
1925 810,279 96.44% 29,947 3.56% 840,226 
1930 971,397 96.38% 36,471 3.62% 1,007,868 
1935 1,120,860 96.64% 38,915 3.36% 1,159,775 
1936 1,141,727 96.68% 39,142 3.32% 1,180,969 
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Table 2.6 
Continued   
1937 1,178,880 96.74% 39,750 3.26% 1,218,630 






 The foreign percentage of the population in the settlement, which included all foreign 
nationalities increased very slightly from 1865-1942. At the peak, foreigners made up of less 
than 4% of the total population in the settlement.  
 In 1941, the Shanghai Municipal Council‟s Commissioner of Public Health released the 
population census for the entire foreign population of Shanghai, categorized by nationality and 
listed by their home location. 
Table 2.7 
Foreign population of Shanghai-1940 
Country International Settlement French Concession Total 
Belgium  17 90 107 
Brazil    6 6 
Chile    4 4 
Cuba    4 4 
Estonia  60 50 110 
Finland  7 13 20 
Greece  150 150 300 
Hungary  75 50 125 
Iran  30 44 74 
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 Table 2.7 Continued   
Italy  275 310 585 
Japan 29,730 1,030 30,760 
Jewish Refugees 13,500 2,100 15,600 
Mexico    17 17 
Norway  135 85 220 
Netherlands  91 115 206 
Poland  500 250 750 
Russia  5,000 12,881 17,881 
Sweden  80 35 115 
Switzerland  108 154 262 
Latvia  100 100 200 
Spain  117 187 304 
Guatemala    4 4 
Great Britain  5,645 4,733 10,378 
Portugal  786 2,381 3,167 
Denmark  200 200 400 
France    2,513 2,513 
Germany  1,319 698 2,017 
USA  1,445 1,445 2,890 
USSR  600 1,400 2,000 
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 According to this population census, almost two thirds of the foreign population resided 
in the International Settlement, with the remaining third in the French Concession. What is ironic 
is that in the International Settlement, the largest group of foreigners was not the British, but the 
Japanese by 1940. Japan had begun a series of invasions against China starting in 1931, with the 
takeover of Manchuria. The Japanese had bombed the Chinese districts of Zhabei and Jiangwan 
on January 28, 1932. By 1937, the entire Chinese city of Shanghai had been under Japanese 
control. The international settlement would be invaded in 1941, and the presence of Japanese 
military personnel in the city had persuaded many foreigners, including the British to abandon 
and evacuate from Shanghai. In the French Concession, where the Japanese would not invade 
until 1943, the Russians constituted the largest group of foreigners. While technically under 
French control, there were relatively few French citizens in Shanghai. Many of the Russians had 
been refugees fleeing the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, or Stalin‟s purges during the 1930s. 
They had found a safe haven in the French Concession, where many of the Russian refugees 
were considered to be quite poor and worked at lower-status jobs alongside the Chinese. 
Table 2.8 
1865-1942 French Concession Population Statistics 
Year Chinese % of Pop. Foreign % of Pop. Total Pop. 
1865 55,465 99.18% 460 0.82% 55,925 
1879 33,353 99.09% 307 0.91% 33,660 
1890 40,722 98.92% 444 1.08% 41,166 
1895 51,758 99.18% 430 0.82% 52,188 
1900 91,646 99.33% 622 0.67% 92,268 
1905 96,132 99.14% 831 0.86% 96,963 
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Table 2.8 
Continued   
1910 114,470 98.73% 1,476 1.27% 115,946 
1915 146,595 98.39% 2,405 1.61% 149,000 
1920 166,667 97.91% 3,562 2.09% 170,229 
1925 289,261 97.37% 7,811 2.63% 297,072 
1928 348,076 97.11% 10,377 2.89% 358,453 
1930 421,885 97.03% 12,922 2.97% 434,807 
1931 440,866 96.68% 15,146 3.32% 456,012 
1932 462,342 96.61% 16,210 3.39% 478,552 
1933 478,755 96.42% 17,781 3.58% 496,536 
1934 479,294 96.21% 18,899 3.79% 498,193 
1936 454,231 95.10% 23,398 4.90% 477,629 






 Just like the International Settlement, the percentage of the foreign population in the 
French Concession never surpassed 5% at its peak. The French Concession was smaller in area 
and developed a bit later than the International Settlement. Most of the migrants to the French 
Concession occurred during the first half of the 20
th
 century. The sudden jump in the number of 
Chinese inhabitants after the Japanese invasion of Shanghai suggested that because the Chinese 
city had already been taken over, many Chinese residents fled to the French Concession for 
safety.  
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 In the latest population census based on nationality in the French Concession in 1936, the 
French comprised only a minority of the foreigners‟ population. 
Table 2.9 
1936 French Concession Foreigners Statistics 
Nationality by 





Total 23,398   Italy 199 0.9% 
Great Britain 2,648 11.3% Japan 437 1.9% 
France 2,342 10.0% Norway 71 0.3% 
USA 1,791 7.7% Poland 324 1.4% 
Germany 821 3.5% Portugal 500 2.1% 
Austria 65 0.3% Romania 49 0.2% 
Belgium 105 0.4% Russia 11,828 50.6% 
Denmark 144 0.6% Sweden 49 0.2% 
Spain 142 0.6% Switzerland 119 0.5% 
Greece 104 0.4% Annam (Vietnam) 738 3.2% 







 The population census in the French Concession showed that slightly over half of the 
foreign populations are Russians, and that the French only made up of 10% of the foreign 
populations within their own jurisdiction. Russian immigrants found the French Concession to be 
much more hospitable, and they opened up many Russian businesses along Avenue Joffre: the 
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major commercial road in the French Concession. 
85
  The French were focusing more of their 
colonial attention in Asia to the Southeast Asia region of Indo-china. Many more French settlers 




 The questions of who really controlled Shanghai or to whom did Shanghai belong to have 
been critical issues in modern Chinese urban history. Shanghai can be seen as a semi-colony, 
where two sections of the city were conceded to foreigners as concession territories. Yet the 
number of foreigners from all nationalities living in Shanghai remained very small, even in the 
concessions. Within the foreign population, the British in the International Settlement and the 
French in their own concession represented a small percentage of the foreigners there. The 
largest foreign populations in Shanghai were not the British or the French, but the Japanese and 
Russians. In fact, foreign businessmen welcomed Chinese customers as they sensed new 
opportunities for business and profits. To become successful in Shanghai, foreign brands had to 
be modified or adapted to fit the local Chinese cultural customs and tastes.  
 While many foreigners who came to Shanghai were wealthy merchants, or had colonial 
political ambitions, many more were poor refugees themselves, fleeing from violence and 
political turmoil in their own countries. European Jews and Russians found Shanghai to be a safe 
haven to restart their lives free from discrimination or political oppression. Shanghai‟s foreign 
environment also allowed a small minority of Chinese elites to become wealthy, educated in 
Western schools, learn to speak foreign languages, and launch their own business, political, or 
academic careers by observing, learning, and following Western models. Shanghai was a melting 
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pot of nationalities, cultures, and ways of life. Most of the Chinese residents in the foreign 
settlement and concessions had little contact with foreigners, and lived their lives just like they 
had before. Most foreigners living in Shanghai were sheltered from the conditions in the Chinese 
city or other parts of China. By the early 20
th
 century, Shanghai‟s concessions provided much of 
the material comforts and luxury items that had been available in major European cities. The 
Japanese invasion of Shanghai sent a rude awakening to European powers that Japan was a 
powerful and militaristic nation with imperialistic ambitions. The Japanese takeover of the 
foreign controlled territories and the ensuing World War II in the Pacific forever changed the 
Europeans‟ vision of Shanghai as their Chinese colony. China‟s status as an ally of the Allied 
forces convinced the British and the French to return their concession territories back to China. 
The defeat of the GMD by the Chinese Communists resulted in a unified China under the rule of 
the People‟s Republic in 1949. 
 Shanghai from the mid-19
th
 to the mid-20
th
 century belonged to everyone and anyone. 
Every person regardless of national citizenship, religion, language, culture, socioeconomic 
status, or occupation could find a home and a niche somewhere in Shanghai. Shanghai during 
that period of time also belonged to no one. No one had full control of the city, and no single 
government could dictate laws or policies for all of the city‟s population. A divided city 
governed by three different jurisdictions was bound together through mutual needs and benefits, 
as middlemen utilized their social networks to hold the city together as one. A distinctive 
Shanghai-style of culture known as haipai was created as the Shanghai identity. Haipai 




 Urban infrastructure, particularly public transportation systems were crucial in 
Shanghai‟s growth and development. Under Shanghai‟s complicated and unique environment, 
the old and the new, primitive and modern, foreign and native, continuity and change, as well as 
rich and poor could co-exist together side-by-side for nearly a century. As a city full of contrasts; 
and as a city that belonged to everyone yet belonged to no one; everything and anything could 
happen, everyone and anyone could find their niche, and every form of public transportation 














































Prior to the 20
th
 century, transport vehicles that moved along Shanghai‟s roads were man-
powered, or pulled by human muscle. Some of these man-powered vehicles were traditional 
Chinese inventions that had been used for thousands of years, while others were foreign imports 
that arrived in China during the mid-19
th
 century. Foreign imports were reshaped and modified 
from their original uses to better accommodate with Shanghai‟s terrain. In understanding the 
transformation of Shanghai‟s urban landscape, two questions regarding the role of these man-
powered vehicles come into mind. First, why were these traditional forms of man-powered 
vehicles so effective and useful for so long? What are the distinctive advantages of these modes 
of transportation? Second, why were these more “primitive” forms of vehicles able to coexist 
with modern motorized machine-powered vehicles that would arrive in Shanghai during the early 
20
th
 century? Why weren‟t these man-powered vehicles completely phased out or replaced by 
more modern and efficient forms of public transport? In order to understand the importance of 
man-powered vehicles, it is crucial to realize both their specific purposes and Shanghai‟s 
geographic and environmental landscape. Each form of man-powered vehicle had served a 
different function in moving people around, and each vehicle catered to different types of 
passengers. 
 Compared to the cities in the West, Shanghai‟s streets were much narrower. The average 
width of Shanghai‟s streets prior to the arrival of Europeans had been around 6 chi (~2.229 
meters). 
87
 Besides being much narrower, Shanghai‟s streets are typically long and winding 
alleyways that connected into people‟s residential compounds. The narrow and winding 
characteristics of these streets allowed smaller, more nimble vehicles to be more effective in 
transporting people and goods from place to place.  
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 According to Joseph Needham, the wheelbarrow was invented in China as early as the 1
st
 
century B.C., and this one wheeled, man-powered cart became an efficient and long lasting 
transportation tool until the early 20th century. 
88
 Needham pointed to evidence found during the 
late Qin-early Han dynasties from the Jiangsu Provincial Archaeological Survey that had 
published a frieze relief from a tomb-shrine near present day Suzhou at around 100 B.C., which 
showed a wheelbarrow very clearly with a man sitting on top of it. 
89
 So how did the 
wheelbarrow, which Europeans had thought of as being very ill adapted to carrying heavy 
weights become such a popular transportation tool in China? The Chinese wheelbarrow had 
become such a useful form of transportation that as many as six people could ride on top of it at 
the same time. During the late 18
th
 century, when European travelers had discovered this ancient 
Chinese invention, they were amazed at both its simplicity and effectiveness. 
A Dutch merchant trader Andreas Everadrdus Van Braam Houckgeest who had been 
living in China wrote in 1797: 
“The sight of this wheelbarrow was entirely new to me. It was singularly constructed and  
was employed for conveyance of persons and goods. The wheel, which is very large in 
proportion to the barrow, is placed in the center of the part on which the load is laid, so 
that the whole weight bears upon the axle, and the barrow men support no part of it, but 
serve merely to move it forward and keep it in equilibrium. The wheel is as it were cased 
up in a frame made of laths, and covered over with a thin plank, four or five inches wide. 
On each side of the barrow is a projection, on which the goods can be put, or which 
serves as a seat for passengers. A Chinese traveler sits on one side, and counterbalances 
his baggage by placing it on the other. If the baggage is heavier than him, then it is 
balanced equally on two sides, and he seats himself on the board over the wheel, the 
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barrow being purposely contrived to suit such occasions. I am convinced that the Chinese 




The biggest advantage of the wheelbarrow had been that both people and their baggage 
could sit on top of it at the same time, and the counter-balance structure of the barrow could 
allow heavy cargo and people to stay in equilibrium as the wheelbarrow moved along the road. 
Needham noted that the Chinese wheelbarrow had pre-existed a similar European invention by 





 century. Unlike the Chinese, the wheelbarrows of Europe were not designed to 
transport people. Instead, it was designed to haul small loads of concrete and bricks to build 
castles and cathedrals by substituting the wheel for the front man of the hod or stretcher. 
 While the wheelbarrow was invented in China as early as the late Qin or early Han 
periods, it was modified and upgraded during the 3
rd
 century during the Three Warring 
Kingdoms. Zhuge Liang, the famous general of the Kingdom of Shu used this device to transport 
supplies for his armies. He designed the wheelbarrow to resemble that of the „Wooden Ox” and 
the “Gliding Horse”. The “Wooden Ox” had a square belly and a curved head, one foot and four 
legs, with its head compressed into its neck and its tongue attached to its belly. This “Wooden 
Ox” wheelbarrow could carry many things at once, and took fewer journeys to transport, so it 
was employed specifically for long journeys covering large distances. It was estimated that the 
time taken by a man to go six feet, the “Wooden Ox” would be able to go twenty feet, or more 
than three times as far. It could carry the food supply of one man for a whole entire year, and 
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even after traveling long distances the porter would not feel tired. 
91
 This would prove to be 
especially important for the Kingdom of Shu in feeding and supplying its soldiers in their wars 
against the Kingdom of Wei. 
 The “Wooden Ox” and the “Gliding Horse” models used during Zhuge Liang‟s times 
were very similar to the wheelbarrow used during the late Qing. The “Wooden Ox” closely 
resembled the small barrow (xiao che) of the late 19
th
 century, as this vehicle was called because 
it had the shafts projecting in front of it so that it could be pulled. The “Gliding Horse” was the 
same kind of wheelbarrow which had been pushed by a single person with the shafts projecting 
from behind. Later, it was named “Chiangchow Barrows” after the city of Chiangchow in 
Sichuan province where Liu Pei (the emperor of the Kingdom of Shu) had reigned, and where 
Zhuge Liang‟s original invention had been made. Kao Chheng, a scholar during the 11
th
 century 
commented that the “Wooden Ox” and the “Gliding Horse” differed in that the former had shafts 
pointing forward and the latter had them pointing backwards. The former invention was thought 
to have copied the shaft-chariot, but both models were essentially economical, in that it was 
more convenient to use small handcarts with two wheels and shafts, for human traction. 
92
 
 Regional differences in geographic terrain caused the evolution of the Chinese 
wheelbarrow to digress across different provinces. Each type of wheelbarrow was designed and 
utilized to maximize transportational convenience in the specific type of land it encountered. 
There were several regional variations of the wheelbarrow including the Jiangxi wheel being the 
“pack-horse” type featuring a wheel central with housing, and taking all the load as a substitute 
for a pack animal. The northern Sichuan model had wagon sides and was influenced by the 
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presumptive design of Zhuge Liang during the 3
rd
 century. Wheel central but with higher center 
of gravity, with housing, and having axle on sloping struts with flat-car sides was used for 
moving earth in Shanxi province. One or two small wheels forward, high center of gravity, axle 
on vertical stayed struts and with stayed support appeared in Sichuan. Wheels far forward with 
rectangular housing, having straight frame, and looking like the “half-stretcher” type appeared in 
Shanxi and many other provinces throughout North China. In western Sichuan, the intermediate 
type with curving frame and curving housing or streamlined housing was very popular. A small 
auxiliary wheel at the forward end of the frame, useful for cleaning obstacles was widely used in 
Hunan and neighboring provinces. 
93
 
 The modern Chinese wheelbarrow used during the late 19
th
 to early 20
th
 centuries was 
characterized as having a large wheel centrally mounted, the load being carried pannier-fashion 
on either side, or even on top. The operator had to propel or guide it but do not have to 
significantly lift the barrow. As a result, a substantial load of people or goods could be carried. 
94
 
While the Chinese wheelbarrow had indeed appeared earlier than it had in Europe, it may have 
been possible that the modern wheelbarrow used in China could have in fact been influenced by 
the European chariot. 
95
 There is a possibility that the chariot wheels used in classical Greece or 
ancient Rome might have been forgotten in the West until it was rediscovered later on, and that 
his idea could have passed on to China. The ancient Chinese wheelbarrow technique such as the 
“pack-horse” could have been transmitted to Europe in the 13
th
 century, while later Western 
influences could have reshaped the contemporary Chinese designs such as the  
                                                          
93
 Needham, Joseph. Science and Civilisation in China, vol.4, Physics and Physical Technology, pt.2, Mechanical 
Engineering. Cambridge University Press, 1965: p.270. 
94
 Lewis, M.J.T. “The Origins of the Wheelbarrow,” Technology and Culture, Vol. 35, No. 3(July 1994): p.453. 
95
 Lewis, M.J.T. “The South-pointing Chariot in Rome: Gearing in China and the West,” History of Technology 14 





 While it is unclear whether or exactly how much foreign influence may 
have had on the modern Chinese wheelbarrow, this design had existed for around 2,000 years 
and had been the most effective transportation device for people and goods throughout China. 
 
Figure 3.1: Wheelbarrow (1908) 
This picture showed that multiple people could sit on both sides on the wheelbarrow. 
Source: Xue, Liyong (editor). Qiu Shanghai Zhujie Shenghuo (Old Shanghai Concession 
Lifestyles). Shanghai: Shanghai Shehui Kexueyuan Chuban She, 2002: p. 118. 
 
 
 In Shanghai, like everywhere else in China, the wheelbarrow remained common all-
purpose vehicles since its mechanical design was particularly suitable to the city. Shanghai‟s 
roads had been served only as a path for local residents, and not for vehicular traffic. Even after 
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the introduction of automobiles into the city in the early 20
th
 century, wheelbarrows remained 
very popular because they could navigate the narrow streets and move into the winding 
alleyways that cars could not. The biggest advantage of the wheelbarrow was its small and 
nimble feature that could allow it to make headway into street corners no matter how heavy the 
ongoing traffic is. Another distinctive trait of the wheelbarrow was that only one person was 
needed to operate it, yet it could carry safely as much as 600 pounds of supplies. From the 1860s 
to the 1930s, the wheelbarrow was a common sight in transporting goods and carrying 
passengers. Even up into the Republican period the wheelbarrow was continuously used in both 
the foreign concessions and in the old Chinese city. People of all socioeconomic backgrounds 
from the working class to the merchants used the wheelbarrow as a method of public 
transportation.  
The popularity of the wheelbarrow and its common acceptance by all social classes could 
be explained by its convenience where as many as eight passengers could ride on the 
wheelbarrow at the same time. Group travel allowed passengers to talk to each other in a 
conservative society that still emphasized the separation of the opposite sex. However, as other 
forms of public transportation became more prevalent, the status of the wheelbarrow was 
lowered to that of the lowly “fourth class”. This designation indicated the gradual segregation of 
the social classes according to how one traveled in public. The wealthiest would ride in the 




The wheelbarrow was called dulunche in Chinese, meaning “single wheeled mobile”. Its 
popularity reached a peak during the era of Emperor Guangxu of the late Qing (1875-1908) 
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because of its durability and affordability. Since multiple passengers could ride on it, the average 
fare for one li (about 500 meters) was only 5-6 cents. For transporting cargo, the dulunche fare 
was about 10 cents for about 450 jin (1 jin =500 grams) for each li. For lighter cargo, the fare 
was about 8 cents for one li. But as Shanghai‟s streets became more crowded, certain sections of 
the city barred the wheelbarrow during the busy hours of the day. In the early 20
th
 century, 
Nanjing Road (the busiest commercial street in Shanghai) banned the wheelbarrow from 8 am in 
the morning to 8 pm in the evening. But by the 1930s, the wheelbarrow was gradually being 
replaced by other methods of transportation, most notably the rickshaw. In 1932, the Chinese 
section of the city still had around 15,700 registered wheelbarrows. However, in the foreign 
concessions, there were only about 8,000 wheelbarrows still in use. 
98
 The wheelbarrow, being 
such a simple yet convenient transportation for 2,000 years was finally being phased out at the 
end of the 1930s. 
Why did the wheelbarrow become obsolete? As other more advanced forms of 
transportation were being developed and introduced, the wheelbarrow became a symbol of 
China‟s backwardness and reflected the low social status of its riders. Due to its primitive state 
as well as its cheap fare and ability to carry multiple passengers, the wheelbarrow was seen as a 
vehicle for the poor. After causing accidents and contributing to the congested traffic, the 
wheelbarrow was barred from traveling on Shanghai‟s main roads or in major commercial areas. 
While it still operated in many small streets and alleyways of the Chinese city until the 1930s, 
the wealthier foreign concessions turned to more modern vehicles of transportation: both man-
powered and machine-powered. The GMD would phase out the last wheelbarrows in the Chinese 
city toward the end of the 1930s as part of their modernization campaign. Nevertheless, the 
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wheelbarrow left a lasting legacy in the history of public transportation in China for two 
millenniums due to its efficiency, low-cost, and durability. 
The Sedan Chair 
 Another ancient form of transport that had survived until modern times was the sedan 
chair, known in Chinese as qiaoche. The sedan chair does not have wheels and is carried by 
manpower. It first appeared during the Qin dynasty where the imperial royalty sat inside a box-
like cart covered by cloth to shield them from the sun. A sedan chair is placed inside the box-like 
cart and has two long bamboo poles attached to either end of the cart where their subjects can 
carry it over their shoulders. The qiaoche became a symbol of power and wealth, as the royalty 
and other prominent officials displayed their status publicly by riding inside the cart, with a veil 
covering the two sides where doors normally would be to prevent outsiders from seeing them in 
person. From the Han dynasty up until the Qing, the imperial court made the qiaoche an essential 
part of their royal experience as they traveled from place to place. 
99
  
The sedan chair publicly displayed the master-servant relationship between the royalty 
and the people they ruled over. The royalty sat inside, safely shielded from the weather and from 
being seen by others. They are carried by four laborers who must not only toil with their muscle 
and sweat, but also deal with the natural elements such as the rain, heat, and cold. The laborers 
who carried the bamboo poles attached to the sedan chair are seen publicly as carrying a very 
important person, whether it was the sovereign emperor or a member of the royal family. This 
reiterates the superiority of the imperial royalty and the inferiority of the common people they 
ruled over. It took four laborers to carry one member of the royalty, with two carriers in the front 
and two in the back, while the royalty is seated inside the protected cart in the middle. From a 
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symbolic interpretation, this suggested that the royalty was at the center or heart of the nation, 
while the commoners labored in the outer peripheral sides to protect the imperial sovereignty. By 
publicly submitting to the royalty‟s domination, the sedan chair justified the status differences 
between the royalty and the common people (laobaixing) and through these public displays of 
submission the laborers indicated the legitimacy of the rule of their imperial sovereignty. 
  
Figure 3.2: Sedan Chair During the Late Qing Dynasty 
The sedan chair offered the passenger privacy and comfort, and signaled the master-servants 
relationship as four laborers (two in front and two in back) were needed to carry the two long 
bamboo poles. 
Source: Wang, Liqun. Shanghai Shi Lunzi Zhuan Chulai De (The Wheels of Shanghai). 
Shanghai: Xuelin Chuban She, 1999. 
 
The sedan chair is often contrasted with the wheelbarrow to highlight the huge 
differences in the social statuses and class origins of the passengers who used these two very 
different types of vehicles. While the wheelbarrow was used by the common folk, most notably 
the poor, the sedan chair catered specifically to the wealthy and powerful. Like the wheelbarrow, 
95 
 
the sedan chair was particularly effective in navigating the streets of Shanghai. During the mid 
19
th
 century, not only did officials but also wealthy families used private sedan chairs and 
personal carriers to take them from place to place. There were public sedan chairs available for 
rent in the number of stations (jiaohang) where carriers could be called on to lift the passenger 
into the box-cart. After Shanghai was opened up to the West, sedan chairs became very popular 
and had to be officially registered so they could be taxed. During the reign of Emperor Tongzhi 
(1862-1874), sedan chairs were in big demand in the foreign territories, especially for special 
occasions such as holiday festivals, weddings, or funerals. But by the early 20
th
 century, as 
rickshaws became more commonly used, the sedan chair began to decline in numbers. Whereas 
in 1905, there were 733 sedan chairs registered for use in the International Settlement, by 1911 
that number dropped to only 199. 
100
 Eventually, the sedan chair no longer became a regular 
transportation tool, but rather a wedding ritual where the bride would be carried in the sedan 
chair to her husband‟s home. During the 1930s, it cost 20 silver dollars to rent a sedan chair for a 
wedding; or about the entire monthly income of an average worker while a taxi ride only cost 
about 4-5 dollars. 
101
 
 While they carried very different types of passengers, the wheelbarrow and the sedan 
chair shared similarities in that they were both native Chinese inventions that had a long-lasting 
tradition spanning nearly 2,000 years, were both extremely effective in navigating urban streets 
and alleyways, and saw their demise during the early 20
th
 century as rickshaws appeared in large 
numbers in Shanghai. The wheelbarrow and the sedan chair served as contrasting foils for each 
other; which highlighted the inequality of Chinese society and the vast differences in economic 
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status and social prestige that existed throughout history in China. Yet they both lost their roles 
as the primary methods of transportation when foreign inventions, most notably the rickshaw 
were introduced into Shanghai. In some ways, the wheelbarrow and the sedan chair symbolically 
represented the distinctive aspects of the Chinese cultural identity in the face of inevitable 
foreign influences. 
The Horse Drawn Carriage 
 Not all man-powered vehicles are native Chinese inventions. Unlike the wheelbarrow or 
the sedan chair, the horse drawn carriage (mache) was introduced to Shanghai in 1853 by an 
Englishman named Smith who had arrived in the British Settlement. Smith thought that these 
carriages which had been common in British cities, would be useful in China as well. 
102
 The 
horse drawn carriage served two functions: to pull heavy objects and to pull passengers. In order 
to pull heavy objects, a large box-shaped container was placed on four wheels, filled with cargo, 
and was attached to the horse with a jockey riding on the horse. For passengers, a mounted chair 
on four wheels is attached to the horse, where the puller will sit on the back of the mounted chair 
with the passengers. While the horse carriage was quite popular in the early 20
th
 century, it 
gradually lost its share of the transportation market as cargo companies and passengers began to 
choose other lighter forms of vehicles. The horse drawn carriage had major drawbacks that 
limited its effectiveness such as the slow speed it can go, the smell of horse manure on the streets 
it had passed, and its inability to navigate through Shanghai‟s narrow streets. The horse drawn 
carriage was used primarily on main streets with wide lanes. The high maintenance costs, 
ineffectiveness to move in and out of small crowded streets, and complaints from residents and 
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Figure 3.3: Horse-drawn carriage (1905) 
Horse-drawn carriages could carry both people and goods. It was especially useful to carry large 
amounts of heavy cargo, but complaints over horse manure and accidents caused the horse-
drawn carriages to be phased out. 
Source: Xue, Liyong (editor). Qiu Shanghai Zhujie Shenghuo (Old Shanghai Concession 
Lifestyles). Shanghai: Shanghai Shehui Kexueyuan Chuban She, 2002: p. 119. 
 
 
 From 1905-1930, the horse drawn carriages reached a peak of usage for both commercial 
use and private ownership. 
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Year Commercial Business Privately Owned Total Horse Drawn Carriages 
1905 677 918 1,595 
1906 711 976 1,687 
1907 642 993 1,635 
1908 595 916 1,511 
1909 591 851 1,406 
1910 574 792 1,366 
1911 535 742 1,277 
1912 520 749 1,269 
1913 525 753 1,278 
1914 455 735 1,290 
1915 333 720 1,053 
1916 284 731 1,015 
1917 253 688 941 
1918 252 634 886 
1919 253 578 831 
1920 278 539 817 
1921 308 476 784 
1922 341 406 747 
1923 343 366 709 
1924 315 333 648 
1925 306 299 605 
1926 295 252 547 
1927 267 198 465 
1928 251 156 407 
1929 227 113 340 




 The highest number of horse drawn carriages appeared to be during the first decade of the 
20
th
 century, with steady decreases afterwards. During the early years of its inception, the horse 
drawn carriage was quite expensive to rent. The average cost for monthly rental was 60 silver 
dollars, or 3 silver dollars per day. Because of the high costs, only the wealthy (mostly 
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foreigners) could afford to ride in horse drawn carriages. The typical carriage could carry four 
people in the back, and the passengers enjoyed a high class feel, as they were able to sit in an 
open-air seat as they traveled along the main roads of the city. Eventually a cheaper form of 
horse carriage known as the “wild chicken horse carriage” appeared, specifically for transporting 
common people. The “wild chicken horse carriage” had cramped seats in the back, which could 
take as many as eight people. The typical fare was ten cents per passenger per stop. The carriages 
carried passengers from Number 16 Pu to Hongkou from 7 am in the morning to 10 pm at night, 
with arrivals coming every half hour each day. Prior to the introduction of the tram and trolley, 
the cheaper version of this horse drawn carriage was a common sight for both transporting 
supplies and people in both foreign concessions and the Chinese city. 
105
 
 As the number of horse-drawn carriages increased, the Shanghai Municipal Council 
established the “Traffic and Licensing Bye-Laws Committee”, appointed at the ratepayers‟ 
meeting in the International Settlement on March 21, 1916. This traffic and licensing committee 
would set laws, regulations, and policies on all forms of transportation vehicles. The conditions 
to operate each type of vehicle would be addressed, and safety laws regarding pedestrians would 
be established. In regards to the horse-drawn carriage, the following rules and regulations on all 
International Settlement roads and alleyways would be observed from then on: 
“No person in charge of any vehicle or when riding a horse, pony or other animal shall 
drive or move such vehicle or ride such horse, pony or other animal on any road 
recklessly or negligently or at a speed or in a manner which is dangerous to the public, 
having regard to all the circumstances of the case, including the nature, condition and use 
of such road and to the amount of the traffic which eventually us at the time or which 
might reasonably be expected to be thereon.” 
 
“No person in charge thereof shall leave on any road any horse or other animal, whether 
attached to any carriage or not, without some competent person in charge, such person 
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being in such a position as to have complete and immediate control over such horse or 
animal by means of the bridle.” 
 
“No person in charge thereof shall drive on any road any horse or other animal drawing 
any heavy wagon, cart, or other vehicle at any faster rate than a common walk.” 
 
“No person shall be asleep while in charge of any horse, pony or mule while on any road 
whether attached to any vehicle or not.” 
 
“No person in charge thereof shall permit or cause any carriage, with or without horse, 
pony or other animal to stand on any road, at a place where it may obstruct traffic, for a 
longer time than is necessary for loading or unloading, or taking up or setting down 
passengers, and no person by means or any vehicle or animal shall willfully interrupt any 
crossing, or willfully cause any obstruction in any road, or shall refuse to cause such 
carriage or other vehicle to be removed upon reasonable request by the Police.” 
 
“No person shall break in or lead for exercise any horse, pony or mule on any road, so as 
to obstruct the traffic or as to cause danger, inconvenience or nuisance to the persons 
using such road or living in houses abutting on such road.” 
 
“Every person shall, except in case of accident or other special circumstance, harness or 
unharness any horse, pony, or mule on any road.” 
 
“Every person leading a horse, or pony, or mule or in charge of any cattle on any road 




As more horse-drawn carriages were used, the problem of where to store these horses at 
night appeared. The Shanghai Municipal Council decreed that new premises had to be built to 
keep these horses in safe and sanitary places. The privately owned Shanghai Hsing Ya Chemical 
Manufacturing Company, Ltd. saw an opportunity to expand their business ventures. The 
Chinese general manager wrote to and received approval for his company to purchase a piece of 
land and build new premises to store horses, since the previous premises were too small. His 
company bought a plot measuring over 2 mow, located near Hart Road near Connaught Road in 
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order to build a large stable for ponies. The company noted that every effort will be made to 
maintain the stale for sanitary condition. 
107
 
 The Shanghai Municipal Council‟s Public Health Department ordered veterinarians to 
inspect horse stables annually to ensure that proper sanitary conditions were met and that no 
animal diseases could spread. In an inspection report written by an assistant veterinary surgeon 
of a horse compound to the Public Health Department, the following conditions were described: 
“I visited Dr. Ke‟s Biological Laboratory at 322 Yenping Road this morning and found 
that the whole concern consists of two and a half mow of land on which there are two 
separate buildings, i.e. one for the manufacture of biological, and the other, a stable. The 
stable is very well built and contains 52 separate stalls, all of which made of concrete. 
The floor of the stall is well drained and paved, with an automatic water trough in each 
stall. All horse manure being deposited in an enclosed receptacle at the north east corner 
of the premises, and removed daily. 
At present there are 41 horse which, with the exception of one, are in fine condition, and 
kept well groomed. There are 13 coolies and 1 foreman to attend these horses, and the 
stable is kept very clean. The Laboratory building is in the course of being equipped with 




 After numerous incidents of heavy cargo falling out and complaints from passengers 
about the slow speed of the horse drawn carriage, a law was passed in the Chinese city that the 
carriages could not be more than one ton in weight. Since the original purpose of the horse drawn 
carriage was to transport heavy equipment and supplies for at least four passengers, reducing its 
weight made it become less competitive with other lighter vehicles for both cargo and passenger 
transportation. While the horse drawn carriage remained in use throughout the first half of the 
20
th
 century during the GMD era, on the eve of the Communist takeover of Shanghai in 1949, 
there were only 63 horse drawn carriages left in the entire city. By 1956, the horse drawn 
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carriage would be completely phased out as a transportation vehicle for both supplies and people. 
109
 
 Compared to New York City, the horse-powered carriages were used much later in 
Shanghai. In New York, horsecars had arrived during the early 19
th
 century. By 1838, there were 
over 100 horsecars covering routes between City Hall and Harlem, with stations at Fourth 
Avenue and Twenty Seventh Street. The horsecars greatly expanded its patronage by carrying 
both local passengers within the city and passengers commuting from the northern end of 
Manhattan to offices in lower Manhattan. These routes carried more than one million passengers 
by 1840 and three and a half million passengers by 1859. In the late 1850s, fares were six cents 
for local passengers and were considered affordable for most of New York‟s commuters. 
110
 
 In New York, the horse-powered vehicles witnessed a decline at around the turn of the 
turn of the 20
th
 century. In some cases, with the construction of street railways, the change from 
horse-powered to electric-powered transit occurred rapidly. The disappearance of the urban horse 
from public transit was the result of both environmental and safety concerns, as well as the 
arrival of more modern vehicles. The horsecars had caused tremendous environmental and 
sanitation problems for a city going through a rapid phase of population growths. Residents and 
government officials could not effectively deal with the horse manure and the number of dead 
horses on the roads. Commercial store owners complained that the stench from horse dung was 
so bad it was driving away potential customers. Dead horse carcasses on busy streets were 
blocking traffic, and it was difficult for sanitation workers to remove dead horses during 
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 After the turn of the century, the horsecars were beginning to be phased out, and 
other forms of transportation; most notably automobiles appeared on New York‟s streets. 
 Initially, both cities welcomed horse-powered vehicles because they could carry heavy 
cargo and passengers. However, environmental and sanitation, along with safety concerns 
resulted in the eventual demise of these horse-driven vehicles. The era of the horse-powered 
transport in New York covered from around 1830-1900, and in Shanghai from around 1850-
1930. New York appeared to be ahead of Shanghai in introducing and phasing out the urban 
horse by about 20-30 years. 
The Rickshaw 
 The rickshaw would become the quintessential image of China‟s backwardness in the 
early 20
th
 century, as numerous pictures of an impoverished puller using his own body to pull a 
rickshaw were contrasted with pictures of modern machine-powered automobiles, trams, or 
trolleys in the backdrop to highlight the growing disparities of rich and poor. However, unlike 
the wheelbarrow or the sedan chair, the rickshaw is neither a native Chinese nor an ancient 
invention. The rickshaw was invented in Japan during the 1860s to aid the crippled and the 
convalescent, so the early rickshaws looked like a sedan chair awkwardly mounted on an axle 
and oversized wheels. 
112
 Later on, refinements were made to include the use of springs, ball 
bearings, and rubber tires to turn the rickshaw from a wheelchair-like vehicle into a light and 
efficiency, yet simple machine that spread throughout Asia to China, Korea, Southeast Asia, and 
India during the late 19
th
 century. This simple yet highly productive technological invention was 
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able to capitalize on the small amounts of capital needed for production, the large pool of 
unskilled labor that could carry it, and the high demand among passengers for personal 
transportation to become a symbolic feature in many Asian urban landscapes. 
113
 From the late 
19
th
 to early 20
th
 centuries, the rickshaw would be come the signature characteristic of the 
distinctively Asian form of transportation. 
 The rickshaw was first introduced into China via Shanghai in the spring of 1873 by a 
French merchant named Menard, who came from Japan and wanted to operate the rickshaw 
business in the French Concession just like it had been done in Japan. In June 1873, Menard 
petitioned the French Municipal Council for a patent to use the rickshaw for the next ten years as 
an experiment to see if the rickshaws could be profitable there. After consulting with the 
Shanghai Municipal Council of the International Settlement, the two councils agreed to permit 
the rickshaws to operate in both the settlement and the concession since the operations of these 
vehicles would efficiently move the flow of traffic and increase revenues for both the British and 
the French. The two municipal councils allowed for up to 1,000 rickshaws to operate in the two 
foreign controlled territories (500 in each) and a license was issued for every 25 rickshaws. The 
following year, on March 24, 1874, Menard registered the first rickshaw business in Shanghai. 
He was followed by nine other rickshaw companies, all owned and operated by Westerners. At 
the end of 1874, there were about 1,000 rickshaws total on the streets of Shanghai. 
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Figure 3.4: Rickshaw in the 1870s. 
This rickshaw was characterized by its large wheels. Large heavy rickshaws were very tiring to 
pull, especially over long distances. 
Source: Wang, Liqun. Shanghai Shi Lunzi Zhuan Chulai De (The Wheels of Shanghai). 
Shanghai: Xuelin Chuban She, 1999. 
 
 When the Japanese rickshaw was first introduced into Shanghai, it was called the 
dongyangche, meaning the “foreign vehicle from the East”. Eventually, the name was changed to 
renliche, meaning “man-powered vehicle” in Chinese. The popularity of the rickshaws grew 
quickly in the foreign territories, increasing from about 1,500 licensed rickshaws in 1882 to 
8,718 rickshaws in just the International Settlement alone by 1914. The success of the rickshaws 
could be attributed to its flexibility and comfort. The rickshaws could move about easily in 
almost every corner of Shanghai‟s winding and narrow streets and alleyways, just like the 
simpler wheelbarrow could. However, it was much more comfortable for the passenger to ride in 
106 
 
the rickshaw than it was to sit in the single-wheeled wheelbarrow. The rickshaw was flexible 
because it was available at any time, and the puller could stop whenever and wherever the 
passenger wanted to get off. This made the rickshaw more convenient than the tram, trolley, or 
bus that arrived later because these vehicles had regular schedules and stops. 
115
  
 After the rickshaw was introduced into China, technical upgrades were made to make the 
rickshaw for adaptive to moving around Shanghai‟s roads. Modifications included discarding the 
original iron-shod wooden wheels in favor of solid rubber tires; using pneumatic rubber tires for 
better traction; adding a backrest to make the passenger more comfortable; replacing the flat, 
hard seat with spring cushions; and adding lights to make the rickshaw look more attractive for 
prospective passengers than the simple, primitive wheelbarrow. 
116
 The rickshaw combined 
elements of both the wheelbarrow and the sedan chair to become an ideal form of transportation 
that was particularly suited to traveling around Shanghai. Although it was not a Chinese 
invention, adaptations and adjustments were made to upgrade the rickshaw to make it more fit 
for use in China. The rickshaw was similar to the sedan chair in that the passenger could sit in a 
chair while riding, and was seen as an upgrade in status and comfort over the wheelbarrow where 
the passenger could not rest his back. However, the rickshaw was also similar to the 
wheelbarrow in that only one puller was needed to carry it, instead of the usual four carriers 
needed to move a sedan chair. Compared to the sedan chair, the rickshaw was more labor-
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efficient and less extravagant. Yet, compared to the wheelbarrow, the rickshaw was more 
modernized and comfortable.  
 Beside Shanghai, the rickshaw had made its way into many other Chinese cities. It first 
appeared in Beijing in 1886, where it competed for passengers with horse drawn carriages, mule 
carters, sedan chairs, and wheelbarrows there. By the early 1900s, numerous rickshaw garages 
opened and rented out these vehicles to laborers, who solicited passengers on the streets. The 
Beijing rickshaws of the early 1900s was rough riding and noisy as its tires made squeaky sounds 
on the road. The body and wheel rims were made of iron, and the shafts held by the rickshaw 
puller were short and mounted very high that made pulling very difficult and slow. Rickshaws 
made a terrible clanking noise, often bounced passengers around in their seats when there was a 
bump on the road, or got stuck in the mud. By the mid 1900s, a light frame and rubber tires made 
it easier for the puller to pull. Instead of having two laborers where one was a puller at the front 
and another was a pusher at the back to push the rickshaw from behind whenever it was stuck, 
only one puller was needed. 
117
 
 Another significant development that contributed to the success of the rickshaws was the 
creation of more paved avenues in major cities throughout China. In Beijing, prior to 1900 
streets were dirty and usually unpaved. Replacing dirt or cobbles with pavement became vital to 
the rickshaw business there. Most of Beijing‟s center sections of major roads were paved by the 
turn of the 20
th
 century; but cart tracks, sides and alleyways were still unpaved. The rickshaws 
could take advantage of the parallel road systems to speed along the macadam with other light 
tired vehicles, while still being able to move in unpaved streets. As a result, the rickshaw 
replaced horses and wheelbarrows as the most widespread form of transportation in Beijing. 
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Chinese historian David Strand argued that rickshaws multiplied in Beijing as a result of private 
entrepreneurship, mostly from Chinese businessmen seeking opportunities to profit from a 
growing urban population rather than government planning or official decrees there. 
118
 By the 
turn of the 20
th
 century, the rickshaw had modernized urban transportation, speeded up the flow 
of traffic, and effectively channeled the movement of people in both Shanghai and Beijing. 
 It was in Shanghai‟s International Settlement that the rickshaws were most commonly 
used. In 1900, there were a total of 4,667 rickshaws for public hire there. By 1907, the number 
had jumped to 8,204. During this time period, private rickshaws known as baoche appeared. In 
1907, there were 5,625 private rickshaws registered in the settlement. To distinguish between the 
public and privately registered rickshaws, the public ones were painted yellow, and called 
huangbao che, meaning “yellow-covered vehicle” in Chinese. The private ones were painted 
black. Although their physical structures looked similar, the painted colors allowed the 
passengers to easily see which rickshaw was public, and which was private. In general, public 
rickshaws looked shabby and dilapidated, even though they seldom broke down on the road. By 
contrast, private rickshaws were always shiny, well maintained, had a clean seat and plaid, and 
even a wide protective tarpaulin to protect the passengers from the rain. 
119
 
 As rickshaws became a common conveyance, the types of passengers that rode the public 
or private rickshaws differed based on their wealth and status. By the 1930s, there were more 
than 23,000 registered rickshaws in operation, or an average of 1 public rickshaw for every 150 
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people in Shanghai. Public rickshaw fares were fairly affordable for the common people. From 
1917-1937, the typical fare for the first mile or less cost around 10 cents, with each additional 
half mile or less costing another 10 cents if the fare was charged by distance. When the fare was 
charged by time, a ride of one hour or less cost around 50 cents, with each subsequent hour or 
less costing about 40-50 cents. These were official fees set by the Shanghai Municipal Council in 
the International Settlement, although it was not strictly enforced. 
120
 Often times, the actual 
fares were higher as rickshaw pullers and passengers bargained and negotiated over the fares. 
Pullers could easily tell if the passenger was familiar with the city‟s layout or not; and often tried 
to swindle their passengers by taking them along longer routes to their destinations, thus 
charging them high fares. 
121
 Overall, rickshaw fares were within the means of most common 
people. 
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Figure 3.5: Rows of rickshaws on the road. 
Source: Wang, Liqun. Shanghai Shi Lunzi Zhuan Chulai De (The Wheels of Shanghai). 
Shanghai: Xuelin Chuban She, 1999. 
 
 To own a private rickshaw and having a personal puller was considered a luxury item that 
was limited to the upper middle class families of Shanghai. In Beijing, just like in Shanghai, it 
was not the rich that used the rickshaws. The rickshaw was considered the second rung on the 
status hierarchy of transportation modes. The ascending order was from buses to streetcars, to 
public rickshaws, then private rickshaws, followed by horse-drawn carriage, and finally to 
automobile. Successful upward mobility depended on an upgrade in one‟s personal 
transportation. According to Xi Ying, a Beijing journalist, having your own personal private 
rickshaw signaled to others that you have “made it”. He felt owning a private rickshaw “really is 
the passport of the petite bourgeoisie”, because people tended to think that after living in Beijing 
for several years, “if you don‟t have a private rickshaw, what on earth are you?”  
 The successful expansion of the rickshaw business in Beijing during the decades of the 
1910s and 1920s were because of the suitability of the vehicle to the city‟s flat terrain and the 
111 
 
transportation needs of the growing professional and mercantile classes. Rickshaw travel, 
especially private rickshaws separated the city‟s professional class from the working class. The 
city‟s officials, moneyed or propertied classes could choose a wide range of elaborate rickshaws 
to highlight and showcase their status and privilege in public. The public rickshaws provided a 
less elaborate but efficient means of transport for people such as administrative office workers, 
journalists, university students, politicians, small businessmen, tourists, and others who lived in 
the suburbs of the Outer City but must commute to the Inner City or downtown to work in 
Beijing‟s governmental, financial, or educational institutions. 
122
  
 Similar to Shanghai, rickshaw pulling became a public spectacle on the streets of Beijing 
during the 1920s. It was estimated that as many as 60,000 men took as many as 500,000 fares a 
today in a city with a population of slightly more than one million. As many as one out of every 
six males in the city between the ages of 16 to 50 was a full time or part time puller. Rickshaw 
laborers and their families made up almost 20% of Beijing‟s total population. 
123
 The prominence 
of the rickshaw as a transportation vehicle and in providing employment opportunities for 
laborers, as well as its notoriety for being a sign of social segregation and class distinctions led to 
political and literary debates throughout China about its role in society. The rickshaw was 
praised for representing technological progress. Over short distances and narrow roads the 
rickshaw traveled faster than heavy, slow-moving mule carts. But critics pointed out that the 
rickshaw merely substituted animal power with human labor, and created a humiliating spectacle 
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where poor laborers must use strenuous physical force to pull middle or upper class clients. The 
sight of one human being polling another became a symbol of oppression and exploitation. 
 In Shanghai, while the rickshaw business originated in the foreign controlled territories; 
after the 1880s, Chinese businessmen made their own rickshaws and as a result, prices for these 
vehicles began to fall. In 1898, Chinese businesses (called chechang), meaning “vehicle firms” 
rented out public rickshaws for hire in the Chinese city. Starting in 1910, rickshaw businesses 
sprang up in Zhabei, a newly developed Chinese district, and later firms were established in 
suburban areas like Huxi and Pudong. The major players in Shanghai‟s rickshaw business were 
still foreigners because they owned the largest rickshaw companies. These companies rented 
rickshaws directly to Chinese contractors, who sublet the rickshaws to the pullers. The Chinese 
contractors played the role of middlemen in this business. During the 1920s, Chinese contractors 
began purchasing rickshaws from their foreign owners and took over many of the rickshaw 
companies in the Chinese city. By the late 1920s, the Chinese had owned most of the rickshaw 
business. During the Greater Shanghai Project where Shanghai was made into a special 
administrative municipality, the rickshaw industry reached a peak when the entire business from 
ownership to contractors to middlemen to pullers was entirely Chinese. 
124
 
 According to the Shanghai Municipal Bureau of Social Affairs, there were 80, 649 public 
rickshaw pullers, and in all the rickshaw business provided employment for more than 340,000 
people, or about 10% of the entire population of the city by the early 1930s. Two studies on 
rickshaw pullers by the Shanghai Municipal Council and the Shanghai Municipal Bureau of 
Social Affairs estimated that in 1934, the average monthly income of the pullers was $9. 
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Compared to the average male factory worker‟s monthly salary of about $25 in 1933, the 
rickshaw pullers earned only about 36% of those who worked in the factories. 
125
 Compared to 
Beijing, a smaller percentage of the labor force engaged in the rickshaw business. Beijing‟s 
rickshaw workers earned between $10-$12 a month during the 1920s, which was comparable to 
the incomes of policemen, unskilled craftsmen, servants, and most shop clerks. The rickshaw 
men of Beijing were considered poor but not impoverished. In fact, compared to Shanghai‟s 
rickshaw pullers, Beijing‟s rickshaw men were relatively well off. An experienced puller 
working long hours could earn around $15 a month. When compared to the rest of Beijing‟s 
lower classes, comprised of about half of the city‟s workers and laborers, the upper strata of 
rickshaw men: those who were stronger or more experienced, enjoyed better living conditions 
such as moderately decent food, clothing, housing, or perhaps even extra cash for opera tickets or 
other forms of entertainment on the weekends. 
126
 
 So why did the Beijing rickshaw pullers earn more money and live better lives than the 
Shanghai rickshaw pullers? One critical difference is the origins of the rickshaw workers in these 
two cities. In Shanghai, almost all of the rickshaw pullers were not native residents of Shanghai, 
but poor migrants from rural villages in other provinces to escape poverty back home. The 
majority of Shanghai‟s rickshaw men came from the rural areas of Subei (northern part of 
Jiangsu province). 
127
 Beijing had a much smaller modern utility and industrial sector than 
Shanghai, and a large pool of local men were unemployed, or had jobs that paid less than 
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rickshaw pulling. Less industrial development in Beijing contributed to more native workers 
participating in the rickshaw trade, which explained why rickshaw men comprised an even high 
percentage of the total labor force than in Shanghai. Since native residents of Beijing had homes 
to go, they did not have to spend money renting out places to live like migrant laborers in 
Shanghai had to. Besides finding cheap places in shantytowns to live, the migrant laborers of 
Shanghai also had to send money back home to their families in their rural villages. This would 
explain why Beijing‟s rickshaw workers would be able to spend their income on other things 
such as food, clothing, entertainment, etc.  
 Since Beijing‟s surface area and layout was much larger and its population more 
scattered, the need for rickshaws to commute was more significant than in Shanghai. As a result, 
a larger percentage of the workforce could be involved in the rickshaw trade and still make a 
decent living. The rickshaw workers of Beijing could be spread out throughout the city, picking 
up passengers commuting to its different corners and centers. Rickshaw pullers did not have to 
congregate in one particular area to compete for passengers. However, in Shanghai, since the city 
size was much smaller and more congested than in Beijing, the rickshaw pullers had to compete 
with each other for business. The pullers could not travel large distances since Shanghai was 
more geographically compact, and passengers usually did not need to travel very far to get from 
place to place. The longer distance it took to commute from place to place could explain the 
difference in incomes between Beijing and Shanghai rickshaw workers. Since pullers charged its 
passengers either by distance or by time, the Beijing pullers would benefit more from the longer 
distances and more travel time required of their customers. 
 While the rickshaw was beneficial to urban transport for many practical reasons, there 
were significant problems associated with it. An article commenting on the situation of the 
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“rickshamen” appeared in The China Weekly Review on August 10, 1935. The writer described 
the rickshaw problem here: 
“The fundamental problem of too many rickshamen for the available trade continues a 
fundamental problem as it was before the authorities started to regulate it. The number of 
rickshas exceeds available customers by more than two to one and there are about four 
times too many rickshamen for the available number of vehicles. The best way to 
visualize the problem is to visit the block on Avenue Edward VII between Szechuan and 
Kiangsi roads on any night of the week, the best time being between 10 o‟clock P.M. and 
midnight. Here in this one block one may count anywhere from 100 to 300 rickshamen 
fighting over a handful of customers who emerge from the bars and dives which occupy 
most of the Frenchtown side of the street. Often the street is so crowded that it is 
practically impossible to drive through in a motor car without an incident. The police 
apparently have long since given up the problem of forcing the hungry pullers to wait in 
line.” 
 
The author continued by describing the living conditions of the rickshaw workers who  
lived in the shantytowns on the outskirts of the city. 
“Next we come to the question of housing the poor, or providing quarters for some 
94,122 destitute Chinese who live in straw-huts or beggar “villages” located on the 




 Most of those who lived in squalid conditions in these beggar “villages” were indeed 
rickshaw workers who had came to Shanghai from even poorer rural villages.  
 An article addressing the rickshaw problem appeared in The China Quarterly in August 
1936:  
“Upwards of one hundred thousand members of our Shanghai community are directly 
dependent, for their livelihood, on the income derived from pulling the nine thousand 
nine hundred and ninety rickshaws licensed by the International Settlement. This group is 
large enough, and its economic status is precarious enough, to claim the responsible 
interest of all of us. The Rickshaw Problem dates from the year 1874. That year the 
income to the Municipal Council, for licensing rickshaws, at two mace (a mace was a 
tenth of a tael) per month, totaled sixty taels. The rickshaws were dirty and dilapidated, 
without pneumatic tires, one and two passenger sizes, and in general much more of a 
public nuisance than service. 
The number quickly increased, and four years later we have the first official regulation of 
the rickshaw traffic. It included the prohibition of two passenger vehicles, the 
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requirement of two pullers when two passengers were carried, and a prescribed width for 
the seat, and height for the hood. The number of licenses was limited to fifteen hundred. 
This limitation was the origin of a racketeering in licenses that remains one of the most 
serious difficulties in the rickshaw problem today. The fifteen hundred licenses were 
bought and sold with profit to no one except racketeers, with a consequent increase in the 
rentals charged by the pullers, and since the public refused to pay correspondingly 
increased fares, with a serious curtailment of the net income to the pullers. They went 
into debt to the owners and these debts were exploited without mercy, until the pullers 
were all intents and purposes owned by the rickshaw owners. 
The Municipal council decided to sell these fifteen hundred rickshaw licenses to the 
highest bidders. This would transfer at least part of the profit from the pockets of the 
racketeers to the Council Treasury. But the owners and sub-leasors appealed to the Court 
of Consuls, and the Court declared the action to be illegal. Whereupon the Council 
increased the licensing rate to $1.50 and removed the fifteen hundred limitation. The 
owners immediately submitted figures to prove that this would make impossible the 
continuance of their business, and withdrew their rickshaws to emphasize their protest.  
Meanwhile the lot of the increasing number of pullers was deplorable. A number of 
individuals and societies took sporadic and shortlived interest in their condition, but it 
was not until 1922 that anything like a serious study of the situation was made. By this 
time the rickshaw business had become so profitable to the owners. The pullers did not in 
any way participate in the profit; on the contrary they were being more severely exploited 
for increased rentals, by impossible charges for damaged vehicles, and by loan 
arrangements that rendered them wholly helpless in the hands of their masters, as 




 This article brought the plight of the rickshaw pullers to light by arguing that rickshaw 
pullers were being ruthlessly exploited for their cheap labor. Reforms were suggested to make 
rickshaws more humane, and to make working conditions better for rickshaw pullers.  
In 1937, there were 41,797 rickshaws operating in Shanghai, which constituted the 
majority of man-powered vehicles. 
130
 The poor working conditions and charges of exploitation 
resulted in numerous rickshaw worker strikes throughout Shanghai. On May 27, 1938, as a result 
of the Sino-Japanese War, 40,000 rickshaw pullers are out of work. At a meeting the previous 
day, attended by 150 representatives of rickshaw pullers, important resolutions were adopted. 
The meeting decided among other things to ask relief for their unemployed fellow pullers from 
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the Shanghai Municipal Council, the French Municipal Council, the Chinese Ratepayers‟ 
Association and other charitable associations. 
131
 On March 15, 1939, rickshaw pullers in Nantao 
(Nanshi in the Chinese city) declared a general strike to protest the increase of the monthly 
rickshaw tax from 40-80 cents the next day. There were 1,200 rickshaw pullers in Nantao who 
went on strike. 
132
 The following year on April 15, 1940, 2,000 rickshaw pullers in Nantao went 
on strike against hire charge hikes. The pullers in Nantao declared a strike and appealed to the 
“Social Bureau” of the “Shanghai Special Municipality” for assistance. 
133
 Rickshaw pullers also 




 Hundreds of new rickshaw coolies get together each month at the French police station to 
buy licenses. Coolies pay 77 cents a month to the French Municipal Police for the right to 
operate in the French Concession. About 500 to 80-0 carts could be seen lined up each morning 
during the first 10 days of each month. The majority of coolies can‟t afford to take out yearly or 
even semi-annual licenses. Being barely able to eke out a living, most of them take out monthly 
licenses, which cost 77 cents, or 85 cents if their license plate from the previous month had been 
damaged in the French Concession. In the International Settlement, the license costs $2.85, good 
for thee months. The average income of the coolies range from $20 to $35 a month, depending 
on their luck in getting fares. Those who work regularly for big business establishments, such as 
brokerage offices and furniture shops can earn more. The coolies are hard workers who must rise 
early in the morning and usually work over 10 hours a day. Their only requisite is physical 
                                                          
131
 “Many Ricsha Men Said Out of Jobs”. The Shanghai Environmental Post, May 27, 1938. Shanghai Municipal 
Archives: U38-2-1-17. 
132
 “Ricksha Pullers in Nantao to Declare Strike”. Wen Hui Pao, March 15, 1939. Shanghai Municipal Archives. 
133
 “2,000 Nantao Ricsha Men Strike Against Hire Charge Hikes”. China Press, April 15, 1940. Shanghai Municipal 
Archives. 
134




strength and a thorough knowledge of local streets. Business is slack during the rainy weather. 
Coolies are dependent on the weather, as bad weather usually means little or no business. 
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In these instances, some measures were taken by the Shanghai Municipal Council in the 
International Settlement, the French Municipal Council in the French Concession and the 
Shanghai Special Municipality Social Bureau in the Chinese city to address the concerns of these 
rickshaw pullers. However, the problem was there were many more rural migrants flocking into 
Shanghai, especially after the Japanese invasion in 1937 that sought out any kind of work to 
support themselves and their families. While rickshaw pullers went on strike in certain sections 
of the city, there were plenty of others who would fill in and take their place, and pull their 
rickshaws in both foreign and Chinese territories. 
The Bicycle 
 
 The bicycle is seen as a form of personal transportation rather than public transportation. 
This is because the bicycle, known as zixingche in Chinese, meaning “self-operating vehicle” can 
only carry one passenger. Unlike the rickshaw or sedan chair, the bicycle does not need a puller 
so it cannot create employment opportunities for laborers. Nevertheless, the bicycle is a foreign 
man-powered invention that became a popular transportation tool when it was introduced into 
Shanghai. The first known bicycle was introduced in Germany in 1817, which had two inline 
wheels connected by a wooden frame. The rider sat aside and pushed along with his feet, while 
steering the front wheel. It became popular in France, England, and Scotland during the 19
th
 
century, which featured a heavy steel frame on which wooden wheels with iron tires could be 
mounted. The primitive bicycles were very difficult to ride on because of the high seat and poor 
weight distribution made the rider vulnerable for dangerous falls. Eventually pneumatic tires 
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replaced wooden ones, and the rear freewheel was developed, which allowed the rider to ride 
without the pedals spinning out of control.  
The bicycle first appeared in China in 1876 where it became a riding toy inside the 
Forbidden City. When Emperor Guangxu saw foreigner riding these bicycles in Beijing, he 
found them to be extremely fascinating. Thus, the bicycle became a leisure toy rather than a 
transportation tool for the Qing imperial royalty. However, in Shanghai, the bicycle quickly 
became a riding vehicle for the masses. Bicycles were often rented out, with typical fares for new 
bicycle at 2 Chinese Yuan for one day or 30 cents for one hour. Used bicycles cost 1.5 Yuan for 
one day or 20 cents for one hour, and really old bikes for 80 cents for one day and 10 cents for 
one hour. 
136
 The biggest growth in the use of bicycles occurred from 1927 - 1935:   
Table 3.2 
Year Chinese City  International Settlement French Concession Total 
1927 9,562 15,436 4,132 29,130 
1928 10,002 17,739 5,573 33,314 
1929 13,209 20,327 6,785 40,321 
1930 15,733 21,530 7,322 44,585 
1931 19,256 23,547 8,041 50,844 
1932 17,398 25,000 8,041 50,439 
1933 21,880 29,500 8,041 59,421 
1934 29,032 32,916 8,041 69,989 
1935 29,360 35,743 8,041 73,144
137 
 
 The rise in the popularity of bicycles can be attributed to its growing acceptance among 
students, postal workers, and women as their preferred form of transportation. Bicycles were 
especially popular with women as they could ride to places on their own, without the escort of 
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their husbands or a male relative. Unlike riding trams, trolleys, or buses, there was no need to 
rush to the designated station in order to catch the next scheduled vehicle or wait a long time for 
the next vehicle to arrive, nor did the rider have to cram onto these vehicles and compete for a 
seat with a multitude of other passengers. Beginning in 1911, the Shanghai postal office bought 
100 bicycles from the British for their postal carriers to deliver mail to nearby locations. 
Eventually the bicycle became the primary method of delivering letters, newspapers, or 
documents, and was used by the telephone companies and police stations.  
During the late 1910s to early 1920, the bicycle became a status symbol among wealthy 
students of private schools and universities. Many students, particularly female students wanted 
to have their own personal bicycles to ride to and from school, where they can carry their book 
bags on their back while riding at the same time. Schools began to designate specific areas on 
their campuses for students to park their bicycles. Having your own personal bicycle became a 
way to separate students from wealthy families from those coming from more modest 
backgrounds, as poor students had to walk home from school. 
138
 The total number of bicycles in 
Shanghai in 1948 was around 230,000, including both publicly rented and privately owned. 
Bicycles primarily served to transport light goods on short distances for commercial purposes. 
139
 
 The rise in the number of bicycles resulted from both the gradual expansion of the city‟s 
territory during the early 20
th
 century and the drop in bicycles prices due to mass production. In 
the beginning of the 20
th
 century, most residents of Shanghai walked from place to place, as the 
local neighborhoods usually provided all the necessary shopping, entertainment, and leisure one 
needed. The core of the city centered around the area between Suzhou Creek and the Huangpu 
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River, and was easily without walking distance. However, as the city‟s geographic boundaries 
expanded to accommodate significant population increases, the size of the city grew larger. By 
1930, the total area of the International Settlement reached 32.83 square kilometers, as compared 
to only 3.19 square kilometers when the settlement was first established, or a more than tenfold 
increase in size. After Shanghai was declared as a special administrative municipality in 1927, 
the Chinese section of the city saw gradual outward expansion as well. By 1949, the total area of 
the Chinese city reached 91 square kilometers, and the total surface area of the entire city 
including surrounding suburbs reached 622 square kilometers. 
140
 The expansion of the city‟s 
area meant neighborhoods, commercial and business centers were further from each other than 
before, and the longer distances required of going from one place to another caused many 
residents to choose the bicycle as opposed to walking in order to save time. 
 The second major factor was the drop in the cost of purchasing a bicycle and the rise of 
wages among Shanghai‟s middle class workers. From 1900-1920, when the bicycle was still 
considered to be a luxury item, the average cost was around 60 Yuan. Due to mass production, 
by the end of the average cost of a bicycle had dropped to about 44 Yuan, and by the 1930s, it 
had decreased to about 23 Yuan. 
141
 As a result of its increasing affordability, the bicycle was no 
longer just used by the wealthy. Beginning in the late 1920s and early 1930s, more and more 
middle class families could afford to buy a bicycle as they commuted to and from work. Bicycles 
were most commonly seen on school campuses as it became a particularly popular method of 
commute for school teachers, as they saw more and more of their students ride bicycles to and 
from school.  
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 The average monthly incomes of Shanghai workers in different occupations in 1929 are 
listed in the table below.  In 1930, China adopted a gold standard with the unit of account valued 




Average Daily Wage Rates in 21 Industries in Shanghai, 1929 
       
Industry 




Average Wage Rate Per 
Month 
Wood working       
   Sawing Male $0.62  $18.63  
(Chinese Yuan ¥46.575)       
Metallurgy       
   Foundry   $0.77  $23.22 (¥58.05) 
Machinery   $0.78  $23.49 (¥58.725) 
Construction of boats   $1.02  $30.51 (¥76.275) 
  Shipbuilding       
Manufacture of bricks       
   Glass-making Adult $0.67  $20.16 (¥50.40) 
  Child $0.32  $9.6 (¥24) 
Manufacture of 
chemicals       
   Soap-making Male $0.54  $16.29 (¥40.725) 
 Female $0.32  $9.66 (¥24.09) 
   Match-making Male $0.80  $24.09 (¥60.325) 
  Female $0.24  $16.65 (¥41.625) 
   Enamelling Male $0.56  $16.65 (¥41.625) 
  Female $0.42  $12.69 (¥31.725) 
  Child $0.32  $9.72 (¥24.30) 
Textiles       
   Silk reeling Male $0.73  $21.96 (¥54.90) 
  Female $0.54  $16.17 (¥40.425) 
  Child $0.33  $9.9 (¥24.75) 
   Cotton spinning Male $0.55  $16.56 (¥41.40) 
  Female $0.45  $13.56 (¥33.90) 
  Child $0.30  $9 (¥22.50) 
   Silk weaving Male $1.26  $37.8 (¥94.50) 
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 Female $0.89  $26.82 (¥67.50) 
  Cotton weaving Male $0.72  $21.66 (¥54.15) 
  Female $0.55  $16.35 (¥40.875) 
  Child $0.36  $10.71 (¥26.775) 
Silk & Cotton Knitting 
Male Male $0.82  $24.54 (¥61.35) 
  Female $0.63  $19.02 (¥47.55) 
Bleaching & dyeing Male   $0.47  $14.04 (¥35.10) 
Manufacture of leather       
   Tanning   $0.62  $18.63 (¥46.575) 
Manufacture of food       
   Flour   $0.56  $16.83 (¥42.075) 
   Oils    $0.60  $18 (¥45) 
   Eggs Male $0.62  $18.69 (¥46.725) 
  Female $0.46  $13.77 (¥34.425) 
   Tobacco Male $0.82  $24.66 (¥61.65) 
  Female $0.58  $17.43 (¥43.575) 
  Child $0.42  $12.48 (¥31.20) 
 Paper & printing       
   Paper-making Male $0.66  $19.8 (¥49.50) 
  Female $0.35  $10.56 (¥26.40) 
   Printing Male $1.23  $36.78 (¥91.95) 
  Female $0.83  $24.78 (¥61.95) 







The affordability of the bicycle by the late 1920s allowed most middle class Shanghai 
residents to be able to purchase a bicycle with less than one month salary. The advantage of the 
bicycle was that it did not need fuel or gas to recharge, nor did it need a parking permit to park. 
Not only did it save time in commuting, but the only cost needed was the initial payment for the 
                                                          
143
 “Average Hourly and Daily Wage Rates and Hours of Labour Per Day in 21 Industries in Shanghai, 1929.” “Wages 
and Hours of Labour (Greater Shanghai), 1929”, p. 135, Shanghai, Bureau of Social Affairs in The China Yearbook 
1934: p. 263. 
124 
 
purchase of the bicycle. The durability of the bicycle allowed the rider to keep on using it for 
years, which made the bicycle a very good deal for a growing number of Shanghai residents. 
 As bicycles became more numerous, new owners were required to purchase bicycle 
licenses issued by either the foreign or Chinese authorities in which they lived in. In a Shanghai 
Municipal Council document regarding the issue of bicycle licenses, government policy in the 
International Settlement stated “the bicycle owners concerned are required to call at the Vehicle 
Inspection Office, 28 Changhsing Lu with their original licenses and vehicles to apply duly for 
the issue of licenses on the dates and according to the number given here under. After the 
necessary particulars have been reported and the vehicles inspected, the applicants shall pay the 
requisite fees without delay to the Vehicle License Section of the Finance Department of the 




 The popularity of the bicycles can be attributed to its suitability and convenience. They 
are mechanically simple, light, handy, adaptable and easy to ride. They are especially effective in 
the extremely narrow streets or lanes extending throughout the city, and since Shanghai‟s terrain 
is mostly level with few hills, bikers can go anywhere as long as there is a road. Another 
advantage is the individualized means of transportation that the bicycle can provide which does 
not require state subsidy to provide parking lots. Bicycles are very economical and practical, can 
navigate large roads and small streets easily, and can be parked anywhere with a lock. 
Furthermore, bicycles do not pollute the environment in any ways, as they require no fuel or 
electric power. A bicycle advertisement with pictures appeared in The North China Herald that 
marketed the usefulness of the bicycle: 
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“International Bicycle Co. 392-95 Nanking Road & No. 7, Broadway, Shanghai. 
Humber, Columbia and Imperial Cycles. Ballistic Cartridges. Repair a specialty. 
Shanghai, 3
rd
 August, 1903.” 
145
 
 In David Hounshell‟s From the American System to Mass Production, the bicycle 
became the new product that could bridge the gap between the more flexible but less productive 
system and the system of mass production. The bicycle played a significant transitional role in 
the development of American mass production. The physical characteristics of the bicycle 
provided a stepping stone to the design of the automobile. Hounshell noted that many early 
automobiles chassis consisted of bicycle tubing and tires, and many automobile companies were 
also manufacturers of bicycles. The American public also enjoyed this new form of personalized 
transportation for both recreation and to get to the workplace. In the 1890s, more and more 
Americans owned bicycles with annual sales exceeding 1.2 million in 1896.  
 As bicycles became more popular, entirely new developments occurred in bicycle design 
and production. Sheet metal stamping and electric resistance welding techniques were adopted. 
During the 1890s, American bicycle manufacturers used many components including pedals, 
crank hangers, steering heads, joints, forks, hubs, etc. made of sheet steel. Punch pressing or 
stamping operations were used along with newer technology such as electric resistance welding 
to produce bicycle parts at much lower costs. This technology would be crucial to the 
development of the automobile industry later on. 
146
 Joseph Woodworth described in his book 
American Tool Making and Interchangeable Manufacturing that the bicycle became the product 
in which the American system of manufacturing was showcased to the rest of the world as an 
efficient and productive system that could design and manufacture machinery, tools, and devices 
economically and quickly. The key was the installation of the interchangeable system of 
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A study done in Shanghai showed that 85% of residents who used bicycles traveled 
distances of eight kilometers or less in journeys of less than 30 minutes, whereas 13% of bikers 
ride for 30-60 minutes and over distances of 8-15 kilometers, and only 2% ride the bike for more 
than 1 hour or more than 15 kilometers. The average distance of bicycle travel is 5 kilometers or 
less, with a corresponding time of about 20 minutes. This showed that residents used the bicycles 
if they plan to travel short distances, such as to their workplaces or for light delivery of goods 
and items. 
148
 People most likely will not ride the bicycle if they must go from one side of the 
city to the other, or if they must carry heavy stuff. The bicycle did not affect any other methods 
of public transportation by taking away potential customers. As a form of personal 
transportation, the bicycle replaced walking as the conventional method of going from place to 
place in relatively short distances. It was not a vehicle that competed with other forms of 
transportation.  
The Purposes and Impact of Man-Powered Vehicles 
 To answer the first question addressed in the beginning of the chapter of what made these 
man-powered vehicles so effective and useful in Shanghai‟s setting, it is important to first look at 
the terrain and roads there. Most of Shanghai‟s roads, especially in the Chinese city were not 
paved until the early 20
th
 century. Unpaved roads along with narrow and winding alleyways 
allowed smaller and more nimble vehicles to be more mobile. The ability to move in and out of 
crowded and congested alleyways, and being able to pick up or drop off passengers any time and 
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anywhere made the wheelbarrow, rickshaw, and bicycle the mode of choice for many urban 
residents. Shanghai‟s growing commercial and industrial expansion forced road constructions to 
be built, and for major roads to be paved. Heavy cargo and large quantities of goods or supplies 
were needed to facilitate this urban growth. For a period of time during the late 19
th
 to the early 
20
th
 centuries, the horse-drawn carriage fit the needs of carrying heavy equipment for long 
distances in the city. The sedan chair‟s role evolved from carrying the imperial royalty to a 
ceremonial role of becoming a cultural ritual during weddings or festivals. 
 The second question examined the relationship between the various forms and methods 
of public transportation that ranged from primitive man-powered to modernized machine-
powered vehicles. In Joseph Schumpter‟s theory of creative destruction, he had proposed the 
notion that the process of transformation would result in the form of radical invention; where 
newer and more efficient technological inventions would eradicate or wipe out older systems that 
had been successful in the past in order for society to sustain economic growth. 
149
 Yet in 
Shanghai‟s case, newer inventions in the form of motorized vehicles did not wipe out, or at least 
did not completely root out man-powered vehicles. This phenomenon could be explained by 
Shanghai‟s continuous population growths, and the fact that different transportation vehicle did 
not necessarily compete directly with each other for customers. Instead, each transportation 
vehicle catered to a particular clientele, or served a particular niche in society.  
 Each type of man-powered vehicle had a specific role or purpose to play, or filled a 
specific need in Shanghai‟s transportation industry. Given Shanghai‟s tenfold population boom, 
every social class witnessed a rapid growth in population among its socioeconomic status. This 
created a different niche for each social group based on class and economic status. The poor, the 
middle class, and the wealthy all needed to travel and get around the city. Combined with an 
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expansion of the city‟s original boundaries and the enlargement of the city‟s surface area, public 
transit became more important than ever for residents to commute to work, home, or leisure. 
Public transportation became a venue where social status could be publicly displayed. Just like 
food, clothing, housing, and entertainment, transportation was a form of material culture that 
distinguished the rich from the poor, the haves from the have-nots, and the sophisticated from the 
uneducated. A particular form of hierarchy built up in the selection or choice of one‟s method of 
travel. The lowest rung on the hierarchical ladder was the wheelbarrow, which could hold 
multiple passengers and charged the cheapest fees. Next came the rickshaw and bicycle, which 
was used by the growing middle classes. The wealthy and powerful Chinese could continue to 
ride in the sedan chair. The horse-drawn carriage catered primarily to large and heavy amounts 
of cargo more than the transport of individual passengers. Since each of these man-powered 
vehicles served distinct purposes and had their own particular clientele, there was little or no 
overlap between them. This allowed all these forms of vehicles to co-exist side-by-side, and even 
after the arrival of motorized vehicles, there was no direct conflict or competition between man-
powered and machine-powered vehicles since it was understood that they each had their own 
specific functions. 
 Man-powered vehicles had a profound impact on Shanghai‟s urban development during 
this time period. Perhaps of all these vehicles, the rickshaw had the most obvious and evident 
impact on Chinese society. The rickshaw is an example of a foreign technological invention that 
was diffused and modified when it was introduced into China to accommodate the specific 
conditions of Chinese cities. While the rickshaw itself was a Japanese invention, brought to 
China by Westerners, its fundamental purpose was altered. It was no longer just a tool to 
transport the disabled or the handicapped, but instead it became a popular vehicle for the 
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mainstream mass movement of people. The rickshaw was adjusted to fit the Chinese urban 
landscape by adding rubber tires to make it easier to move about, backrest and soft seats to make 
the ride more comfortable for the passenger, and a cover to protect the rider from the rain. 
Though initially controlled by foreigners, eventually the rickshaw business became Chinese-
owned and operated, as the Chinese bought these rickshaw businesses from foreigners and 
established their own trade.  
 The rickshaw became the most notable form of transportation in Shanghai during the 
Republican period of the 1920s and 1930s. Even after the introduction of more modern machine-
powered vehicles, the rickshaw remained an important method of transportation. The rickshaw 
had distinctive advantages over motorized vehicles in navigating the narrow and winding streets 
and alleyways, could pick up and drop off passengers any time anywhere, and was seen as a 
public display of wealth and social status.  
The biggest reason for its continued operation was the employment opportunities this 
trade created for the tens of thousands of unskilled migrant laborers from the countryside who 
had flocked to Shanghai, and for the unskilled native residents of Beijing. For these unskilled 
laborers, the rickshaw trade gave them their livelihood and allowed them to survive in the city. 
Both foreign and Chinese authorities realized that without the rickshaw business, tens of 
thousands of unskilled migrant workers would have no jobs and that would cause all sorts of 
social problems. Without an employment outlet, unskilled rural migrants would most likely 
resort to crime, or beg and steal in order to survive. This could potentially result in major social 
unrest, which neither the foreign nor Chinese authorities wanted to deal with. The rickshaw 
industry granted this mass employment opportunity for these unskilled laborers in not only 
providing mobility for Shanghai‟s residents, but to prevent social and political instability or mass 
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unrest.  Despite its “inhumane”, “cruel”, and “primitive” descriptions, the rickshaw was used 
until 1955, well after the founding of the People‟s Republic when it would finally be eliminated. 
150
  
For over 80 years, the rickshaw reflected the backwardness of China as compared to the 
modernity of the automobiles in the West, yet the rickshaw represented an integral part of 
Shanghai‟s population expansion, commercial and industrial development, and served as an 
intersection that connected the ancient and the modern, native and foreign, urban and rural, rich 
and poor, and most importantly, the past and the future. Man-powered vehicles left a lasting 
legacy in reshaping the course of Shanghai‟s historical development and growth before and after 
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 The turn of the 20
th
 century ushered in a new era that brought about the arrival of 
machine-powered vehicles into Shanghai. With the arrival of machine-powered motorized 
vehicles, the landscape of the city would be forever altered. While machine-powered vehicles 
such as the automobile, the tram and trolley, the bus, and the taxi brought convenience and 
expanded the options that Shanghai residents had, they did not completely replace traditional 
man-powered vehicles. Instead, both man-powered and machine-powered vehicles appeared to 
serve the needs of Shanghai‟s growing population, and each form of vehicle served specific 
purposes and functions. This chapter will ask the questions of what forces brought about the 
arrival of machine-powered vehicles, how were each of these vehicles used to fulfill the needs of 
Shanghai‟s public transportation, what were the advantages and disadvantages of each form of 
vehicle, who were the passengers who used these vehicles, and how were their socio-economic 
statuses publicly reflected when they were riding in these vehicles? Understanding the purposes, 
functions, roles, and social significance of each form of machine-powered vehicle will help 
explain the complex and multi-faceted urban landscape of Shanghai‟s roads where modern and 





 The automobile or qiche, meaning “gas vehicle” in Chinese was brought to Shanghai in 
1901 by a Hungarian named Leinz. The early automobile resembled a box-shaped vehicle with 
four wheels. In fact, it was often called a “sedan chair on four wheels”, and looked awkward on 
the outside with its rectangular shape. Nevertheless, the automobile gained interest as people 
could see the benefits of being able to put large amounts of cargo in the trunk while sitting 
inside. Like the sedan chair, the automobile could protect its passengers from the sun or rain. But 
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it could also serve as storage as the passenger could put luggage and other heavy items in the 
back. By far the biggest advantage the vehicle provided was speed. The automobile became an 
instant success as its number increased from only 2 vehicles when Leinz first introduced them in 
1901 to 1,400 cars by 1911, 12,695 by 1927, 19,655 by 1930, and 24,572 in Shanghai in 1936. 
151
 By the 1930s, the automobile became the transportation vehicle of choice for long distance 
travel. During the early 1930s, there were over 40 automobile companies representing a wide 
range of cars, from the luxurious Mercedes Benz to the classic Ford Model T. While the number 
of privately owned cars remained small, and was limited only to the wealthy, many middle class 
people used cars for important occasions such as weddings or picking up guests to urgent needs 
such as rushing to the hospital. 
152
 The automobile signaled the important transition from the 
man-powered vehicles of the 19
th
 century to the machine-powered vehicles of the 20
th
 century, 
and highlighted the growing influences of foreign inventions into the Chinese market, as well as 
accommodations and adaptations made to better utilize these foreign vehicles in Shanghai‟s 
particular environment. 
 The North China Daily News began printing advertisements for the purchase of private 
automobiles as early as 1904. For the wealthy foreigners living in the settlement, owning a 
personal automobile was a reminder of the modern amenities available in Western cities that are 
now beginning to be available in Shanghai. By the turn of the 20
th
 century, roads in the 
International Settlement and French Concession were built for automobiles. The area of the 
foreign settlements had enlarged significantly, and automobiles were needed for quicker 
commute.  
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“Automobiles, Motor-Bicycles, Gazoline-Launhes: Sale and Repair. French and 
American Makes. E. Pinguet, 351, Nanking Road. 15 Jan, 1904” 
“The Thomas Motor Car, Model No. 18 is without exception, equal to any car 
manufactured. Beautiful in Design, Finish and Style. Perfect in Materials, Workmanship, 
and in Operation. We have one of the Model 18 Cars in stock. Will be pleased to exhibit 
to any one interested. New York Export and Import Company. 45 Kiangse Road, 
Shanghai. 22
nd





Figure 4.1: Car engine advertisement (1904) 
This car engine was very popular among drivers in Britain. 
Source: The North China Daily News. January 16, 1904. 
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“Automobiles: Tonneau and Runabout Cars in Stock. Unsurpassed in finish, 
workmanship construction of Motor and all essential parts. New York Export and Import 
Company, 45 Kiangse Road, Shanghai, 20
th





Figure 4.2: Automobile advertisement (1904) 
Many automobiles of the early 20
th
 century were open-air vehicles that did not have a roof. 
Source: The North China Daily News. May 31, 1904. 
 
Information and news of where to purchase automobiles, what types of automobiles were 
available appeared in the advertisement section of The North China Daily News or through the 
word of mouth and referrals among foreigners in the International Settlement. The cars had 
arrived from Europe or the United States, and the quantity of automobiles arriving in Shanghai 
through the export and import companies continued to increase as demand for automobiles 
increased significantly. During the first decade of the 20
th
 century, automobiles were considered 
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safe to drive on Shanghai‟s newly constructed and wider roads. The popularity of automobiles 
can contributed to being able to carry multiple passengers such as a family together, the quicker 
speed to get from place to place, and direct pick-ups and drop-offs for passengers.  
 With the arrival of automobiles, the Traffic and Licensing Committee of the Shanghai 
Municipal Council passed a series of new laws and regulations in 1916 to ensure the safety of 
drivers and passengers. These include:  
 “Every person in charge of a vehicle shall keep on the left hand side of the road and when 
 passing other vehicles, shall do so on the right hand side.” 
 
“Every pedestrian and every person in charge of a vehicle shall promptly obey the signals 
of the Police engaged in regulating the traffic, and must stop at once either when required 
to do so, or when any accident has occurred in which such pedestrian or person is 
concerned.” 
 
“No person shall expectorate in or upon any footpath or public vehicle.” 
 
“Every person in charge of slow and heavy traffic shall keep to the sides of the road, 
leaving the centre for fast traffic.” 
 
“Every person in charge of a vehicle when passing over a bridge or crossing or when 
turning a corner, shall slow down, and when turning a corner to the left shall do so as 
sharply as possible, or when to the right, he shall take a good sweep.” 
 
“No person in charge of a vehicle shall approach a crossing on the wrong side of the road, 
or attempt to pass other vehicles going in the same direction when a good view ahead 
cannot be obtained.” 
 
“Every person in charge of a vehicle proceeding along any road when wishing to stop or 
turn to right or left shall raise his hand so as to be visible for a few seconds to the traffic 
concerned thereby.” 
 
“Every person in charge of a vehicle when taking up or setting down passengers shall 
draw up his vehicle as near the footway as possible.” 
 
“No person in charge of a vehicle shall keep such vehicle standing at the entrance to any 
building, store, or residence, after the occupants have alighted, in such a manner as to 
block the approach to subsequent arrivals, and impede the passing traffic. The person in 
charge of such vehicle shall move on to a sufficient distance to leave the approach to the 




“No person in charge of a vehicle shall keep such vehicle standing in the narrow section 




Laws were strictly enforced to ensure the safety of both the drivers and the pedestrians on 
the road. After the laws and regulations were implemented, traffic accidents reduced 
significantly.  
In the late 1920s, the detachable wheel was introduced as an attempt to upgrade the motor 
tires used. The North China Daily News reported that the detachable wheel is the solution to the 
“reliability and convenience of the medium pressured types that had “wheel wobble”. 
A newspaper article promoting the “Tyres for 1927” advocated “the adoption of low 
pressure tyres, either of the full balloon or semi-balloon type” to fit easier to the covers of the 
wheel. A major improvement is the well-based grim better suited for racing at high speeds. Low 
pressure tires were beginning to be replaced by medium pressure tires. This new form of tires 
had a positive affect on the steering mechanism of the “wheel wobble”. 
156
 
There were numerous problems associated with the old tires that needed to be upgraded. 
The newer pressure tires allowed the pattern steering gear to be much lighter than its older 
predecessors, and the connexions of steering gear are easier to adjust. As a result, the ratio of 
turns of the steering wheel to the range of steering lock would be higher. The security bolts had 
been almost obsolete. The newer cover would be capable of holing itself and its tube in position, 
and the rider will not fear accidents on bumpy surfaces. The all rubber treads can hold its own 
but there is a problem where unpleasant sounds or noises inevitably occur on certain surface 
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In the same newspaper published that day, an advertisement of the new British motor car 
appeared. Auto shows, which showcased the newest editions of cars, had become popular in 
Shanghai. The British motor cars that had already debuted in Britain were on their way to China 
in large quantities. Booking targets for a total of 250,000 cars of the 1927 models were to be 
made, with many of them shipped to British colonies around the world. The motor car began as a 
luxury item for the wealthy, but gradually the British manufacturers revised their designs and 
overhauled their production methods as demand for automobiles increased. British automobile 
manufacturers considered the leading points of a desirable car to be “minimum initial cost, 
smooth running, simple and efficient control, economy in fuel consumption and upkeep, comfort 
combined with attractive design, and a good life in longevity and durability”. One of the most 
important triumphs of British automobile engineering had been the rapidity in which the costs of 
manufacturing had been lowered. The decreases in production costs allowed larger quantities of 
automobiles to be manufactured, and for the prices of automobiles to drop. The annual 
automobile shows were the best places to test consumer interests, and to determine which brands 
or which types of cars were most welcomed by potential buyers. 
158
Automobile companies kept 
close observations of the consumers‟ response to each type of car and each model. This allowed 
the motor industry to modify their models each year based on demand and consumers‟ feedback. 
American made automobiles also made its appearance in Shanghai during the early 20
th
 
century. During the first eight months of 1925 exports of American cars and trucks was the 
highest n history. According to an article in The North China Daily, American automobiles 
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seemed to be outdistancing European competition and gaining a firmer hold on the world market, 
especially in China. 
159
 
Various automobile companies bought advertisements in newspapers that touted the high 
quality and durability of their brands during the 1920s. A special section called “Motor Car 
Buyers Guide” appeared in The North China Daily with descriptions of each brand and the 
locations of car dealerships: 
“Packard: Packard perfection is attained by continuous improvement, the result of 
unremitting research and experiment. Two outstanding developments now incorporated 
in every Packard car insure the crank case oil against dilution and the proper amount of 
lubricant to forty-five separate places on the chassis. The first operates automatically, the 
second by a simple plunger action on the dash. Precision of workmanship is thus 
protected by a minimum amount of effort. Packard Inc, USA. 18 Avenue Edward VII, 
Shanghai.” 
 
“Chevrolet: An Economical Car-First Cost and Last. Hartzenbusch Motor Co., 131 
Avenue Foch West.” 
 
“Ford: The Logical Car for Shanghai. Bills Motors, Federal Inc, USA. Authorized 
Dealers: Avenue Edward VII and Thibet Road.” 
 
“Daimler (British). Fitted with this wonderful Sleeve-Valve Engine. The Auto Palace 
Co., 27 Avenue Edward VII.” 
 
“Rover: An all-British Car: Combing Appearance, Economy & Durability. A trial will 
convince you. Selling agents in Shanghai. Shanghai Motor Sales Corporation, 151 
Bubbling Well Road.” 
 
“Jowett: The Big Small Car. Built for Today‟s Motoring Needs. 837-845 Avenue Edward 
VII, 151-D Bubbling Well Road.” 
 
“Singer: The Car That Looks After Itself. Shanghai Service Co., 98 Weihaiwei Road.” 
 
“Essex Motor Cars: Closed Car Comfort at Open Car Cost. Hudford Motors, 25 Rue 
Conty.” 
 
“Morris, Oxford and Cowley Cars at the New Reduced Prices. Demonstrations with 
pleasure. The Auto Palace Co, 27 Avenue Edward VII.” 
 
“Fiat: The Car of International Reputation. The Auto Castle, 242/4 Avenue, Joffre.” 
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“Dodge Brothers Motor Car: Consistently Good. China Motors, Federal Inc, USA.” 
 
Car companies found advertisements in the newspapers to be extremely important in 
marketing their brands to potential customers. Advertisement spaces in the newspapers were 
highly sought after. Besides cars, auto parts such as engines, tires, and oil were also advertised in 
the newspapers: 
“Robert Bosch A.G. Stuttgart. “The sign of quality”. Bosch Horn: Absolutely dependable 
and most pleasing. Large and medium sizes are supplied with choke-switches to produce 
two distinct tones. Loud tones for country drive, low tone for town drive. Keep the 
choke-switch on low tone position, give the button a short touch, use horn only when it is 
really and absolutely necessary. Obtainable from all dealers.” 
 
“Pratt Motor Spirit: “From the Golden Pumps”. Socony Motor Oils, Standard Oil 
Company of New York.” 
 
“Goodyear Balloon Tyres: Goodyear Means good wear.” 
 
“Put the BEST into your car and get the best out of it: “SHELL”. Motor Spirit and 




 By the late 1920s, American brands such as Chrysler and Ford were becoming the most 
common brands of automobiles in China. This can be attributed to both the American system of 
mass production, which resulted in decreases in prices 
161
 as well as constant marketing and 
advertisements. Chrysler took out lengthy full page ads in The North China Daily News 
promoting their latest models with pictures and descriptions to convince prospective buyers of 
their products: 
“The New, Lower-Priced Chrysler Six- Touring Car, Roadster, Sedan, Coach, Coupe. 
Walter Chrysler now presents the new Chrysler Six-the latest product of Chrysler 
engineering. Remarkable power and performance. Lightning acceleration. Extraordinary 
gasoline economy. The beauty of Chrysler dynamic symmetry. Genuine Chrysler quality 
and long life. Riding ease which only Chrysler gives. The supreme safety of four-wheel 
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Hydraulic Brakes. Oil-filtered and air-cleaner. Seven-bearing crankshaft. Full pressure 
lubrication. Full pressure lubrication. Extraordinary strength. Roomy, luxurious bodies.” 
 
“Presenting the New Chrysler Four. Speed with comfort. No rattle or shake. Brilliant, 
flashing Chrysler pick-up—far finer than any car of equal price. 25 miles to the gallon-
practical thrift that has never been accomplished with such performative results. Full tired 
all-steel bodies. Seats wide and easy. Every detail is planned to give you the finest riding 
and greatest comfort.” 
 
“Walter P. Chrysler Develops a New Manufacturing Principle-Standardized Quality. 
Chrysler standardization of quality goes back to the sources of raw materials; it governs 
the very minutest operations; it makes certain that every unit is produced with the finest 
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Figure 4.3: Chrysler advertisement (1926) 
The American automaker Chrysler had become a popular brand throughout the world by the 
1920s. 
Source: The North China Daily News, December 10, 1926. 
 
After Chrysler‟s aggressive marketing efforts, Ford Motor Company began to place full 
page ads in daily newspapers to promote their new models as well.  
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“For Safe Comfortable Driving: New Fordor Sedan. The new Fordor Sedan is 
conspicuous among these motor cars. Its smart low lines and beautiful two-tone colouring 
compel admiring attention wherever it is seen. Moreover, there is a mechanical perfection 
combined with its exterior beauty that is not excelled by any other make of car. Light, 
flexible handling in congested traffic, remarkable acceleration. Houdaille hydraulic shock 
absorbers to assure comfortable riding, non-shatter Triplex windshield glass, and a 6 unit 
completely enclosed brake system for safety are a few of the features that make riding in 
the new Ford a real joy. Arrange with our dealer today for a demonstration ride. Ford 
Motor Company Exports, Inc. Shanghai Price: Tls 1, 1925 (including Bumpers & Extra 
Tire.” 
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Figure 4.4: Ford advertisement (1929) 
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Henry Ford‟s assembly line created the mass production of cars, and lowered the prices of Ford 
automobiles. 
Source: China Weekly, May 18, 1929. 
 
 Ford Motor Company published a financial statement of different models and years of 




Make & Number Year Total Cost Per Year (US$) Cost Per Mile Per Year 
1929 Model A 
Tourer 8112 
 
1935 922.26 0.075 
1936 993.18 0.089 
1937 484.35 (6 months) 0.086 
1929 Model A 
Sedan 8620 
 
1935 1,203.26 0.096 
1936 1169.86 0.083 
1937 1266.55 0.096 
1928 Model A 
Sedan 812 
 
1935 818.38 0.069 
1936 1,201.52 0.086 
1937 520.97 (6 months) 0.071 
1928 Model A 
Tourer 8570 
 
1935 282.14 0.014 
      
      
1929 Model A 
Tourer 4206 
 
1935 489.85 0.074 
1936 508.2 0.113 
1937 827.53 0.103 
1929 Model A 
Tourer 4611 
 
1935 705.59 0.077 
1936 1,201.31 0.145 
1937 672.07 0.094 
1930 Model A 
Couper 8556 
 
1935 948.47 0.081 
1936 1,311.32 0.142 
1937 1,137.26 0.096 
1931 Model A 
Sedan 1719 
 
1935 892.86 0.088 
1936 1,062.35 0.083 
1937 1,393.01 0.097 
1931 Model A 
Sedan  5009 
 
1935 603.69 0.1 
1936 812.44 0.07 




Table 4.1 Continued 
 
1931 Model A 
Sedan 4730 
 
1935 1,103.23 0.085 
1936 1,076.02 0.081 
1937 1,087.59 0.087 
1935 Model C 
Sedan 8570 
 
1935 358.11 (4 months) 0.067 
1936 706.6 0.055 





1937 506.21 0.107 
      
      
 
 Ford trucks became popular in Shanghai as heavy supplies could be loaded up and carried 





Make & Number Year Total Cost Per Year (U.S.$) Cost Per Mile Per Year 
1931 Ford 
3 Ton Truck 26 
 
1935 830.07 0.183 
1936 546.98 0.146 
1937 1,322.97 0.232 
1931 Ford 
3 Ton Truck 27 
 
1935 1,738.27 0.391 
1936 841.76 0.126 
1937 1,675.66 0.169 
1931 Ford 
3 Ton Truck 16362 
 
1935 980.27 0.239 
1936 1,557.41 0.411 
1937 832.34   
1933 Ford 
15 cwt 15944 
 
1935 743.63 0.095 
1936 1,066.42 0.129 
1937 1,271.35 0.132 
1934 Ford 
15 cwt 15942 
 
1935 545.3 0.089 
1936 1,066.42 0.129 
1937 1,271.35 0.132 
1929 Ford 
15 cwt Passenger 
Van 15945 
1935 704.97 0.08 
1936 861.6 0.106 
1937 1,123.41 0.091 
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Table 4.2 Continued 
 Morris 
Commercial 
1933 30 cwt 16454 
 
1935 383.31 0.114 
1936 702.51 0.146 
1937 923.44   
Morris 
Commercial 1932 
30 cwt 15799 
 
1935 376.97 0.205 
1936 879.13 0.132 
1937 1,797.07 0.131 
Morris 
Commercial 1932 
30 cwt 16426 
 
1935 651.07 0.126 
1936 667.23 0.132 
1937 1,134.52 0.139 
Morris 
Commercial 
1932 30 cwt 16429 
 
1935 677.62 0.1 
1936 842.58 0.129 
1937 1,431.95 0.156 
Commercial 
Raider 
1934 30 cwt 15941 
 
1935 587.51 0.084 








After automobiles became common in Shanghai, a plethora of brands, models, types, and 
sizes of cars appeared in Shanghai. There were numerous car dealerships that demonstrated the 
functions of cars available or allowed potential customers to take a test drive. At first, European 
cars dominated the auto industry but gradually American companies such as Chrysler and Ford 
increased their presence in the Shanghai auto market through aggressive marketing in newspaper 
advertisements. As the prices of cars dropped, more buyers could afford automobiles. 
Nevertheless, cars remained a luxury item in Shanghai given the crowded space, traffic 
congestion, and limited parking spots available. It was mostly the wealthy foreigners who owned 
personal automobiles.  
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The Tram and the Trolley 
On March 5, 1908, the Shanghai Tram Company introduced the first tram (yougui dianche) in 
the International Settlement. The tram was a British introduction that brought about 
revolutionary changes in the public transportation systems of Shanghai.
167
 Previously, methods 
such as the wheelbarrow, rickshaw, sedan chair and bicycle are man-powered vehicles that 
required the muscles of the puller or the rider. With the introduction of the tram and the trolley 
(wugui dianche), public transportation vehicles made the transition from man-power to machine-
power, and allowed for a far greater number of people to ride in the same vehicle than ever 
before. The major difference between the tram and the trolley is the tram needed tracks to move 
while trolleys do not need tracks. 
 Unlike other forms of transportation vehicles, trams and trolleys were not first introduced 
to Shanghai. Trams first appeared in Tianjin in 1905, after the jointed owned European Tianjin 
International Tram Company signed a contract with the Qing government in 1904. Trams 
appeared within the walls of the old city of Tianjin, with four initial lines going from north, east, 
south, and west. Eventually, five new tram lines were built in the old city and the foreign 
concessions controlled by the Austrians, Italians, Japanese, French and Russians. The original 
trams were painted white, and later trams were painted red, blue, green, yellow, and flowery to 
distinguish their routes. 
168
 The successes of the trams in Tianjin may have influenced the British 
to introduce trams to Shanghai a few years later. 
 The earliest tram had a hard steel shell, painted in green, and weighed about 20,000 
pounds, with the shell weighing about 8,000 pounds. It moved along slowly and many residents 
                                                          
167
  Zhou, Yuanhe (editor). Shanghai Jiaotong Hua Dangnian (Words from Past Years of Shanghai Transportation). 
East China Normal University Press, 1987:  p.54-55. 
168
 Liu, Haiyan. “Dianche, Gonggong Jiaotong Yu Jindai Tianjin Chengshi Fazhan.”  (The Tram, Public Transportation 




were afraid to ride in it. The British formed the “Shanghai Zhizao Dianqi Youxian Gongsi” in 
1905, with the intention of testing the tram, which had been in use in Britain since the late 19
th
 
century in Shanghai. It took three years for the construction of tram tracks and in 1908, when the 
tracks were finally completed; the tram was officially introduced to the city. The tram had three 
major lines: (1) from Jingan Temple to Hongkou Park, covering an area of 8.6 km; (2) Jingan 
Temple to #16 pu, covering an area of 5.9 km, and (3) from #16 pu to Yangshupu, covering an 
area of 3.3 km. There were a total of 65 trams in operation, with each tram having first class and 
third class. The fares are for 1.5 km, 6 cents for the first class, and 2.5 cents for third class. A 
typical tram had six seats in the first class, about forty seats in the second class, and no seats in 




Figure 4.5: Earliest tram introduced in International Settlement in 1908 
Trams required tracks and electrification. 
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Source: Wang, Liqun. Shanghai Shi Lunzi Zhuan Chulai De (The Wheels of Shanghai). 
Shanghai: Xuelin Chuban She, 1999. 
  
 While the British owned and operated the trams, with the headquarters based in London, 
the Shanghai Tram Company had a permanent office in Shanghai, located at #185 Suzhou Road. 
This office served as the operation and management center where administrative and technical 
issues would be taken care of. The trams quickly became an instant success due to the fact that it 
could transport over a hundred people at once. In 1913, the Shanghai Municipal Council 
approved the installation by the Shanghai Electric Construction Company of a system of rail-less 
electric cars. 
170
 The number of trams increased from 65 when they were first introduced in 1908 
to 312 in 1932, a fivefold increase. The number of passengers who rode the trams increased from 
11,772,715 to 108,845,656 during that same time, an increase of nine times. The total distance 
covered increased from 1,979,001 miles to 9,407,656 miles, a five times increase. The number of 
lines increased from three to twelve during those 24 years.
171
  
 By 1937, there were 10 major tram routes in the International Settlement connecting 
downtown to residential areas. Designated stations were located at busy streets, parks, and 
connection points. The routes were: 
Table 4.3 
Number Starting Point End Point Distance (km) 
1 Jingan Temple Hongkou Park 8.6 km 
2 Jingan Temple #16 Pu 5.9 km 
3 Carter Road Dongxin Bridge 2.8 km 
4 Tilan Bridge French Concession Border 3.3 km 
5 North Train Station Laoximen 2.3 km 
6 North Train Station North Henan Road 6.6 km 
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Table 4.3 Continued 
 7 North Train Station Tilan Bridge 5.8 km 
8 Yangshupoo Road #16 Pu 8.4 km 
11 Huangputan Road Hongkou Park 4.0 km 
12 Tilan Bridge Jingan Temple 4.6 km 
 




Number Starting Point End Point Distance (km) 
1 #16 Pu Fukailin Road 7.2 km 
2 #16 Pu Xujiahui 8.6 km 
3 Xiaodongmen Laoximen 2.5 km 









6 #16 Pu Lujiawan 5.1 km 
7 #16 Pu Haige Road 6.4 km 
8,9 #16 Pu Waiyangjing Road 1.1 km 
10 #16 Pu Lujiawan 4.9 km 
 




P150 Table 3.5 
Number Starting Point End Point Distance (km) 
1 Gaochang Temple Xiaodongmen 4.8 km 
2 Heping Road Zhaozhou Road 8.9 km 
3 Laoximen Mingguo Road  5.1 km 
4 Gaochang Temple Zhaozhou Road 3.9 km
172 
     
 The trolley, known as wugui dianche first appeared in 1914. Unlike the tram, the trolley 
did not need the tracks and could drive directly on the roads. Also known as the trackless trolley, 
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this vehicle began operation on Nanjing Road. 
173
 The trolleys were not as numerous as the trams 
because few roads were completely paved at the time. Instead, the trolley served as a 
complement to the tram rather than a substitute. In areas where it was difficult to built tracks, or 
where there were relatively well-maintained and paved roads, trolleys were used. In other areas 
where roads were unpaved, or if tracks had already been built, trams were put into operation.  
 Seeing the successes of the trams in the International Settlement, the French introduced 
the trams into the French Concession in 1911. During the first year, there were 28 trams in 
operation; in 10 years it had increased to 38. By 1937, there were over 100 trams with six major 
lines and 38 trolleys with two lines, and gross revenue of 660 million Yuan. Unlike the 
settlements, the distances the trams cover are limited to only 12.5 miles. 
174
 Trams also made its 
way into the Chinese section, which included Hunan, Zhabei, Huxi, Jiangwan, and Zhenru 
districts. In 1913, the Huashang Dianqi Gongsi was established with the first tram operating in 
Nanshi on August 11. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the trams provided easy access to the 
masses in the Chinese sections of the city. Unfortunately, the Japanese bombing of Zhabei in 
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Figure 4.6: Tram in French Concession (1911) 
Trams were introduced into the French Concession after the French had seen trams operate in the 
International Settlement. 
Source: Wang, Liqun. Shanghai Shi Lunzi Zhuan Chulai De (The Wheels of Shanghai). 
Shanghai: Xuelin Chuban She, 1999. 
 
 Trams and trolleys became very important transportation tools during the 1920s and 
1930s. The management systems differed in the settlement, concession, and Chinese district of 
the city. Each company painted its own trams and trolleys in different colors to signify the 
different routes and fees of each vehicle. In the settlements, the Shanghai Dianche Gongsi 
painted the vehicles into green and white colors to distinguish the first class and third class seats. 
The head of the vehicle, or first class would be colored green, and prices would be much higher, 
while the rest of the vehicle would be colored white, to indicate passengers there are third class. 
Third class passengers paid only a small fraction of the ticket prices of first class passengers. 
There was no second class section on these vehicles. In the French concession, trams and trolleys 
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were colored brown and green, mainly to indicate the different directions of the routes. In Nanshi 
district of the Chinese section, the Huashang Dianqi Gongsi operated green and red vehicles. 
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 In 1931, there were 21 tram or trolley routes in the International Settlement and French 
Concession, and 4 routes in the Chinese section, primarily in Nanshi. Many Chinese companies 
hired German engineers to help them expand their routes. In Nanshi, new tracks were installed to 
connect Zhonghua Road, Laoximen, Hu-Hang train station and Gaochangmiao Road together. 
By 1937, four new routes were completed in the Chinese section, with a total length of 23.24 km, 
and 54 trams or trolleys were in operation. 
177
 The success of the tram and the trolley can be 
linked to the gradual expansion of the total surface area of the International Settlement and the 
French Concession during the early 20
th
 century. From 1914 to 1915, the settlement occupied a 
total area of 52,570 mu (8658. 3 acres) and the concession had an area size of 15,124 mu (2490.9 





A more spread out area required faster forms of transportation to go from place to place, and the 
increasing population required a form of mass transport unlike the rickshaw or bicycle that could 
transport large numbers of people at once. These two factors contributed to the increasing 
dependences of the tram and trolley as public transportation tools.  
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Figure 4.7: Chinese owned tram in the Chinese city 
The Chinese introduced trams into their own territory after witnessing the successes in the 
foreign concessions. 
Source: Wang, Liqun. Shanghai Shi Lunzi Zhuan Chulai De (The Wheels of Shanghai). 
Shanghai: Xuelin Chuban She, 1999. 
 
 Unlike rickshaw pullers, who earned below average salaries, tram and trolley operators 
earned significantly higher incomes than most Shanghai workers. By 1936, there were over 
20,000 workers in the tram and trolley industries. According to the 1938 “Shanghai Canye Yu 
Shanghai Zhigong” report, tram and trolley drivers, and ticket collectors earned a minimum of 18 
yuan per month and a maximum of 60 yuan per month in the Chinese section. In the French 
Concession, drivers earned a minimum of 27.7 yuan and a maximum of 55 yuan per month, 
while ticket collectors earned a minimum of 27.7 yuan and a maximum of 49 yuan. In the 
International Settlements, drivers earned a minimum of 22 yuan and a maximum of 35.5 yuan, 
while ticket collectors earned a minimum of 22 yuan and a maximum of 33.5 yuan. 
179
 It‟s 
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surprising to note that the ticket collectors earned about as much as money as the drivers. It‟s 
clear that the average salaries for tram and trolley workers would place them at the upper middle 
class range of Shanghai‟s population. This could be explained by the fact that the trams and 
trolleys can carry so many passengers at once, and since each passenger must pay a fee for the 
fare, revenues from ticket fares can be quite high. Unlike the rickshaw puller, who can only 
charge a fee for one passenger at a time, trams and trolleys were much more lucrative businesses 
due to its ability to mass transport so many people. Unlike the rickshaw puller who relied only on 
his muscles, the driver of the trams and trolleys would be considered a skilled worker, someone 
who can operate a complicated vehicle.  
 There were numerous incidents of worker strikes over demands for better working 
conditions, safety standards, and higher wages. The French Tramway Strike of 1930 began as a 
public utility concern. The strike began on June 20, 1930 when only the workers in the shops 
walked out, after their demands for increase of wages were not met by their employers. Later it 
spread, and the tramway motor men were involved. The tram company owners did their best to 
maintain a skeleton service with the protection of police on the trams. On August 11, the strike 
expanded to many office workers throughout the French Concession. Protest was raised by the 
ratepayers, who were angry about paying extra taxes. The strike was not resolved until a 
representative was sent by the French Municipal Council to negotiate and settle the matter. The 
terms of the settlement were 1) full pay of wages to all workers during the strike, 2) $2.40 
increase of pay per month for all workers, 3) release of all workers arrested during the strike, 4) 
principles of pension, compensation, bonus, and extra pay for tram workers, and 5) the tram 
157 
 
company could not dismiss workers without reason. The agreement was signed on August 14, 
1930 and all 1,730 workers involved in the strike returned to work immediately. 
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By the early 1940s, after three decades of success, the tram service encountered a number 
of challenges and difficulties, most notably the Japanese takeover of the city. In March 1940, the 
tramcar service north of Soochow Creek had difficulties in continuing their operation. The 
British-owned Shanghai Electric Construction Company reported that while increased traffic 
facilities “north of the creek” would be welcomed because of the congestion running in the area, 
they were skeptical that they would be allowed to resume operations under the same condition 
prior to the Sino-Japanese hostilities. The Japanese-operated busses had now begun service in the 
area where previous tram routes had been. The Japanese had opposed the area‟s reopening 




 In response, the Shanghai Municipal Council approved increases in tramway fares 
throughout the rest of the International Settlement in June 1940. Fares were to be raised from 
3.71 to 5.02 cents per mile for first class passengers and from 2.54 to 3.43 cents per mile for 
third class accommodation. Consideration was given to the lobbying of the Shanghai Electric 
Construction Company at a meeting of the Public Utilities Committee and the Council meeting 
between May 24 to May 29, 1940. The increase was necessitated to offset increased operating 
expenses and a loss of revenue in “north of Soochow Creek” routes to the Japanese. Under the 
tramways franchise, the Shanghai Electric Construction Company was entitled to increase its 
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fare charges up to maximum rates stipulated in the franchise. The revised fare tables were 
accordingly approved to take place in the settlement beginning in June 1940. 
182
 
 The Shanghai Electric Construction Company continued to increase fares throughout the 
1940s. The revised fares come into effect on June 28, 1941 involved an increase from 6.37 to 
9.11 cents per mile for first class and 4.87 to 7.29 cents for third class. The Company justified 
the increased fare by stating that it was necessary giving the rising costs of operation due to the 
lower exchange value of the local currency, local economic conditions and the effects of war 
conditions abroad. Since 1937, when the Sino-Japanese war broke out, revenue had failed to 
keep pace with rising expenditure. The Company‟s financial data showed that working 
expenditure increased some 310% from 1937-1941, and electrical energy had increased in price 
by 423%, while the fare charges only increased 153% during the same time period. The results 
had been a reduction each year in net profit earned on capital invested dropped from 8.5% in 




 After negotiations with the Japanese, tram lines north of Soochow Creek was reopened 
on Dec. 30, 1941. The Shanghai Electric Construction Company received permission to 
recommence running trams from the corner of Muirhead Road and Broadway to Lay Road in 
order to service the dense industry area of the city. This first tram route to commence running in 
the Hongkou area since the outbreak of the Japanese invasion in 1937 provided a boon to the 
hundreds of thousands of laborers working in the district covered by the new route. Japanese 
owned buses still covered the Hongkou area with a skeleton service. The wayside route operated 
from 7am to 10pm daily and eight trams and trailers were employed. From the time tram service 
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had been discontinued north of Soochow Creek in August 1937 as a result of safety concerns due 
to Japanese military presence in the area to the reopening in December 1941; lines, rails, and 
other equipment were kept in a state of repair so that only a few minor finishing touches had to 
be made by the company in order to re-open after four years of inactivity. 
184
 
  Following the resumption of the tram service, the Shanghai Electric Construction 
Company and Japanese authorities agreed to allow for the resumption of trolleys in the area on 
January 22, 1942. Trolley service in the area was recalled along with the tram routes in 1937. 
The resumption of trolleys will cover the routes along the Broadway mansions to North Soochow 
Road to North Szechuan Road to Range Road. Another trolley line resumed along the Broadway 
and Yangtzepoo Roads to the Riverside Plant of the Shanghai Power Company.
185
 
 In May 1942, simultaneous with the resumption of tram and trolley service between 
Hongkou and areas south of the Soochow Creek, the fares in the two areas were adjusted in order 
to prevent disparity. Tram fares in Hongkou had been charged in military yen. The fare from 
Garden Bridge to Asia Development 10 sen (military yen). In the Settlement, the fare from the 
Bund corner of Nanking Road to Yates and Bubbling Well Roads had been 20 cents (Chinese 
fabi). When the two areas are linked by a joint service, the fares were to be equalized. It was 
planned to lower the fares prevailing in Hongkou and raise the fares in effect at south of 
Soochow Creek. The fares were part of the unified tram system covering areas north and south of 
the Creek beginning in 1942. 
186
 After the Japanese seized the International Settlement after 
December 7, 1941, this area became part of the Japanese occupation. The fabi currency was 
made illegal and converted 2 to 1 to the new puppet currency, which spkied inflation. 
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 On June 5, 1942, two additional routes were opened by the Shanghai Electric 
Construction Company to provide more accessibility to passengers. Route No. 1 covered 
Bubbling Well Road to Hongkou Park and Route No. 8 covered the south end of the Bund to 
Yangtzepoo Point. The inauguration of the new Routes No. 1 and No. 8 unified the Shanghai 
Electric Construction Company and the Central China Omnibus Company. Starting on June 5, 
1942, the transportation companies in both the French Concession and the International 
Settlement adopted fares in Chinese currency. Previously, tramways had been operating in north 
and south of Soochow Creek but there was no direct service across Garden Bridge, a main 
crossing point. The Garden Bridge was cleared by the Japanese military authorities to allow for 
the unhampered passage of the trams. The Shanghai Electric Construction Company set the end-
to-end fare on Route No. 1 from Hongkou Park to St. George‟s at 70 cents for first class and 45 
cents for third class. The fare from Carter Road to the Bund was 50 cents for first class and 30 
cents for third class. From Garden Bridge to Hongkou Park, first class passengers paid 50 cents 
for the ride. From Yangtzepoo point to the south end of the Bund, the two terminal points of 
Route No. 8, passengers paid 75 cents for first class and 50 cents for third class.  
An exchange rate of CRB$5 to one military yen had been fixed for the currency 
exchange. The fare in tramways of the Campagnie Francaise de tramways et D‟Eclairage 
Electriques de Shanghai had also been switched to Chinese currency. Chinese fabi notes of $1 or 
higher were no longer accepted, as only 10, 20 and 50 cents notes were used. The tramways in 




 The fares were raised in the French Concession immediately following fare raises in the 
International Settlement. On June 1, 1942, fares on buses, trams and rail-less trams operating in 
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the French Concession were raised by a minimum of 100 per cent when fares were posted in the 
vehicles by the Compagnie Francaise de Tramways et D‟Eclairage de Shanghai. Rates for all 
distances had been doubled in most cases. The fare from Zikawei to the Bund cost $1.30 instead 
of 60 cents before. From Yates Road to the Bund, the fare will be $1.10, and the minimum fare 




 The bus, known as (gonggong qiche), meaning the public vehicle was first introduced on 
October 10, 1924 in the Settlement. The first bus went from banks of the Huangpu River to 
Jingan Temple, running from 7:30 am in the morning to 11:00 pm at night, with a new bus 
coming every 5-8 minutes. 
189
 The bus made its first appearance in the French Concession on 
February 1, 1927, and in the Hunan district of the Chinese section on October 10, 1928, followed 
by the Zhabei district on November 18, 1928. The number of buses jumped significantly during 
the 1920s as Shanghai‟s population increased from 1.28 million in 1910 to 2.64 million in 1927 
to 3.70 million in 1935. The early buses were considered expensive as each stop cost 5 cents, and 
a complete ride of 5 stops cost 20 cents. 
190
 In the 10 years since the bus first came into existence 
in 1924 to 1934, the number of buses in operation increased from 28 to 164. In 1934, buses 
covered a total distance of 5,147,431 miles and carried a total of 37,328,561 passengers. There 
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Bus Lines in the International Settlement (1934) 
Line Starting Point End Point Distance(km) Date Began 
1 Taofeng Yuan Hongkou Park 11 1928.2.17 
2 Aiduoya Road Hongkou Park 4.7 1926.3.12 
3 Jingan Temple Beixing Road 7.7   
4 Jiaotong University Hongqiao Airport 9.5 1928.7.18 
5 Aiduoya Road North Henan  Road 2.3 1925.1.1 
6 Hongkou Park Linqing Road 4.2 1927.1.17 
7 Jingan Temple Jiaotong University 3.6 1928.4.4 
8 Jiaotong University Guiyang Road     
9 Jingan Temple Guiyang Road 13.4 1924.10.9 
10 Caojiadu Linqing Road 12.3 1924.12.1 
11 North Train Station Tilan Bridge 3.1 1933.8 
12 Wanhangpu Road Waibaipu Bridge   1934.12.11 
 
 
 By the early 1930s, there were four major bus companies: 1) the British owned 
Yingshang Gonggong Qiche Gongsi, which colored the buses yellow and operated in the 
International Settlement; 2) the French owned Fashang Gonggong Qiche Gongsi, colored gray in 
the French Concession; 3) the Chinese owned Huashang Gonggong Qiche Gongsi, operated in 
Zhabei and Baoshan districts; and 4) the Chinese owned Nanshi Gonggong Qiche Gongsi, 
painted yellow and in operation in Nanshi, Xujiahui, and the southeastern part of the city. 
192
 At 
the end of 1932, the British owned bus company had 13 permanent stops and 5 temporary stops 
along its line, covering a distance of 129.3 km in the settlements. 
193
 In addition, there were five 
direct buses going from Waijing Qiao to Taofeng Yuan, Fanhangdu Road, Kangnaotuo Road, 
and Caojiadu with no stops in between. Each line had 2 buses that came each day for the direct 
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line. The Chinese owned Huashang Bus Company began operations in 1928, with its initial 
starting point in Zhabei. By 1934, five major lines had been established going from Zhabei to 
Jiangwan, Sichuan Road/Qiujiang Road to the bridge at Hengfeng Road, Zhabei to Zhenru, 
Zhabei to the new municipal government headquarter, and from Zhabei to the new residential 
areas.  
 
Figure 4.8: Chinese owned bus company (1922) 
Private companies operated by Chinese entrepreneurs sought to make profits from supplying 
transportation to meet consumers‟ needs. 
Source: Xue, Liyong (editor). Qiu Shanghai Zhujie Shenghuo (Old Shanghai Concession 
Lifestyles). Shanghai: Shanghai Shehui Kexueyuan Chuban She, 2002: p. 125. 
 
Due to its initial successes, and the large number of passengers wishing to ride the buses, 
the double-decker bus was introduced in 1934 to accommodate more people. A typical double-
decker bus could fit 44 people on the lower level and 38 people on the top level, making it a 
164 
 
highly efficient carrier. 
194
 Like other transportation vehicles, the bus created job opportunities 
for a new group of drivers. These drivers had to have specific driving licenses and had to be on 
time at each stop and be skilled at parking these long vehicles. Compared to the trams and 
trolleys, bus fares were cheaper since the bus charged passengers for each stop rather than for 
kilometer traveled. Since the distance between each stop usually covered several kilometers, a 5 
cents ride on the bus typically covered more distance than the tram or trolley. Unlike the tram or 
trolley, which separated passengers into first or third class based on fares, the bus was much 
more egalitarian. There were no designations on the bus that separated passengers or charged 
higher fees. Everyone who rode the bus was treated like everyone else and paid the exact same 
fare. While the tram and trolley allowed the wealthy to public flaunt their status by sitting in the 
privileged first class section in the front, while others had to sit on the floor in the third class 
section in the back, the bus was a vehicle of equality operated on a first-come, first-sit basis 
where any passenger could sit if he/she could find an open seat. Passengers who arrived late or if 
all the seats had already been taken had to stand up and hold on to the rail pole as the bus moved. 
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Figure 4.9: Double decker bus 
The double decker bus could carry twice as many people and offered passengers on the second 
floor a scenic view of downtown Shanghai. 
Source: Wang, Liqun. Shanghai Shi Lunzi Zhuan Chulai De (The Wheels of Shanghai). 
Shanghai: Xuelin Chuban She, 1999. 
 
A major problem with the buses had been the smoke nuisance that received a lot of 
complaints from pedestrians. In 1935, the Commissioner of Public Works investigated the smoke 
pollution problem and forced bus companies to come up with technical alterations to abate the 
smoke nuisance. The Commissioner had promised financial support if a new type of oil used 
could reduce smoke emission. As a result, a new and more expensive kind of fuel oil was used 
by the bus companies starting in late 1935. 
195
 The China General Omnibus Company, which had 
become the major bus supplier in the Settlement, reported to the Municipal Council that the 
perfect combustion of fuel oil in bus engines was more difficult in the winter months because of 
cold weather. In January and February, the coldest months of the year, the smoke emission from 
the buses continued to be a nuisance problem. But in other months of the year, smoke emission 
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could be significantly reduced due to new fuel oil. The Public Works Department was satisfied 
with the improvements. 
196
 
Bus routes had a significant impact on the commercial developments of the city, as 
streets close to bus stops tended to have more businesses, stores, and traffic. During the late 
1930s and early 1940s, as the Guomingdang began to consolidate control over Shanghai, more 
bus routes were installed that covered a wider range of area for the passengers. Bus routes were 
longer, and had more intermediate stops along the way than before.  
Table 4.7 
Bus Lines During the 1940s 
Bus Route # Starting Point End Point 
#1 Zhonghua Road (Laoximen) Minguo Road 
#2 Laoximen Henan Road 
#3 East Zhongshan Road Kailu Road 
#4 South Nanjing Road Changyang Road 
#5 Xujiahui Zhaojiapu 
#6 Kangding Road Xizhang Road 
#7 The Bund Shanghai Law School 
#9 Xujiahui East Zhongshan Road 
#10 Zhongshan Park Sichuan Road 
#11 East Zhongzhen Road West Zhongzhen Road 
#12 Xinmen Bridge Tilan Bridge 
#13 North Train Station Guohuo Road 
#14 Xujiahui Road Xizhang Road 
#15 Xujiahui North Train Station 
#20 Xizhang Road        #2 East Zhongshan Road 
#21 Damu Bridge The Bund 
#22 Hengshan Road The Bund 






                                                          
196
 “Smoke Nuisance From Buses: Council Satisfied Company is Doing its Best”. The North China Daily News, 
December 25, 1935.  
197
 Shanghai Gonggong Qiche Luxian Tu. (Map and Routes of Shanghai Public Buses). December, 1949. Shanghai 
Municipal Archives, R1-20-17. 
167 
 
Compared to the earlier bus routes of the late 1920s-early 1930s, these route lines 
covered much more distance and had more stops. A few locations such as the Bund (particularly 
along East Zhongshan Road), Xujiahui, the North Train Station, Xizhang Road, and around 
Laoximen had multiple buses coming and going to facilitate the large number of passengers at 
these busy stops. The availability and accessibility of buses made commuting much easier for the 
city‟s residents, as they could pretty much go anywhere in the city by bus. Transfer points were 
set up at busy locations such as the Bund, Xujiahui, and Laoximen where passengers could get 
off one bus line and get on another bus line quickly. The bus routes helped shape the space 
configuration of the urban landscape by turning a few locations into busy commercial centers for 
shopping and commerce, or into entertainment areas for leisure. Locations closest to major bus 
routes benefited the most from an abundance of passengers who got on or got off the buses. 
These locations became more prosperous and important because of their close proximity and 
easy access to the bus lines. 
The Taxi 
 The Huanqiu Public Company began renting out automobiles in 1908, signaling the 
beginning of the taxi as a luxury transportation vehicle. The taxi (chuzhu che), meaning “the 
rental vehicle”, catered to the rich as its fares were well beyond the means of common people. 
When it first appeared, the fare was 6 Yuan for the first hour, with 4 Yuan for each ensuing hour. 
The following year, the “Shanghai Zhinan” reported that the typical taxi service cost 5 Yuan for 
the first hour and 4 Yuan for the next hour. To use the taxi for four hours would cost the rider 15 
Yuan, and to rent it for an entire day beginning at 8:00 am would cost 25 Yuan. In 1911, the 
Oriental Car Company began renting out taxis to foreigners who liked the comfort of the 
automobile without the stress of finding parking, and who could afford to pay the rental fees. 
168 
 
Instead of charging by the hour, Oriental Car Company charged fares by distance with 60 cents 
for the first mile, and 15 cents for the next ¼ mile. 
198
 Compared to other vehicles, the number of 
taxis remained fairly small as only the wealthy elites could afford the high costs.  
 Other foreign companies such as the Olivier Motorcar Department., Hanseo Magill 
Company, and Central Garage Company all joined the taxi business in 1911, seeking to rent out 
automobiles to the well-to-do foreigners who wanted to enjoy the luxury and status of riding the 
taxi. In 1914, five Chinese owned taxi companies began renting out taxis in the Chinese section. 
By 1921, there were 24 Chinese run taxi companies that offered taxis to the rich and powerful 
political leaders and businessmen in the Chinese zones. 
199
 By the 1920s, Chinese taxi companies 
such as The Eastern & Star Garage Company, Auto-Gastle, and Yunfei all had taxi stations 
where pick-up and delivery services were readily available. Some of the larger taxi companies 
had close to 100 taxis while the smaller companies had about 20 taxis at their disposal. It‟s 
typical for a Chinese merchant to buy an old or used car at discount price, then after remodeling 
the car, he would purchase a taxi license and began his own taxi business. After accumulating 
and refurbishing several old or used cars, the family-owned taxi business became more common. 
A designated lot could be purchased where cars could be parked, and an advertisement could be 
placed in the newspaper or phone book. The taxi business allowed several Chinese merchant 
families to become very wealthy during the late 1920s. 
200
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Figure 4.10: Chinese owned taxi company (1930) 
Several Chinese owned taxi companies sprang up to compete for business. Passengers included 
government officials and upper class elites. 
Source: Xue, Liyong (editor). Qiu Shanghai Zhujie Shenghuo (Old Shanghai Concession 
Lifestyles). Shanghai: Shanghai Shehui Kexueyuan Chuban She, 2002: p. 130. 
 
Some taxi companies charged different fees according to how many passengers rode in 
the car. In 1925, a small taxi that could seat two or three people charged 3 Yuan per hour, while 
a middle sized car that could seat four or five people charged 4 Yuan per hour, and a large mini-
van that could seat seven people charged 5 Yuan per hour. In addition to the fares, passengers 
were required to give the driver a tip, ranging from 40 to 60 cents depending on the distance 
traveled.
201
 This practice was designed to prevent free riders, as often a group of friends or 
colleagues would ride the taxi together. In this case, if more people wanted to ride the taxi, the 
group would be charged a higher fee. This was mutually beneficial to the taxi company as they 
could charge more money for more passengers, while spending the same amount of time and gas 
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transporting the riders, and for the riders themselves who could split up and share the total cost 
of the taxi. Overall, the taxi business only catered to a very small segment of the population, and 
served more as a symbol of public status for the wealthy rather than a significant transportation 
tool.  
Statistics 
 An estimate of number of operating motor vehicles in China showed that Shanghai had a 
disproportionate number of motor vehicles given the city‟s share of the total population: 
Table 4.8 











Motorcycles  Total 
Chinese Area 12 107 26 16 161 
French Concession 3,849 36 866 117 4,868 
International Settlement 6,162 120 1,815 804 8,901 
Military Vehicles 
registered 50   100 50 250 
Outside Districts 1,000 65 550 10 1,625 
Shanghai Total 11,073 328 3,357 997 15,805 
China Total 27,350 5,894 8,259 2,751 44,754 
Shanghai % of National 
Total 40.50% 5.60% 40.70% 36.20% 35.30% 
  
 Shanghai contained about 1% of the total population of China, but over 35% of the total 
motor vehicles and over 40% of all cars and trucks. The main reason was the lack of construction 
and maintenance of paved roads in other provinces. Approximately 90% of China‟s road mileage 
was made of simple earth construction. Very little gravel of macadam construction had been 
done. The usual method of road construction throughout China (excluding Shanghai‟s foreign 
territories) was to cut or fill to the level of the proposed road. When the proper level was 
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reached, the road may be either rolled or left to traffic to be beaten down. The mechanical 
equipment used was practically non-existent until the introduction of industrial railway dump 
carts. If the stretch happened to be a cut, the material excavated was shoveled by hand into 
baskets and carried away to a fill by two coolies, supporting the load on a bamboo pole slung 
from shoulder to shoulder. The surface was usually leveled by the use of a native-made form of 




 Automobiles and Buses in International Settlement and French Concession (1934) 
  
  International Settlement French Concession 
Public Automobiles 468 N/A 
Private Automobiles 5.818 4,015 
Total Automobiles 6,286 4,015 







 In 1934, only some 44,000 motor vehicles were in operation in China, with about one 
third alone found in the foreign territories of Shanghai. Beside having limited paved roads in 
other provinces, the tendency of provincial authorities themselves to operate or to grant 
franchises to private bus line companies for the exclusive use of given roads limited the 
opportunity for passenger cars. The right to operate motor cars over China‟s newly constructed 
roads was still chiefly reserved for government officials or bus line interests. Private citizens 
have little opportunity and few could afford a private automobile outside of the foreigners living 
in Shanghai. Increases throughout the 1930s in the numbers of automobiles were primarily 
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 The tables below compare the distances and passengers of trams, trolleys, and buses in 
















16,497,433 10,746,511 5,750,922 165,130,931 98,616,120 66,514,511 
 





















7,038,641 5,049,392 1,989,249 68,736,210 48,109,486 20,626,724 
 


















15,451,027 11,631,826 3,891,201 93,711,744 73,266,682 20,445,062 
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From the statistics, the trams appeared to be the most common method of motorized 
public transportation, with slightly more total distances traveled and passenger ridership than the 
buses. The trolleys covered less area and had fewer routes than trams. The total distances 
traveled and passengers served for trolleys were less than half the distances and numbers of 
trams and buses. The larger surface area and earlier installations of each type of motorized 
vehicles by the British in the International Settlement over the French Concession explained the 
differences between the two territories.   
By 1939, the public utilities available in Shanghai included the tramways, which operated 
36 ¼ miles of track and 20 ¾ miles of trolley bus routes. In 1938, trams and trolleys carried 
99,204,164 passengers. The China General Omnibus Company maintained 170 vehicles that ran 
5,240,675 miles and carried 57,813,484 passengers in 1936. By the end of 1938, the Shanghai 
Telephone Company had installed upwards of 63,000 telephones. The Shanghai Gas Company 
manufactured 806,159,000 cubic feet of gas; the Shanghai Waterworks Company‟s total output 
was over 16,154 million galloons, the Shanghai Power Company had a total generating station 
output of over 594 million kilowatt hours. In addition to trams and buses, there were 9,500 
public and 6,500 private rickshaws, 9,500 motor vehicles, 38,000 bicycles, 13,757 licensed 
handcarts, and 2,826 wheelbarrows in the city. 
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As a reflector of socioeconomic status, how does machine-powered public transportation 
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Vehicle Cost Distance 





Sedan Chair 20 silver dollars wedding rental
211
 
   
Rickshaw 10 cents first mile 





Bicycle 10-30 cents  one hour 








Vehicle Cost Distance 
Tram (first class) 3.71-5.02 cents (1940)   first mile 





Tram (first class) 6.37-9.11 cents (1941)  first mile 




Bus  5 cents one stop 
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 In comparing man-powered and machine-powered vehicles‟ rates and fares, trams and 
buses costs were similar to wheelbarrow, rickshaw, and bicycle costs. The ability to mass 
transport many passengers to designated locations along a route allowed trams, trolleys, and 
buses to be able to provide affordable and accessible travel for commuters. Man-powered 
vehicles could only transport an individual or at most several individuals. Given the man-power 
involved and the frequent tips that are often associated, traveling by rickshaw did not necessarily 
cost cheaper than riding the tram or bus. But the advantage of the rickshaw and bicycle was it 
could deliver an individual directly to a specific location, rather than a designated stop or station 
along a route. The convenience of being able to be delivered to your door step was a major 
reason rickshaws and bicycles were so popular. 
 The more expensive forms of transport were the taxi and the sedan chair. The taxi and the 
sedan chair provided an individual or individuals with the privacy of being able to sit inside a 
vehicle. Comfort and security could be guaranteed without riding alongside the masses of other 
passengers, as in the tram, trolley, or bus. Arguably the most expensive form of travel involved 
owning an personal automobile. The high costs of purchase, maintenance, and parking ensured 
that only the very wealthy could afford a private car.  










Prices of Food in International Settlement Markets (1940) 
 
Food Unit Price (Chinese Yuan) 
Beef 1 lb. 0.81 
Mutton 1 lb. 0.87 
Pork 1 lb.  0.72 
Veal 1 lb. 1.16 
Crabs 1 lb. 0.63 
Lobster 1 lb.  2.49 
Shrimp 1 lb. 0.67 
Bamboo shoots  1 lb. 0.53 
Cabbage 1 lb. 0.12 
Tomatoes 1 lb. 0.56 
Apples 1 lb. 0.29 
Bananas 1 lb.  0.22 
Oranges 1 lb. 0.38 






 It appeared that several round trip rides on the tram or bus was similar in cost to 1 lb. of 
food. Studies done during the 1930s on the percentage distribution of living expenses based on 
occupational background revealed how much of a worker‟s income was spent on food, clothing, 
rent, transportation, etc. 
Table 4.13 




Occupation Food Clothing Rent 
Fuel& 
Light Miscellaneous Total 
Rickshaw families 73% 6% 8% 11% 3% 100% 
Village families 67% 15% 5% 5% 8% 100% 
Farm families 58.90% 7.30% 5.30% 12.30% 17.50% 100% 
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   City workers 60.50% 8% 7% 7% 16.20% 100% 
Industrial workers 56% 9% 10% 8% 17% 100% 
Average 63.10% 9.10% 7.10% 8.40% 12.30% 100% 
 
 Another study of standard living among Chinese workers in Shanghai in Hangchow and 
Shanghai in 1931 examined the budget choices of urban, rural, and farm families. 
Table 4.14 
Percentage Distribution of Living Expenses among Chinese Workers in 1931 
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Type of  
Family Food Clothing Rent 
Fuel& 
Light Miscellaneous Total 
Urban workers 55.70% 8.00% 10.80% 8.80% 16.70% 100% 
Rural families 66.80% 18.70% 4.70% 3.60% 6.20% 100% 
Farm families 59.00% 8.20% 4.70% 12.30% 15.80% 100% 
Average 57.50% 7.50% 7.50% 10.00% 17.50% 100% 
 
 Transportation was categorized under fuel & light, and in both studies on average 
comprised a higher percentage of workers‟ budget than clothing and rent. Food was the biggest 
share of the total living expenses. Since food, clothing, and rent are basic necessities, any 
changes in prices or costs of other living expenses such as public transportation would have a 
profound impact on people‟s standard of living. A decrease in the cost of public transportation 
through more routes, stops, or lower fares would allow commuters to have more savings to spend 
on other living expenses. An increase in the cost of public transportation such as higher fares 
would force commuters to cut back on their other living expenses. 
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The Impact of Machine-Powered Vehicles on Society 
 The need to design a modern city that had modern conveniences similar to the cities in 
the West became the driving force to bring machine-powered motorized vehicles to Shanghai at 
the turn of the 20
th
 century. Given the increasing number of foreigners residing in the Settlement 
and Concession, modern public transportation satisfied the accommodations and needs of 
Westerners living in Shanghai. Each form of motorized vehicle played a specific role and served 
specific functions in the development of Shanghai‟s urban infrastructure during the early 20
th
 
century. The automobile and the taxi served as personal or private methods of transportation for 
the wealthy. But as population increased and traffic became a more urgent issue, trams, trolleys, 
and buses provided the means for mass transit. These forms of mass transport allowed for a large 
number of passengers to be transported to a designated location on a particular route.  
 These vehicles did not directly compete with each other for passengers. Trams and 
trolleys were better served for longer distance travel, as these vehicles traveled at faster speeds 
than buses but had fewer stops on their routes. They were more efficient in bringing passengers 
from the suburbs to downtown and vice versa. Buses were more efficient in downtown travel 
since there were stops every few blocks. More stops on the bus routes allowed passengers to get 
to downtown areas more effectively.  
 The wide range of public transportation choices allowed passengers to choose how to 
travel based on their socioeconomic status and living expenses. Trams symbolized the disparity 
in social and economic conditions between the rich and poor, foreign and Chinese with the first 
class and third class distinctions. Buses provided a more egalitarian method of travel. Luxury 
items such as the personal automobile or the taxi allowed privileged individuals to publicly 
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display their status. Each form of transportation saw significant increases in passenger ridership 
as continuous population increases raised demand for each type of vehicle.  
 While trams, trolleys, and buses became popular, they could not replace rickshaws or 
bicycles because they could not deliver passengers directly to their door steps. Rickshaws and 
bicycles remained popular because they were personalized forms of transport where the 
passenger did not have to share “public space” with the masses. Both man-powered and 
machine-powered vehicles had different roles and functions to serve, and each vehicle 





Figure 4.11: Various types of man-powered and machine-powered vehicles on the road. 
180 
 
Major roads in downtown areas were very congested with heavy volumes of traffic, especially in 
rush hours. 
Source: Wang, Liqun. Shanghai Shi Lunzi Zhuan Chulai De (The Wheels of Shanghai). 

















































































The relationship between state and society had been complicated given Shanghai‟s three 
separate zones of governance. Within this relationship, whose responsibility was it to provide 
public transportation infrastructure, choices, and accessibility? The authorities in charge, 
representing the state and the private enterprises, representing companies and entrepreneurs 
needed to collaborate on this major undertaking. What were the differences in how authorities 
determined and delegated the construction of public transportation between foreign and Chinese 
controlled areas? How did these authorities come up with policies for the city‟s layout? Did 
private enterprises effectively lobby political authorities for their own financial profit? Were 
there a working partnership between the state and the private enterprises? This chapter will focus 
on the public and private relationship where government agenda and private enterprises worked 
together to build Shanghai‟s public transportation infrastructure. The two sides depended on each 
other: the authorities needed to develop an efficient system that could accommodate the growing 
population and reduce traffic congestion. The private companies needed government authorities 
to pass laws and regulations that would allow them to profit from society‟s increasing demands 
for accessibility and mobility. Much of this working relationship had been based on mutual 
benefits; and for both sides in all three political jurisdictions, the stakes were enormously high. 
 In examining the politics behind public transport, this chapter will show that the 
construction of new roads and placement of major routes or stops had definite political reasons 
behind them. The determined locations and placements for public transport were designed with 
specific intentions and motives behind them, which were to allow government authorities to 
better establish political control. The uneven developments in urban infrastructure caused 
Shanghai to witness significant differences or gaps in access and mobility. Certain areas of the 
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city became much more developed than others, which resulted in higher population density and 
economic prosperity for these designated areas that became more commercially vibrant. Other 
“less-important” areas of the city lagged behind in infrastructure developments, and could not 
match the better-developed areas in attracting population growths and commercial activities. 
Real estate values were directly linked to access to public transport. The uneven developments in 
public transportation would shift Shanghai‟s population density greatly, and reshape the city‟s 
identity in the 20
th
 century.  
International Settlement 
 Construction of more and larger roads was a top priority for the Shanghai Municipal 
Council as the International Settlement witnessed a significant expansion of the size of its 
territory and the growing population. In December 1908, the Shanghai Municipal Council 
officially asked Mr. Johannis de Rijke, an experienced Dutch civil engineer as “Engineer-in-
Chief”, where the Council would directly ask him for advice. W.E. Leveson, Secretary of the 
Shanghai Municipal Council had presented a plan showing suggestions for the construction of a 
road 75 feet in width along the Whangpoo (Huangpu) river front between Yangtszepoo Creek 
and the Point, which would greatly facilitate the flow of travel and commerce. The needs for the 
construction of this major road would be for shipping, since Shanghai depended almost entirely 
upon shipping trade for its prosperity. 
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 In a memorandum written by William Carlson, Harbour Master to H. Elgar Hobson, 
Commissioner of Customs, Shanghai, Carlson described the increase of shipping in 1908 as 
being so great that the space within the Harbour Limits had been totally inadequate for its 
accommodation. He advocated the extension of Harbour Limits to Tung Kou Creek, a stretch of 
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1.6 miles, which would be suited for the construction of wharves with accommodation for 
vessels. 
221
  In a letter written from the Harbour Master to Secretary Leveson, Carlson 
emphasized that “wide public roads should be laid down along the bank of every ride and sea 
front.” New roads constructed should be 55 feet in width. These wider roads add greatly to the 
appearance of the city when buildings are being built along the river banks. In the letter, Hobson 
noted that de Rijke, the Engineer-in-Chief felt that new road construction along the Whangpoo 




Figure 5.1: Laying the tracks in International Settlement (1907) 
Tracks had to be built before trams could arrive. 
Source: Xue, Liyong (editor). Qiu Shanghai Zhujie Shenghuo (Old Shanghai Concession 
Lifestyles). Shanghai: Shanghai Shehui Kexueyuan Chuban She, 2002: p. 121. 
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Figure 5.2: Intersection of Nanjing Road and Jiangxi Road in International Settlement (1910) 
Nanjing Road would become the busiest shopping area in Shanghai. 
Source: Xue, Liyong (editor). Qiu Shanghai Zhujie Shenghuo (Old Shanghai Concession 
Lifestyles). Shanghai: Shanghai Shehui Kexueyuan Chuban She, 2002: p. 223. 
 
 
 A letter from the engineer and surveyor for road construction plans from 1915 to 1918 
was published in the Shanghai Municipal Gazette on January 28, 1915. The report indicated 
there were 44,032 pedestrians, 17,800 rickshas (rickshaws), and 5,714 other traffic in the Eastern 
and Western Districts of the International Settlement. Fourteen major road construction plans 
were proposed, and later approved by the Municipal Council upon the recommendation of the 
engineers who had thoroughly inspected the territories. The proposed plans included the 
widening of North Fokien Road Extension to 40 feet and its deviation to meet Cunningham 
Road. The widening of Foochow Road to 50 feet throughout. This road was to be one of the most 
important Chinese roads in the Settlement and would be the center of the chief places of 
amusement. The widening of Bubbling Well Road to a width of 50 feet where it has not yet so 
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scheduled; its extension to Tifeng Road and junction with Great Western Road. The widening of 
Great Western Road west of Siccawei Road to 60 feet and its further extension, which had been 
favorably considered by he Council. The widening of Siccawei Road south of Edinburgh Road 
and extension of the latter northward to Jessfield Village. The construction of a new road from 
Kiaochow Road to the corner of Singapore Road, northward to Soochow Creek. The widening of 
Gordon Road to 50 feet and a short extension northward to the Soochow Creek. The widening of 
Carter Road to 50 feet throughout and Markham Road south of Connaught Road. The widening 
of North Thiet Road to 60 feet forming a continuation northward of the wide road formed by the 
culverting of the Defense Creek. 
 These proposals were not intended to deal completely with the whole question of road 
extensions and widening, but they deal broadly with the main arteries. The weakest area of 
development, according to the engineers was the area bounded by Soochow Creek, Carter Road, 
Bubbling Well Road, and Thibet Road. The widening of Yates Road to 50 feet would be a great 
improvement to existing traffic but should also involve radical improvements of the area around 
Bubbling Well Road and Burkill Road junction. The report concluded that in parts of the Eastern 
and Western Districts where the development of Chinese properties are indicated, the blocks are 
too big and immediate roads must be scheduled. The schedule for these road constructions 
should be completed by 1918, according to plans. 
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 Numerous new road constructions led to the establishment of the “Traffic and Licensing 
Bye-Laws Committee”, which was appointed on March 21, 1916. This committee was organized 
to set forth traffic laws and regulations throughout the International Settlement. Fines and 
penalties were set for each type of traffic violations. These included: 
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“Every person in charge of a vehicle shall keep on the left side of the road and when 
passing other vehicles, shall do so on the right hand side. “ 
 
“Every pedestrian and every person in charge of a vehicle shall obey the signals of the 
Police engaged in regulating traffic, and must stop at once when required to do so.” 
 
“Every person in charge of slow and heavy traffic and rickshaws shall keep to the sides of 
the road, leaving the centre for fast traffic.” 
 
“No person in charge of a vehicle shall keep the vehicle standing at the entrance to any 
building, store, or residence as to block the approach to subsequent arrivals, and impede 
the passing traffic.” 
 
The penalty cause for any person violating these laws and regulations would be liable 




To better accommodate the increasing traffic, the Municipal Council decided to 
significantly widen the roads and extend the lengths. The engineers had recommended to the 
Municipal Council‟s Works Committee that the “irregular lines of roadway scheduled in 1903 
prior to the advent of the motorcars are not best suited for present-day traffic requirements.” The 
engineers advocated for straighter and wider roads in order to avoid bends and curves. On 
September 17, 1917, construction began on a main road from east to west by joining East Yalu 
Road to Pingliang Road, widening the roads to 50 feet in width. The new Brenan Road would 
form a continuous and direct road from the railway station to Jessfield Park, about eight miles in 
length. This road intersected the densely populated areas in the Northern District and would 
divert much traffic from the Central District. 
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Since the Municipal Council took annual taxes from residents, or “ratepayers”, the 
interests of the residents had to be taken into consideration. A letter from Ada French, a resident 
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in the Settlement addressed to J.B. Mackinnon, Esquire; a member of the Municipal Council 
reflected what the residents wanted. In French‟s letter, she asked on behalf of the residents that 
the Council build more well-laid roads and improve the conditions of the existing roads. She 
suggested that the approach to widen and lengthen Broadway, but that the municipal should not 
grant licenses for the Chinese to set up either shops or houses facing the road. The Chinese 
landlords could still build one foreign house and perhaps even ten or twenty Chinese places at 
the rear of the road. She wrote that many in the British Community felt compelled to live in the 
French Town because their facilities were well laid out. Many people were dubious about living 
in the Settlement because they felt it was still the “Chinese quarter”, and that the British have 
scarcely any place to allocate to new settlers; many of them were living in alleys in the Hongkew 
district in semi-foreign houses. She requested a new school was badly needed in the area from 
Muirhead Road on one side and Yangtszepoo Road on the other side to as far as Tongshan Road 
and Lay Road. This would make the area a more attractive model settlement. 
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The Municipal Council held meetings that specifically addressed residents‟ concerns. 
During the meeting on August 11, 1916, the Council met with the engineer and surveyor and 
agreed to “readily give its support for such a project but that the initiative must come from the 
whole of the landowners concerned.” 
227
In a return letter from the Acting Secretary to Mrs. 
French, the Council acknowledged the receipt of her letter on the subject of town planning in the 
Eastern district. However, the Council stated that “it had no powers as to stipulate the style of 
buildings which shall be erected on any specified locality”. Support would be given to any 
reasonable and justified project residents proposed, “but it would require the sanction of all the 
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  The Municipal Council was willing to take any resident‟s requests 
and suggestions into consideration, but would only approve any projects or initiatives if all, or at 
least the vast majority of residents were going to be satisfied.  
In an earlier report on September 4, 1917, a comparison of the roads in the French 
Concession was made to advocate the increase widening of roads. A reference was noted that in 
the French Extension area, it had been proposed to have no roads under a width of 20 meters. 
The French had viewed wide roads as essential for the development of a foreign residential area. 
The Works Committee noted that the International Section had numerous sections densely 
populated with Chinese, and wide trunk roads through these areas to the outlying districts are 
essential for commuters. While some engineers had recommended widening the roads even 
more, the Council decided that 40 feet was sufficient width around Avenue Edward VII, 
Yangtszepoo, Pingliang, North Szechuan, Nanking, and Gordon Roads. Other roads away from 
these densely populated areas would be widened even more. 
Muirhead Road was widened to 60 feet and Chaoufoong Road was widened to 50 feet to 
form direct and much needed access between the Wayside District and the neighborhood of Rifle 
Range and Hongkew (Hongkou) Recreation Ground. East Seward, Seward, and Tiendong Roads 
were widened to 60 feet to form a main thoroughfare from Wayside District to North Szechuan 
and North Honan Roads. Seward Road had been very congested due to its convergence with 
Broadway, where widening would relieve the congestion on the northern approach of the Garden 
Bridge. Honan and North Honan roads were widened to 50 feet since Honan Road formed a 
good alternative road from the Central District northward, and because it had been the direct 
route from the old North Gate of the city to the Shanghai Railway Station. A census taken in 
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January 1915 had showed Honan Road had carried the most traffic, thus increasing the width of 
the road would alleviate and accommodate more traffic flow. 
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In the engineers‟ report to the Works Committee, they laid out the reasons for widening 
and extending certain main arteries of the Settlement. The engineers felt the traffic congestion 
had been due to the lack of foresight on the part of the early residents decades ago, who did not 
consider the need to built roads wider than the passing of two wheelbarrows. Because of 
inadequate width of minor roads, residents in outlying districts had to pass through the heart of 
the Central District, thus swelling an already congested volume of traffic in the business quarter. 
The Works Committee proposed to increase the width and length of roads between the Western 
District and the Hongkew Recreation Ground to provide better direct communication, and to 
make it feasible for travelers to move from Jessfield to the Point (railway station) without using 
the heavily congested Nanking (Nanjing) and Szechuan Roads. In some cases, a minor 
connexion of existing roads were considered to be suffice, while other roads required more 
extensive widening and extensions. 
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Beside engineers, residents continued to express the desire to increase the size of the 
roads for better accessibility and mobility. In a letter from J.J. Symmington and others to N.O. 
Liddell, the acting secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Council dated on February 15, 1918, 
Symmington wrote “the ratepayers and residents in the Eastern District request laying a road 
giving direct communication between the Yangtszepoo District and the areas around the Public 
School for Boys and Hongkew Recreation Ground.” The letter noted that at present, a boy 
attending the Public School has to travel by tram right up to the Garden Bridge junction, then 
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change cars and journey along North Soochow Road, North Szechuan Road, and North Szechuan 
Extension. This is a very long and dangerous journey, with great loss of time and fatigue to 
children. Symmington expressed that he and other residents are greatly concerned about the 
dangers to which young boys are exposed to when changing cars, especially at the general rush 
hour for cars around the Astor House corner. The alternative, which will allow boys to commute 
to school safer and quicker involve considerable extra expenses. This is why the letter asked for 
a new and wider road directly connecting the Yangtszepoo District and the Northern District. 
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In a return letter to Symmington dated March 8, 1918, Liddell wrote that after 
considering the request, the Council fully realized the need for direct communication between 
Yangtszepoo and the neighborhood around the Public School for Boys. Instructions have been 
given by the Council to the engineers for steps taken to improve the means of transportation 
between the Eastern and Northern Districts. 
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After the road construction was approved, the engineers and surveyors wrote back to the 
Council secretary with their proposed road connecting Yangtszepoo District with the Public 
School for Boys and Hongkew Recreation Ground. The engineers submitted a plan dated on 
April 13, 1918, proposing a possible connection of the Muirhead Road with Urga Road. That 
section to the west of Kungping Road was comparatively clear of houses and can be easily 
acquired. The engineer-in-chief suggested the acquisition of this section of the road immediately. 
The portion to the east of Kungping Road presented more difficulties, and would be necessary to 
remove several foreign houses and acquire lot 1139. A direct continuation of the Muirhead Road 
is not possible as access is not obtainable through the Wah Hai Miao (temple) property. The 
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recommendation was that the section east of Kungping Road be scheduled in the ordinary way 
and the land acquired when the opportunity became available.  
With regard to the more direct access to the Public School for Boys through an extension 
of Chaoufoong or Kungping Road, three options were suggested. First option was to cooperate 
with the Chinese authorities. This would mean that the road would be constructed over the 
course of the next few months, but the control would pass over to the Chinese whereas the cost 
of acquisition, construction and maintenance would be covered primarily by the Municipal 
Council. Second, purchase a series of holdings adjacent to each other and with these acquisitions 
cutting out the necessary road area. This involved purchasing considerable surplus land but there 
would be no difficulty in disposing of such land, one the land is constructed. This method 
through land purchases would raise land values. The drawback in this scheme would be a 
leakage of information which may result in the Council having to pay exorbitant fees for the final 
connecting links. The third option would be to arrange a company such as the Shanghai Land 
Inmant Company, Ltd., to purchase an estate on the proposed road. It would be understood that 
the Council would allow the company to develop the land and that one half of the purchase price 
of the road be funded by the private company. This action would fund the Dixwell Road 
Extension. The third choice was the most promising with the engineers suggesting road 




After reviewing the engineers‟ recommendation, the Works Committee approved the 
connexion of the Urga and Muirhead Roads and the extension of the Kungping Road. 
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 On 
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March 4, 1919, a petition was submitted by 39 residents of the Eastern District requesting the 
provision of better road access between Wayside and the Public School. The engineer-in-chief 
advocated in his report for the construction of trunk thoroughfares, but that this extension 
proposed had great practical difficulty since it involved traversing a triangular shaped-area,  
which was located not only outside the boundaries of the Settlement, but was not included even 
in the extension area. It was suggested that a practicable route would be to deviate Muirhead 
Road to meet Urga Road, and this course was approved by the Works Committee on March 4, 
1919. 
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 After inspecting the site, the engineer-in-chief affirmed that the project could be 
completed at a cost of 16,700 taels (1 Chinese Yuan= 0.72 taels) 
236
 with additional charge for 
lighting.  
 On August 16, 1920, the members of the Works Committee endorsed road planning of 
the whole Settlement area with the scheduling of roads through unregistered land. The 
Commissioner of Public Works, appointed by the Municipal Council would assume the 
leadership of all urban infrastructure development projects starting in 1921. 
237
 C.H. Godfrey was 
appointed as the Commissioner of Public Works. In his first letter to the Secretary of the 
Municipal Council, he detailed his vision for future road planning developments. The central 
question addressed was the direct connection between road planning and traffic congestion, both 
vehicular and pedestrian. When the intersecting roads are a considerable distance apart, such as 
when the blocks of house property are large, the roads served a larger number of people than 
would be the case if the blocks were smaller. Godfrey noted that in other public works, the 
greater the road area compared to the property area, the less congestion on the roads. He 
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continued by comparing other large urban cities by pointing out most large cities have 
regulations governing the distance between intersecting streets, and despite the density of the 
population in Shanghai, most of the blocks of property were very much larger here than would 
be allowed elsewhere. 
 In comparison, in Leeds the maximum distance allowed between intersecting streets was 
150 yards, and in Liverpool the regulation was the same, except that in the case of blocks of 
property in one occupation, a distance of 400 yards was permitted. In Shanghai, the block of 
property bounded by the Bund, Hankow, Szechuen, and Foochow Roads was 150 yards square. 
Godfrey showed that in reference to the plan of the Settlement that while the blocks were not 
excessively large in the Central District; this was not the case in other districts, particularly the 
Western and Eastern. The cost of cutting up blocks of existing house property with additional 
intersecting roads would be enormous, but something could be done in the case of undeveloped 
or partially developed districts. The difficulties would be of course, the strong opposition from 
land owners and others with vested interests, as it would cut up so many properties, and the costs 
would be an important factor. The report concluded that while the road planning was tentative, it 
was considered to have advantages. 
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 A report from Charles Reade, government town planner and J.M. McKee, his assistant 
secretary, based on their observations and inspections to the Municipal Council on August 7, 
1922 outlined the challenges and feasibility of road widening plans. The report informed the 
Council that 1) the width of the road represents the width between buildings. As a general rule, 
buildings can be erected to a height equal to one and a half times the width of the land. Owners 
desiring to build to a greater height than allowed by the rules would be compelled to set back the 
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upper stories. 2) Owners do not anticipate widening. All road widening and extensions are 
definitely laid down on plans issued annually, and all new buildings are to be erected to these 
lines. 3) Payments are to be made for the land, when available for public use, and when the 
necessary formal surrenders had been executed. 4) For purposes of taxation and acquisition of 
land, the registered property within the Settlement would be assessed every five years, though 
this period had occasionally been reduced, owning to fluctuations in land values. 
 The annual road widening planned reflected all of the Council‟s approved proposals and 
requirements for the current year. When these plans were officially approved by the Council, a 
notice appeared in the Municipal Gazette stating that the plans would be open for inspection and 
that land owners have the right for three months after publication of such notice to protest in 
writing against any road extension or widening or scheduling for public purposes. Such protests 
would be considered by the Council, and if considered advisable, alterations would be made in 
the official plans. No hard and fast rules could be laid down as to the amount of compensation 
payable to land owners, with each case being considered on its individual merits. But it was 
customary in the case of land required for roads to base compensation upon the assessed value of 
the property less a deduction (varying from one-fifth to two-thirds) for betterment with a final 
addition of 10% for compulsory surrender. Occasionally, if the land scheduled for acquisition 
had been without road access, a free surrender of the necessary road land would be demanded. 
Under Land Regulation 6a., land which becomes registered after a road was scheduled would be 
subject to compulsory free surrender. 
 With regard to land which had been used for public purposes such as parks, markets, etc., 
the price paid would usually be higher than the assessed value, and in these cases the 
compensation would be a matter of arbitration or compromise. A case of land acquisition was 
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only referred to the Land Commission when it was found impossible for the Council and the land 
owners to agree. In the outlying districts, Chinese or unregistered land, as opposed to registered 
land, it would usually be acquired at the “Proclamation Rate”, which was approximately the 
value of land for agricultural purposes and had been settled between the Council and the Chinese 
authorities concerned. On the other hand, Chinese land which was situated in the more developed 
portion of the Settlement would be accorded the same treatment as land in the possession of 
foreign owners, provided that the owners would undertake to affect Consular registration or to 
pay land tax on an assessed value of the remaining portion of the property. 
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 On April 17, 1923, the Municipal Council released a report of the new road 
constructions, widening and extensions that had taken place in the International Settlement: 
Table 5.1 
District Open to Traffic (Miles) 
Not Open to Traffic 
(Miles) Total Miles 
Central 7.3 None 7.3 
Northern 5 0.4 5.4 
Eastern 15.4 5 20.4 
Western 12.4 0.8 13.2 
Total 40.1 6.2 46.3 
 
 Of the 40 miles now open to traffic, 30 miles were approximately still incomplete and 
negotiations would be necessary to widen for this length. The Eastern and Western districts saw 
significant new road constructions that increased access for passengers into previously unpaved 
or unsettled territories.  
Table 5.2 
Trunk Roads 
60 feet wide or over 
Miles 
Under 60 feet wide  
Miles Total Miles 
Outside Settlement 8.5 18.5 27 
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 New roads were to be over 60 feet wide in order to allow more vehicles and pedestrians 
to pass through, as well as to allow for vehicles to park on the edges of the streets. Included in 
the 8.5 miles for roads that are 60 feet wide or over were sections of approximately four miles in 
length for which negotiations were necessary or ongoing to complete to full width. The total 
length of roads within the Settlement Boundary was now 158 miles long. The total area of the 
Settlement was 33,503 mow. Of this area, paved roads comprised 5,750 mow, or 17.2% of the 
total. Deducting the paved roads, it left 27,753 mow of available land in the Settlement for 
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Figure 5.3: Hongkew (Hongkou) district in International Settlement 
Scale: 1 inch=1,000 feet 
Hongkou, on the north side of the International Settlement was considered a very desirable 
residential neighborhood. 





Figure 5.4: International Settlement Boundary 
Scale: 1 inch= 1,000 feet 
The International Settlement continued to expand, bordering the Huangpu River. 
Source: Shanghai Municipal Archives. 
 
 
 In the report, the Council released a detailed mileage of main roads in each district with 
the schedule width and length of roads that were expected to be completed by the end of 1923. 
Table 5.3 




The Bund Avenue Edward VII & Garden Bridge   0.7 
Szechuen Avenue Edward VII & Soochow Bridge 70‟ 0.8 
Honan Avenue Edward VII & Soochow Road 60‟ 0.8 
Fokien Avenue Edward VII & Soochow Road 60‟ 0.7 
Thibet Avenue Edward VII & Sinza Road 80‟ 0.8 




Table 5.3 Continued 
  Soochow The Bund & Thibet Road 70‟ 0.9 
Nanking The Bund & Thibet Road 60‟ 0.9 











North Thibet North Soochow & Settlement Boundary 80‟ 0.3 
North Chekiang North Soochow & Settlement Boundary 60‟ 0.5 
North Fokien North Soochow & Boone Road 60‟ 0.4 
Cunningham Boone Road & Settlement Boundary 60‟ 0.3 
North Honan North Soochow & Settlement Boundary 60‟ 0.6 
North Szechuen North Soochow & Settlement Boundary 60‟ 0.5 
Seward Broadway & Fearon Road 60‟ 0.3 
Broadway Garden Bridge & Fearon Road 75‟ 0.4 
Alabaster Settlement Boundary & North Chekiang 60‟ 0.3 
Tongdongkaloong North Chekiang & North Kiangse 60‟ 0.3 
Tiendong North Kiangse & Broadway 60‟ 0.5 
Haining Settlement Boundary & Chapoo Road 60‟ 1.6 










Broadway East Dixwell Road & Muirhead Road 75‟ 0.9 
East Seward Dixwell Road & Muirhead Road 60‟ 0.9 
East Yalu Dixwell Road & Tongshan Road 60‟ 0.5 
Ward Muirhead Road & Linching Road 70‟ 1.8 
Pingliang Yangtszepoo & Liping Road 70‟ 3.1 
Yangtszepoo Muirhead Road & Liping Road 75‟ 3.6 
Point East Seward & Linching Road 80‟ 3 
Point Linching Road & Normal Line 120‟ 1.4 
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Table 5.3 Continued 
  Muirhead Yangtszepoo & Settlement Boundary 60‟ 0.9 
Dalny Yangtszepoo & Settlement Boundary 60‟ 0.9 
Lay Yangtszepoo & Ward Road 60‟ 1 
Sansing Yangtszepoo & Ward Road 60‟ 0.8 
Glen Yangtszepoo & Point Road 60‟ 0.5 
Kueiyang Yangtszepoo & Hochien Road 60‟ 0.5
 











Avenue Foch Chungking Road & Avenue Haig 70‟ 1.4 
Manila Changtu Road & Avenue Edward VII 90‟ 0.3 
Avenue Edward VII Manila Road & Thibet Road 90‟ 0.4 
Avenue Haig Avenue Foch & Bubbling Well  60‟ 0.1 
Jessfield Bubbling Well & Settlement Boundary 60‟ 0.1 
Kiaochow Avenue Road & Yuyuen Road 60‟ 0.1 
Gordon Bubbling Well & West Soochow 70‟ 1.8 
Yates Bubbling Well & Avenue Foch 60' 0.5 
Chengtu Avenue Foch & West Soochow 60‟ 1.2 
Mohawk Bubbling Well & Avenue Edward VII 60‟ 0.4 
Robison West Soochow & Settlement Boundary 60‟ 0.8 
Sinza Thibet Road & Settlement Boundary 60‟ 2.1 
Bubbling Well Thibet Road & Settlement Boundary 70‟ 2.1 
Great Western Avenue Haig & Settlement Boundary 60‟ 0.03 






The road constructions focused on widening and extensions during the 1910s and 1920s 
paid off in significant renovations and upgrades in each of the districts within the Settlement. By 
the early 1920s, the Settlement had become very accessible for an increasingly mobile urban 
population and a wide range of man-powered and machine-powered vehicles. 
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 On January 17, 1928, Charles Harpur, the Commissioner of Public Works wrote to 
Captain E.I.M. Barrett, the Commissioner of Police with a table of the mileage of roads and 
public alleyways and the distance in miles of roads and public alleyways patrolled by the police. 
Table 5.4 
  Roads Public Alleyways 
Western District     
    Inside Settlement 45 15 
    Outside Settlement 13   
Central District 21 6 
Northern District     
    Inside Settlement 22 12 
    Outside Settlement 3   
Eastern District A 36 7 
Eastern District B 9   




Distance in Miles of Roads and Public Alleyways Patrolled by the Police 
 
      
  Roads Public Alleyways 
Western District     
Inside Settlement 45 15 
Outside Settlement 13   
Central District 21 6 
Northern District     
Inside Settlement 22 12 
Outside Settlement 3   
Eastern District A 36 9 
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 “Letter from C. Harpur, Commissioner of Public Works to Captain E.I.M. Barrett, Commissioner of Police.” 
January 17, 1928. Shanghai Municipal Archives. 
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 The construction in the Settlement caught the attention of the American Consul General 
in Shanghai. Edwin Cunningham, the American Consul General was very impressed with how 
the Municipal Council managed to revamp the urban layout and wanted to ask Stirling 
Fessenden, the Chairman of the Shanghai Municipal Council for advice in this letter dated 
January 15, 1929: 
“Sir: I have the honour to inquire if it is possible for this Consulate General to obtain 
from the Municipal Council information regarding the total number of miles of roads, 
suitable for motor traffic, in operation, under construction, and projected in the 
International Settlement; and a list classified by types of their construction, viz: 
Macadam, concrete, asphalt, dirt, and cinder, etc. It is needless to state that any 
information received will be much appreciated. 
      I have the honor to be, Sir, 
      Your obedient servant, 
      Edwin S. Cunningham 




 The Commissioner of Public Works replied back to the American Consul General with a 
table of the description of roads: 
Table 5.6 
Present Mileage of Roads (January 23, 1929) 
Districts 
Description Central Northern Eastern Western Total Miles 
Waterbound  2,723 7,349 20,465 33,743 64,280 
Macadam           
Bituminous 12,596 10,836 7,004 12,740 43,536 
Concrete           
Sett Paved 5,232 6,435 3,110 1,500 16,278 
Wood Block 0.945       0.945 
Unmetalled   0.484 17.643 30.404 48.531 
Total 21.856 25.105 48.222 78.387 173.57 
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 Waterbound macadam, bituminous concrete, sett paved, and wood block are suitable for 
motor traffic in all weathers but unmetalled would only be suitable in fine weather. The program 
for road construction in 1929 had not been approved but it may be assumed that about three 
miles of the unmentalled roads would be converted into waterbound macadam roads. 
247
  
 Harpur also provided a description and mileage of roads within the Settlement that was 
under Municipal Council‟s control: 
Table 5.7 
Districts 
Description Central Northern Eastern Western Total Miles 
Waterbound  2,755 5,066 21,736 19,695 40,252 
Macadam           
Bituminous 12,999 8,968 7,634 10,750 40,351 
Concrete           
Sett Paved 5,157 6,333 3,045 1,500 16,035 
Wood Block 0.945       0.945 
Unmetalled   0.23 16.833 3.681 20.744 
Total 21.856 20,597 49,248 35,626 127,327 
  
The length of alleyways was 54.22 miles, situated as follows: 
 Central District: 2.44 miles 
 Northern District: 3.36 miles 
 Eastern District: 25.22 miles 
 Western District: 23.20 miles 
 Total: 54.22 miles 
 
 The length of drains and sewers are: 
 
 Storm and surface water drains 
Inside Settlement: 101 miles 
Outside: 8.2 miles 
Total: 109.2 miles 
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January 23, 1929. Shanghai Municipal Archives.  
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 Sanitary sewers 
  Inside Settlement: 37.6 miles 
  Outside: 7.4 miles 
  Total: 44.8 miles 
 
 Total mileage of paved roads 
  Inside Settlement: 127,327 miles 
  Outside: 47, 545 miles 
  Total: 174, 870 miles
248
 
 The years from 1929-1933 saw the significant road expansions and renovations under the 
leadership of Charles Harpur as Commissioner of Public Works. Both large roads and private 
alleyways were widened, expanded, and upgraded. 
Table 5.8 
Mileage of Private Alleyways in the Settlement (February 6, 1930) 
Settlement Mileage  
Eastern District:  57.6 miles 
Northern District:  51.7 miles 
Central District:  34.7 miles 







Harpur had ambitious plans for expanding roads and mileage. His projected goals for 
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Mileage of Roads as of December 31, 1929 
Districts 
Description Central 
   
Northern Eastern 
    
Western   Outside Limits Total Miles 
Total Completed 21,856 20,597 49,248 35,626 47,513 174,840 
Projected (1930) 0.417 1,060 11,435 10,159   23,071 






 Harpur insisted that all new roads must be built with waterbound macadam, bituminous 
concrete, sett paved, or wood block. These four types would be suited for motor vehicles in all 
types of climate. No new roads would be constructed using unmetalled surface, as this type 
would only be suitable in fine weather. The Public Works Commission focused their tasks on 
increasing road expansions in the less developed and less densely populated Eastern and Western 
districts in order to accommodate more residents who are moving away from the crowded 
Central and Northern districts in search of more affordable housing.  
 In actuality, the mileage of completed roads at the end of 1930 fell short of Harpur‟s 
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Mileage of Roads as at December 31, 1930 
Description Central 
     
Northern Eastern 
    
Western   Outside Limits Total Miles 






 In 1930, a total of 8.49 new miles were added to the Settlement under the terms of 
Extension Agreement of 1899. Of the new mileage of roads, 4.34 miles were constructed by the 
Council, which remained outside of the Settlement limits. The mileage of external roads between 
the Western Boundary of the Settlement and the Railway Line was now 20.4 miles. 
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 Harpur was not detoured by the failure to reach his targeted goals for road construction in 
1930. For 1931, he set even higher expectations for increasing the mileage of roads in further 
urban expansions. In his report to the American Consul General, he submitted his projected goals 
for 1931: 
Table 5.11 
Mileage of Roads as of December 31, 1930 
Districts 
Description Central 
     
Northern Eastern 
    
Western   Outside Limits Total Miles 
Total Completed 21,929 21,657 50,022 35,903 47,513 175,964 
Projected (1931) 0.417 1,060 11,435 10,159   23,071 
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 Harpur had set the same projected target for 1931 as he had for 1930. By the end of 1933, 
while the mileage of roads had increased significantly over 1928, it nevertheless fell far short of 
Harpur‟s expectations. 
Table 5.12 
Mileage of Roads as of December 31, 1933 
Districts 
Description Central 
     
Northern Eastern 
    
Western   Outside Limits Total Miles 
Total 22,058 25,311 53,445 81,195 47,513 229,522
254 
 
 Harpur may have set unrealistic targets but under his leadership, the Public Works 
department focused on constructing and paving new roads inside territories within the 
Settlement‟s boundary, or under the Municipal Council‟s direct control. There were no 
constructions in the outside limits of the Settlement. Growth and expansion in the International 
Settlement had resulted in significantly more miles of paved roads than the French Concession. 
In a letter from the International Labour Office‟s China Branch to Charles Harpur dated July 17, 
1934; a comparison between mileage and roads in the International Settlement and French 
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Total Inside Settlement 136.01 
    
Outside Limits: Northern 3.8 
Outside Limits: Western 20.4 
Total Outside Limits 24.21 







 The mileage of roads in the territories within the Settlement boundaries was more than 
twice as large as the mileage in the French Concession. Much of the expansion growths could be 
attributed to the higher population density in the Central District that propelled the Municipal 
Council to construct new roads to reduce traffic congestion and find new residential areas. The 
Public Works Commission and the engineers worked to accommodate residents‟ needs, and 
devised annual construction and expansion plans.  
 Charles Harpur wrote back to the International Labour Office, China Branch on 
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 Just like the road construction plans, most of the expansions in the alleyways were in the 
Eastern and Western districts, which were home to more and more residents during the late 
1920s to early 1930s. 
 Despite numerous accomplishments, there were still plenty of problems for Shanghai‟s 
roads. An article written in the Shanghai Times by S.H. Peek, a member of the Rotary Club 
highlighted the challenges that traffic strangulation had on a city of continuously growing 
population. Peek noted that despite road widening, the fundamental trouble with the roads was 
that they were still too narrow for the volume of traffic they are called upon to bear. He asked if 
this was the case today, how would the roads handle more population density, more number of 
motor cars, and the demands of motorists, rickshaws, hand-drawn trucks, wheelbarrows, 
bicycles, and pedestrians in rush hour traffic every day in the years to come?  
 Peek suggested that in the extremely densely populated Central and Northern districts, 
once a road widening had been scheduled, the Council should not grant any building permit for 
reconstruction on the scheduled area- any new building erected on the lot will have to be set back 
to the new building line. A major traffic congestion point prone to accidents had been at Peking 
Road, which had been increased in width to 70 feet since 1921 but when it joined the Bund, it 
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was only 40 feet wide at the intersection- quite a nasty bottleneck for the heavy traffic of 
vehicles and pedestrians. Charles Harpur had released figures regarding the expenditure the 
Public Works department had incurred during the years from 1926 to 1933 a sum of more than 
14 million dollars for the 936 areas where road construction and renovation had taken place. The 
amount claimed as compensation by the owners who were called upon to surrender land totaled 
nearly 21 million dollars. The total road frontage affected was 162,428 feet. These figures 
showed how much more rapid progress was made during the “boom” years when many new 
buildings were erected. In 1931, the expenditure was nearly 3 million, but in 1933, it dropped to 
$1,264,000. The question of financing any serious scheme to expediting the road widening 
programs had become more difficult. 
 The cost of road widening increased with the rise in land values, a correspondingly 
greater amount would be required each year to merely maintain the present rate of development. 
In 1920, most of the eastern district was undeveloped farm land, and only isolated lots were even 
registered. These stood at around 500 taels per mow. In 1927, the figure had gone up to 3,000 
taels, and in 1934, it has reached 7,000 taels. The average price paid for the area acquired for the 
following year could be as high as 8,200 taels per mow. After a road widening plan had been 
approved, the Council must pay the land owner for heavy compensation. Not only must the land 
be paid for, but also the building, plus loss of rent, and disturbance of trade. Since it would be 
difficult and expensive to maintain the previous pace of road widening, Peek believed a solution 
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An editorial appeared in Shanghai Times the next day that insisted many people felt there 
really was no acute traffic problem in Shanghai. They point to the absence of any serious traffic 
blocks such as occur in London or other large cities, to the fact that it was possible for residents 
to get from their homes to their offices in 20-25 minutes even if they lived in the more outlying 
residential areas away from the city center. The more efficient traffic control by the police had 
prevented many accidents during rush hour times. However, the editorial did support Peek‟s 
perspective of the need to create a cleaner city with wider arterial thoroughfares, a planned 
provision for the future, the creation of adequate pavement room on which pedestrians could 
walk in safety and comfort, and the uncluttering of roads in the downtown business district by 
the removal of hundreds of parked cars which could seriously obstruct the flow of traffic. 
258
  
Another editorial appeared in the North China Daily News that same day that addressed 
the financial challenges of continued road widening. The article described Peking Road having 
already made significant progress in widening that had now given to more freedom in the flow of 
traffic. However, the difficulty in adopting an intensive program of road widening was chiefly 
tied to expenses. This would not arise solely from the cost of compulsory acquisition. There were 
indirect costs such as the economic loss on the community as a result of relocation and pushing 
back construction of new houses for residents affected. Furthermore, looking at the present 
(1934) state of trade and worldwide economic depression, such an increase in taxes would be 
considered excessively burdensome for both foreigners and Chinese residents alike. The editorial 
concluded that the traffic problem cannot be discussed entirely in terms of the inconveniences 
caused to less than 15,000 car owners in Shanghai. The city will have to do the best it can to deal 
with the roads and traffic given the resources available. 
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Charles Harpur had been very conscientious of the comparisons between the International 
Settlement and French Concession. In a letter he wrote to his colleague E.B. Howell, Esquire., in 
England, Harpur highlighted the differences between the Settlement and the French Concession: 
Table 5.15 
Total Mileage of Motor Roads in Shanghai Area 
Under Control of    Under Control of    Under Chinese 
International Settlement  French Concession   Control 
138.279 miles (surfaced)  64.617 miles (all surfaced)            186 miles (mostly ash) 
44.749 (mud)             
183.028 (total) 
 
Area of Shanghai Districts 
 
Area of International Settlement Area of French Concession Area under Chinese Control 
Acres Acres Acres 
5,723 2,525 122,265 
 




Public School for Girls 0.568 





Sassoon House 0.719 
Chapoo Road Bridge 0.492 
Boone 0.397 
Jukong 0.416 
Japanese Public School 0.511 
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 Harpur wanted to make sure the Municipal Council as well as his colleagues in England 
was well aware of accomplishments under his leadership as the Commissioner of Public Works. 
In his annual reports, he reiterated his achievements and the differences in road and mileage 
between the Settlement and the French Concession. While Harpur took the credit for road 
expansions and renovations instead of sharing the recognition with the engineers and surveyors, 
road constructions were indeed faster and more roads were paved than in the French Concession. 
The International Settlement had more than twice as much in total mileage of paved roads than 
the French Concession, and access and mobility were more convenient for residents in roads and 
alleyways than the French area. The major difference between the foreign controlled territories 
and the Chinese city was the roads under foreign control had surfaced pavement while the 
Chinese roads were mostly ash. 
 In 1940, the Municipal Council released a report with data on public and private roads 
within the Settlement. Public roads are considered to be public property and under the direct 
control of the Council, while private roads are residential homes and private property owned by 
landowners and real estate developers. 
Table 5.16 
District 
Public Roads & 
Alleyways 
Private Roads & 
Alleyways Total 
Western 24.18 miles 108.59 miles 132.76 miles 
Central 2.83 miles 36.40 miles 39.23 miles 
Northern 4.52 miles 48.38 miles 43.90 miles 
Eastern A 14.87 miles 73.48 miles 88.35 miles 
Eastern B 14.84 miles 17.23 miles 32.07 miles 
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 Most of the roads and alleyways fell under the category of private, as residential homes 
and private businesses comprised the majority of the area in the International Settlement. Public 
roads were where government buildings, large department stores, public schools, shopping, and 
entertainment centers were located. 
 In May 1943, the Council‟s Cadastral Plan set exact boundaries to each district and 
created health departments and revenue offices in each district. 
Western District 
Northern Boundary: Soochow Creek 
Western Boundary: Boundary Line of the International Settlement 
Southern Boundary: Avenue Edward VII-Avenue Foch, Luzon Road 
Eastern Boundary: Yu Ya Ching Road 
 
Central District 
Northern Boundary: Soochow Creek 
Western Boundary: Yu Ya Ching Road 
Southern Boundary: Avenue Edward VII 
Western Boundary: the Whangpoo River 
 
Northern District 
Northern Boundary: Boundary Line of the International Settlement 
Southern Boundary: Soochow Creek 
Eastern Boundary: Hongkew Creek 
 
Eastern District A 
Northern Boundary: Boundary Line of the International Settlement 
Western Boundary: Hongkew Creek 
Southern Boundary: The Whangpoo 
Eastern Boundary: The Yangtszepoo Creek 
 
Eastern District B 
Northern Boundary: Boundary Line of the International Settlement 
Western Boundary: The Yangtszepoo Creek 
Southern Boundary: The Whangpoo River 




 Three days later on May 17, the Council set the sub-division of the Settlement by various 
departments. Upon the recommendation of the Commissioner of Public Works, the Settlement 
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was divided into five districts, each with a land office. For the convenience of building 
surveyors, each district had been subdivided into blocks: Central district= 25 blocks, Northern= 
20 blocks, Eastern A= 36 blocks, Eastern B= 29 blocks, and Western= 39 blocks. The health 
department and revenue office in each district would be in charge of providing health care and 
collecting tax revenues from residents living in each respective district. The police department 
had divided the Settlement into 13 districts with a police unit patrolling each district. The police 
districts were Pootoo Road, Gordon Road, Bubbling Well Road, Sinza Road, Chengtu Road, 
Lousa Road, Central District, West Hongkew, Hongkew, Kashing Road, Wayside, Yulin Road, 
and Yangtszepoo. 
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 The plans were made under the period of Japanese occupation. 
Chinese City 
 Chinese authorities faced many more challenges than the foreign territories in dealing 
with road construction. Unlike foreigners, who could rely on experienced civil engineers and 
surveyors that had worked on major urban cities in the West, the Chinese did not have the pool 
of well-trained engineers. Most of the roads in the Chinese districts of Nanshi and Zhabei were 
unpaved or paved with ash. Population increases had put a tremendous amount of pressure for 
the Chinese government to build wider and more accessible roads. Having seen the foreign 
territories undergo successful road widening, extensions, and constructions of new roads that 
connected busy commercial spots together, the Chinese looked to the foreigners for suggestions. 
 Much of the road constructions in the Chinese controlled territories of Nanshi and Zhabei 
came much later than the road widening and expansions in the International Settlement. In the 
late 1920s, the Guomingdang had solidified much of the political control over the country by 
defeating regional warlords and geared their focus toward urban development. For the GMD, it 
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would be crucial to provide economic development in order to win over the civilian population‟s 
support and to further establish credibility and legitimacy over the Chinese sections of the city 
they had control of.  
 On February 2, 1929, the Shanghai Special Municipality‟s government decreed that 
major roads would be widened to ensure vehicle and pedestrian safety, and to allow for more 
traffic flow. Mayor Zhang Dingpan ordered heavy government investments to be made in road 
renovations. In the first stage, the following roads would be widened: 
Table 5.17 
Road Width (chi, 1 chi = 33.33 cm) 
 Donglu Yuan  40 
 Pubing 40 
 Shenjia Garden 50 
 Longhua Zhen 20 
 Anhai 30 
 Houjiabing 36 
 Luban 50 
 Xietu 50 
 Rijun 40 
 West Rijun 30 
 Lujiabing 80 
 Chaoxie 22 
 Huining 40 
 Xiexu 40 
 New Guangdong 12 
 Haichang 20 





















Table 5. 17 Continued 
                                                           
District Road Width (chi) 
Gaoqiao Haigao 10 
Zhenruo & Pusong Zhenbei 10 







 The following year on March 13, 1930, more road widening was ordered by the Chinese 
municipal government. Attention was focused on not only making the roads wider, but on 
connecting roads to each other to make travel and transportation smoother. 
Table 5.18 
District Road Width (chi) 
Luxi Zhenning 15 
  Huashan 25 
  Yejiamao 15 
  Kaixuan 18.3 
  North Caoxi 40 
Zhabei northern part of Xinmin 30 
  Song Park 45 
Yinxiang southern part of Jimei 35 
  middle part of Silian 12.2 
City Center Pentagon square of Xiangying 35 
Pudong South Madou 20 
  southern part of Nanpu 35 
Wusong Tongsong 35 






Shen Yi, the Chinese Commissioner of Public Works often consulted with Charles 
Harpur of the International Settlement for advice. In a letter from Harpur to Shen dated on 
September 17, 1930, Harpur wrote to Shen regarding plans relative to the alignment of the 
                                                          
264
 “Shanghai Special Municipality Government Decree: Mayor Zhang Dingpan.” February 2, 1929. Shanghai 
Municipal Archives. 
265
 “Shanghai Special Municipality Government Decree.” March 13, 1930. Shanghai Municipal Archives. 
219 
 
Municipal Council roads where they would connect with the roads of the Chinese municipality. 
Harpur pointed out that road extension from Mokanshan Road to West Soochow Road would cut 
through well developed mill property and thus necessitate high cost and result in an indefinite 
delay in construction. He suggested that the scheduling of a road in this locality be deferred until 
an opportunity of making a connection appeared more favorable to both the Settlement and the 
Chinese municipality. With regard to Mokanshan Road, Harpur offered an alternative scheme 
that necessitated the scheduling of a road through the southern portion of the Cantonese 
Cemetery instead of bisecting it as present proposal indicated. This will provide further 
advantage of connecting the Robison Road in the Settlement with Kwang Tsao Road in the 
Chinese city. Harpur concluded by mentioning that Robison Road would be an important 
thoroughfare serving the western section of the Settlement and extending to Jessfield Park. He 
understood that Kwang Tsao Road was also of considerable importance to the Chinese 
municipality, and that such a connection would be mutually beneficial for both municipalities. 
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 On December 12, 1931, the Shanghai Special Municipality released government 
documents detailing the status of the roads under Chinese control, with their current widths. 









Bailinan (west part) 20 
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Table 5.19 Continued 
Bailinan (east part) 17.5 


































Nanjing Hejie 5.5 




Table 5.19 Continued 
Youche Lane 5 
Sixin Lane 5 
Sanyi Lane 5 
Peixiu Lane 5 
Miantang Lane 4.5 
Yongchang Lane 4.5 
Pingyuan Lane 4.5 
Jinlin Lane 4.5 







 Reduced government revenue, financial problems, and the Sino-Japanese War halted 
further road renovations until the end of World War II. From November 1946 to November 
1948, the GMD turned their attention to the Huangpu district. New roads were built and older 
roads were renovated. This was the last urban development project by the GMD as they would 
be defeated by Communist forces and forced to evacuate Shanghai in May 1949. 
Table 5.20 
Huangpu 
Roads Width (che) 
Tianmu 30 
North Zhejiang 20 
Central Zhejiang 20 
South Zhejiang 20 
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 The Chinese city began road constructions on widening and extending the lengths of the 
roads much later than the foreign controlled territories. A later starter, poor infrastructure, and 
the lack of experienced engineers and surveyors all hindered the road renovations project in the 
Chinese municipality. While roads were widened and lengthened, the grounds of the Chinese 
city remained primarily an ash-filled terrain. When it rained, the road surface became very 
difficult to navigate through. For these reasons, population density was lower and far fewer 
vehicles were on the roads than there were in the International Settlement or French Concession. 
Despite active government involvement in developing the urban infrastructure, the Chinese 




Public Control and Private Responsibilities 
 In the International Settlement, the Municipal Council set forth the laws and regulations 
regarding all matters in the boundaries within their control. Their public revenues came from the 
taxpayers, or residents living under the Settlement‟s jurisdiction. The Municipal Council left the 
responsibilities of providing transportation to the private sector, and allowed the market forces to 
dictate the types of vehicles and options available for each form of transportation. The major 
responsibilities for the Municipal Council was to ensure public safety and set forth standardized 
license requirements to operate all forms of vehicles navigating on the roads. The Traffic and 
Licensing Bye-Laws Committee was formed in 1916, comprising of elected officials and 
engineers to set traffic laws and license regulations. By 1916, when the automobile, tram and 
trolley, and taxis have all arrived in Shanghai‟s roads, the Council felt such a Committee would 
be absolutely necessary to deal with so many different types of vehicles. 
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 In their very first meeting, the Committee made five recommendations to the Council, 
which were immediately approved and set into law.  
1) “The Police should insist upon slow moving traffic keeping to the sides of the roads 
and also upon pedestrian traffic, in busy streets, keeping to the footpaths as far as 
convenient and possible, without prejudicing the rights of such pedestrian traffic.” 
2) “The licenses relating to ammunition, firearms and similar articles should contain a 
condition by which the Council may acquire such articles, when conveyed in bulk 
through the Settlement, to be accompanied by a police officer.” 
3) “The licenses relating to the sale of ammunition and firearms should contain a 
condition by which the Council shall require the vendor, within 24 hours of sale to 
furnish the police with the name and address of the purchaser.” 
4) If possible, an arrangement should be made between the Council and the Customs 
Authorities whereby the latter shall agree to furnish the Council with a full 
description of all ammunitions passing through their hands into and out of the 
Settlement.” 
5) “It should be quite understood by all concerned that the annexed bye-laws are no way 
intended to prejudice the inherent right of any Ratepayers‟ Meeting to criticize or 




Besides setting laws, the Committee did not favor any type of vehicle over another, or 
give preference to any private company seeking to capitalize on the public transportation needs 
of the Settlement‟s population. The British owned Shanghai Electric Construction Company was 
the first to move into the mass transit market to provide service for the electrification of the 
routes that the trams would be used. The Shanghai Tram Company (Shanghai Dianche Gongsi in 
Chinese) was a British tram company that had seen the successes of the European multinational 
Tianjin Tram Company (Tianjin Dianche Gongsi) in Tianjin‟s concessions. This company was 
convinced there would be a huge potential market for the trams once the road tracks were 
completed, and having seen the successful implementation of the trams in European cities, they 
were confident it would be well-received in Shanghai as well. The Shanghai Tram Company had 
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the first mover advantage in that once the tracks were completed they immediately introduced 
their trams into the city.  
 
Figure 5.5: Tram Tracks Completed in International Settlement (1914) 
Trams were especially effective for long distance commute because they were faster than buses, 
but tram routes had fewer stops.  
Source: Xue, Liyong (editor). Qiu Shanghai Zhujie Shenghuo (Old Shanghai Concession 
Lifestyles). Shanghai: Shanghai Shehui Kexueyuan Chuban She, 2002: p. 124. 
The successes of the trams allowed the Shanghai Electric Construction Company to 
successfully lobby the Municipal Council to install rail-less electric cars: the trolleys. Their 
argument was the trolleys did not need tracks and would be less expensive to maintain. The 
Municipal Council approved this in 1913 and the following year, the Shanghai Tram Company 
introduced trolleys into the city. Since the Shanghai Tram Company had seized control of the 
tram and trolley market, no other British owned tram company could tap into the Shanghai 
market. The Shanghai Tram Company had been a huge success by introducing first, second, and 
third class seats to distinguish between the passengers; and by introducing multiple routes that 
covered all parts of the Settlement to make the passengers‟ commute much more convenient and 
accessible before. After seeing the successes of the trams and trolleys, and that passenger safety 
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was ensured, the Traffic and License Bye-Laws Committee did not interfere with the Shanghai 
Tram Company‟s operations as long as safety standards were met. The Shanghai Electric 
Construction Company managed to successfully lobby the Council‟s Public Utilities Committee 
to raise fares on several occasions to accommodate increasing costs of operations and 
maintenance.  
The British owned British Bus Company (Yingshang Gonggong Qiche Gongsi) was the 
first mover to come into the bus industry. As buses became more popular in Western cities, the 
British Bus Company felt there would be demand for bus services in Shanghai. The British Bus 
Company believed they could provide a service for passengers who wanted to travel shorter 
distances and come move around more conveniently in the city center since the buses had more 
stops than trams and trolleys. Once the British Bus Company seized control of the bus market by 
gaining the approval of the Municipal Council in 1924, and through expanding their routes and 
stops, they were the only bus service in the Settlement. 
Unlike the British Tram Company and Bus Company, the automobile and taxi industries 
had numerous competitors. In 1932, there were over 400 different automobile makers listed in 
Shanghai. However, the motor car trade in Shanghai was practically monopolized by the agents 
of around 20 automobile companies, which dominated more than 50% of the automobile 
business. The big players were American models such as Ford, Chevrolet, and Buick. The 







Make International Settlement French Concession Total 
Ford 803 671 1,474 
Chevrolet 498 405 903 
Buick 639 343 982 
Morris 487 352 839 
Overland 302 169 471 
Fiat 300 136 436 
Studebaker 297 115 412 
Citronen 175 225 400 
Austin
 
224 116 340 
Essex 181 142 323 
Renault 135 181 316 
Nash 198 101 299 






 American cars came to dominate the automobile industry in Shanghai by the 1920s. More  
 
American-made motor cars were introduced into the city than any other country, surpassing even  
 
British and French automobiles in the International Settlement and French Concession.  
Table 5.22 
  1925 1926 
USA 578 1064 
Great Britain 351 381 
France 266 433 
Canada 296 361 







 The reasons behind the success of the American automobiles were more than just their 
quality. American motor companies aggressively marketed themselves in the advertisement 
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sections of Shanghai‟s newspapers such as The North China Daily News, The Shanghai 
Municipal Gazette, etc. American mass production also played significant roles in the dominance 
of the automobile market. David Hounshell described the successes of the assembly lines and 
interchangeable parts in Ford Motor Company‟s factories in From the American System to Mass 
Production, 1800-1932, which allowed Ford to produce more quantities of automobiles at lower 
prices. 
272
The competitive advantages of mass production resulting in lower prices along with 
advertisements all contributed to the successes of the American cars. Likewise with trams, 
trolleys, and buses, the Municipal Council allowed automakers to set up their businesses in the 
Settlement without any interference as long as they met the laws and regulations for vehicles set 
by the Traffic and License Bye-Laws Committee. 
 Just like private automobiles, the taxi business in the Settlement was very competitive 
with numerous companies fighting to attract customers. The major players were the Huanqiu 
Taxi Company (Huanqiu Gongying Qiche Gongsi in Chinese), the Oriental Tax Company 
(Oriental Qiche Gongsi), Olivier Motorcar, Hanseo Magill Company, and Central Garage 
Company all had their own respective areas throughout the Settlement. While Huanqiu was the 
first to arrive in 1908, the other taxi companies all establish their businesses by 1911. The cars 
used and fares varied by each taxi company, and they all managed to gain their foothold in 
Shanghai due to the relatively small number of private automobile owners. Each taxi company 
was able to set their own fares without seeking the approval of the Council. 
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In the French Concession, a similar French Municipal Council was established to govern 
the population under the French jurisdiction. After the creation of the French Municipal Council 
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in 1862, a series of public works took shape following the trends in the International Settlement. 
Road construction and the arrival of machine-powered vehicles appeared usually appeared 
several years after the British controlled International Settlement as the French authorities paid 
careful attention and observation to what the British Shanghai Municipal Council was doing. 
Road construction projects were followed by work on drainage, paving, and sewers; funded by 
mandatory contributions through taxes from property owners living in the French Concession. 
From 1887, the French Council started a land register in order to raise local and property taxes. 
Road constructions were regulated and had to be approved by the French Council.  Perspectives 
were defined, which doesn‟t seem to have been the case for the International Settlement, whence 
the difficulty of joint realization of infrastructure work, such as the filling-in of the 
Yangjingbang Creek, which had become an open sewer. Common projects were, nonetheless, 
completed, such as the slaughterhouse, the cemetery, and a fire department water tank, and 
traffic and police rules were decided jointly. 
Created in 1906, the French Shanghai tram company fared well and by the 1930s had 100 
trams, 60 buses, and 38 trolleybuses, and supplied countless households with electricity and 
water. Although its salaries were somewhat lower than those of its British rival in the 
International Settlement, the company was forward-looking and offered better welfare benefits: 
housing, relief funds, cost of hospitalization and treatment, school funds. 
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Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, there were numerous tram strikes in the French 
Concession. During these strikes, the French Council stepped in to resolve tensions either 
through increasing wages for tram and trolley workers, raise fares to increase revenues, and 
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pardon strikers in exchange for them to return to work. 
275
 The French Bus Company (Fashang 
Gonggong Qiche Gongsi) was the only bus company that navigated through the Concession. 
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The routes and distances covered were smaller than the British bus companies in the Settlement 
given the smaller size of the French Concession. However, just like the British, the French Bus 
Company focused on transporting passengers in the densely populated downtown areas through 
numerous stops every few blocks. American cars dominated the private automobiles in the 
French Concession just like they had in the Settlement. American cars such as Ford, Chevrolet, 
and Buick outsold French vehicles such as Renault. 
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Chinese capitalists had sensed the opportunities to make profits by catering to the 
growing demand for better access and convenience in the Chinese municipality. They attempted 
to learn as much as possible from the foreign companies in setting up their own businesses. In 
the 1920s, Chinese taxi companies such as Eastern & Star Garage Company, Auto-Gastle, The 
Central Garage Company, and Yunfei all found growing number of wealthy clients like Chinese 
government officials and businessmen who wanted the comfort and privacy of personalized 
travel. The Chinese taxis provided this service for the Chinese elites and made profits. 
278
 By the 
1930s, more than two decades after the foreign territories, Chinese trams and trolleys appeared in 
the Chinese city and mapped their routes along busy roads. 
279
 There were two Chinese bus 
companies that covered the territories of Nanshi and Zhabei. The Chinese Bus Company 
(Huashang Gonggong Qiche Gongsi) and the Nanshi Bus Company (Nanshi Gonggong Qiche 
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Figure 5.6: Bus routes in Shanghai (1949)  
Buses were more effective for commuters to downtown areas because bus routes contained more 
stops than trams or trolleys. In downtown areas, there was a bus stop every couple of blocks. 
Source: Shanghai Municipal Archives. 
 
The Chinese capitalists had hoped for a strong Chinese government to lessen the foreign 
economic power and influence in Shanghai to the benefit of Chinese businessmen. Ironically, 
most Chinese capitalists desired to live in the foreign controlled International Settlement and 
French Concession because of better infrastructure and services, as well as the financial and 
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personal security afforded to them in living in foreign territories after they had made their 
fortunes doing business in the Chinese city. 
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 While Chinese capitalists and the Chinese 
municipal government shared the mutual agenda of wanting to reduce foreign power and 
influence, the two groups differed on many major issues. The tensions and disagreements 
between the Chinese municipal government and Chinese capitalists prevented better 
collaboration and coordination throughout the 1920s and 1930s. 
The Chinese capitalists were upset at the constant financial pressure they faced from the 
municipal government to pay more taxes to bankroll and fund the GMD‟s large scale projects. 
While their banks, businesses, and finances provided the GMD government with much of its 
income, the constant new taxes and forced loans imposed on wealthy Chinese capitalists caused 
them financial difficulties and eroded their support for the municipal government. The inability 
of the Chinese municipal government to challenge the foreigners and to take back foreign 
territories had been a long-standing source of shame and humiliation among the Chinese. This 
was especially true with the Chinese elites such as capitalists and intellectuals. The Chinese 
capitalists had felt the municipal government had been too weak to dare to fight for Chinese 
interests in the face of foreign powers, and this caused them to be extremely angry. The Chinese 
municipal government had been upset that so many of the wealthiest Chinese capitalists had 
lived in the foreign territories and were not paying their share of income and property taxes to 
the Chinese authorities. Lastly, tensions built up as more Chinese capitalists desired for a direct 
political voice in Shanghai politics.  
The capitalists demanded for direct representation within the GMD party and for official 
recognition of the legitimacy for private capital. They set up organizations such as the chambers 
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of commerce and banking associations in an attempt to influence public policy through effective 
lobbying and even threats of withholding their taxes. However, Chiang Kai-shek had established 
himself as the supreme leader of the GMD party and wanted to further solidify his political 
control. He was unwilling to allow any class or social group to become too independently 
powerful and repeated squashed attempts by wealthy Chinese capitalists to interfere with the 
GMD‟s state building plans. 
282
 In Chinese controlled Shanghai, the result was the GMD had the 
political power and the Chinese capitalists had the financial power. They had a tension-filled 
hostile working relationship with each other in that they both needed each other but could not 
agree on key principles.  
Public Revenues 
 The International Settlement and French Concession both relied on public revenues from 
their populations to fund public works. The following data tables show the comparisons between 
British and French public revenues during the 1930s:  
Table 5.23 
1934 
  International Settlement French Concession 
Total Revenues ($ U.S.) $23,474,291.73  $9,673,551.67  
Principles sources of revenue     
   Land tax $6,914,750.31  $2,522,310.60  
   Rental assessment $10,996,562.17  $3,252,139.05  
   License fees $3,090,685.63  $2,039,642.01  
   Miscellaneous $1,980,169.49  $814,137.84  
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  International Settlement French Concession 






Throughout the 1930s, the International Settlement generated almost 2.5 times more 
revenue than the French Concession with a difference of $23 million per year for the Settlement 
and less than $10 million per year for the Concession. This significant gap could be attributed to 
the advantages the International Settlement had in land taxes, rental assessments, and license 
fees. Given the International Settlement had much larger sizes in terms of both surface area and 
population, the Settlement was about to generate far higher revenues and incomes after 
expenditures than the French Concession. Larger revenues meant higher expenditures on public 
works projects, thus allowing the Settlement to develop more roads, more routes, and more 
vehicles than the Concession. 
 In all three territories, the state, whether it was the Shanghai Municipal Council in the 
International Settlement, the French Municipal Council, or the Chinese municipal government 
had to satisfy the growing demands of the population under their jurisdiction. For the most part, 
all three governments were involved in setting the laws and regulations for road constructions, 
determining the location of routes to make traffic flow more smoothly, and to provide better 
access and greater conveniences to their passengers. The governments determined the 
requirements necessary for licenses, as well as ensured vehicle and pedestrian safety standards. 
The private sector was given the opportunities to capitalize on the growing demand for public 
transportation to make profits. In each of the three territories, private companies such as tram and 
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trolley companies, bus companies, automobiles, and taxi services were able to tap into this large 
consumer market and make significant profits. The increasing populations meant a growing 
demand for public transport services and options, and each form of private companies: trams and 
trolleys, buses, automobiles, and taxis had enough customers that needed their services.  
In the tram and trolley business, the first mover advantage allowed the British Shanghai 
Tram Company and the French Tram Company to seize control of the market before anyone else. 
This occurred in the bus business as well with the British Bus Company and French Bus 
Company monopolizing the bus market. In the Chinese municipality, Chinese businessmen 
learned from the foreigners and established their own businesses to cater to the demands of the 
Chinese population. Two bus companies carved out their own respective territories in two 
different parts of the Chinese city. However, the automobile and taxi businesses saw a plethora 
of choices. American automobiles were able to aggressively advertise and market themselves, 
and through their mass production techniques that reduced prices found their way to become the 
dominant player in Shanghai‟s market. Numerous foreign as well as Chinese taxi companies all 
targeted the wealthy and elite in providing the comforts of private travel for those who want to 
avoid public transportation.  
Comparing the three territories, the British controlled International Settlement developed 
urban infrastructure and introduced machine-powered motor vehicles the earliest. The 
International Settlement was ahead of the French Concession in terms of infrastructure, and the 
introduction of vehicles by a few years. The French modeled their plans after the British. The 
Chinese municipality lacked the financial resources and technical expertise, and developed much 
later than the foreign controlled territories. This caused the bulk of Shanghai‟s population to 
continue to reside in the foreign territories as infrastructure and services were much better there. 
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The growing feelings of nationalism and the rising power of the GMD party under Chiang Kai-
shek set the stage for the Greater Shanghai Project in 1927: a plan by the Chinese government to 
transform Shanghai into the city where GMD political control could be strengthened and 
economic developments could be made to showcase a new and modern Chinese city.  
  


















































 After the Guomingdang defeated the various regional warlords and began to strengthen 
their control over China, a new capital city was formed in Nanjing. The Nanjing Decade of 1927-
1937 would see the GMD party attempt to consolidate and solidify their power through state-
building programs aimed at fostering a sense of national loyalty under the banner of economic 
development. Shanghai‟s status as the most populous and most commercially important city 
would become the focal point of the GMD‟s state-building plans during this decade. The Greater 
Shanghai Project of 1927-1937 would be a massive restructuring project where the GMD, with 
the assistance from the Shanghai municipal authorities envisioned a radical transformation of 
Shanghai‟s urban landscape. Unable to take back the foreign concessions by force, the GMD 
strategized the creation of a new Shanghai: a city where a new city center would convince 
Chinese residents to move away from the foreign controlled territories to Chinese controlled 
areas. This would allow the GMD to solidify their power and control to a more grassroots level. 
To accomplish this ambitious plan, the GMD needed to use public transportation as a critical 
vehicle to implement their urban planning and construction. Their goal was the reconfiguration 
of space, where the bulk of Shanghai‟s Chinese population would leave the foreign territories 
and be resettled in newly constructed Chinese zones, where the GMD could enforce their control. 
To achieve these grandiose plans, the GMD needed the technological blueprint necessary to 
create a new and modern city from scratch, and they must do it quickly. 
 Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 will focus on the Greater Shanghai Project of 1927-1937. This 
chapter will describe the first half of the Greater Shanghai Project from 1927-1932. During this 
phase, questions such as what were the initial intentions of the GMD‟s new urban planning 
visions, why they selected the area of Jiangwan as their new city center, how they planned to 
build new urban infrastructure, their financial sources of public revenue, and the roles each 
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mayor played in implementing the GMD‟s actions will be discussed and analyzed. This chapter 
will critically breakdown the initial successes and triumphs the Greater Shanghai Project 
achieved in a short period of time, the challenges the GMD and local municipal authorities faced 
in continuing this Herculean construction project, and the unexpected difficulties they faced as 
they move toward the second half of their decade-long plan. In order to understand the purpose 
and mission of the Greater Shanghai Project, it would be crucial to realize the fundamental 
motives behind this political agenda, as well as the key actors involved and their personal 
outlook of this ambitious modernization plan.  
 This chapter will explain the reasons and motivations behind the timing of the Greater 
Shanghai Project. There were two major political agendas that the GMD government based in 
Nanjing wanted to achieve in this decade-long campaign. The first was to build a modern 
metropolis with a brand new city center located in Jiangwan, a previously remote and primarily 
unsettled territory that would attract large numbers of Chinese residents to relocate there. 
Second, the GMD wanted to show the foreign powers ruling over the concessions that a Chinese 
regime was fully capable of governing and presiding over a modern city. While the GMD could 
not recapture the foreign concessions by military force, such a modernization campaign would 
gain the GMD regime respect and credibility among both the Chinese and foreign residents of 
Shanghai. As an authoritarian regime, the GMD was well aware that the best way to gain the 
credibility and legitimacy of their political rule among the Chinese people would be through 
economic development, by improving the lives of the people they want to govern. By using the 
rhetoric of economic development under the banner of national interest, the GMD had hoped the 
Greater Shanghai Project would quickly gain the support of Chinese citizens, especially wealthy 
Chinese capitalists living in foreign concessions. If the people were fully behind this 
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modernization campaign, the GMD believed implementation of government policies, and 
eventually political consolidation and grassroots control would be easy to follow. This was the 
GMD‟s mission and purpose in orchestrating the Greater Shanghai Project in the summer of 
1927. 
 While the Greater Shanghai Project could not be considered a success in that it failed to 
accomplish its original motives, the movement should not be considered a total failure. In this 
chapter, progress and improvements in urban infrastructure in the form of building new roads, 
improving access and mobility for commuters, and the construction of major buildings in the 
designated Jiangwan region will be discussed. In looking at the first half of the Greater Shanghai 
Project up until early 1932, it can be observed that the GMD had indeed achieved significant 
progress. They had learned from the foreign concessions in designing and building a new city 
center, and through heavy government investments, building plans that looked grandiose and 
overly ambitious seemed to be possible and realistic. However, Chapter 6 will address the 
reasons behind the demise of the Greater Shanghai Project through both external forces that the 
GMD could not control: the Japanese invasion and impending Sino-Japanese War as well as 
internal forces, most notably financial difficulties and limited public revenue that doomed the 
second half of the Greater Shanghai Project from 1932-1937. To fully understand the nature of 
the Greater Shanghai Project and the importance of Shanghai‟s strategic location to the GMD, it 
is important to understand the rise of the GMD as the political party that would rule China 
following the collapse of the last imperial dynasty: the Qing in 1911. 
The Rise of the Guomingdang 
 When the Guomingdang party took power and founded the new Chinese Republic in 
1912, they faced numerous challenges. After being ruled for thousands years under successive 
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imperial dynasties, GMD leader Sun Yat-sen felt that China was not yet ready for democracy. 
Accordingly, Sun came up with his three-stage idea, instituting that the Republican party (GMD) 
after attaining power, should lead the Chinese people first through military rule and then into a 
period of tutelage under the party‟s guidance. Only after a measure of wisdom and sense of 
responsibility have been achieved by the people, could they move into a period of genuine self-
rule under the Republican constitution. Sun also determined that the GMD party would have a 
well-defined hierarchical structure, with members divided into three groups. Founding members 
such as himself would perform executive and legislative functions in the government; those who 
joined the party later on during the military rule could vote and hold office, while those who 
joined later could only have the vote only. 
285
 
 While Sun Yat-sen was the most influential political leader, he was not as experienced in 
military affairs. General Yuan Shikai took power soon afterwards and when Yuan died in 1916, 
China lacked a strong centralized government. As a result, many regional and provincial 
warlords set up their own armies and controlled the power in their home regions or provinces. 
The GMD had limited political control in China outside of the major cities; and even in cities 
like Shanghai, the GMD were only able to govern small parts of the city not controlled by 
foreigners. When Sun Yat-sen died in 1925, a power vacuum occurred in the GMD leadership to 
replace him as the supreme leader of the party. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, trained at the 
Whampoa Military Academy quickly assumed control of the GMD leadership. His first order of 
business was to launch a Northern Expedition to crush regional warlords and to bring all of 
China under GMD control. Chiang‟s military victories over warlords gave him enormous support 
and respect among the GMD‟s leadership. By the spring of 1927, Chiang‟s primary concern was 
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no longer about the regional warlords his army had defeated, but the growing influence of the 
Chinese Communist Party based in Shanghai. 
 On March 21, 1927, the General Labor Union under Chinese Communist Party direction, 
launched a general strike and held an armed insurrection. Some 600,000 workers were involved 
and the city came to a standstill with power and telephone lines cut, police stations seized, and 
railway stations occupied. The strikers were under orders not to harm any foreigners, which the 
insurrectionists obeyed. Chiang‟s Nationalist troops entered the city in late March. Chiang had 
issued reassuring statements to the foreign community and praised the unions for their 
“constructive achievements.” He held meetings with wealthy Shanghai industrialists, local 
officials, and the leading Green Gang gangsters and underworld figures. A secret alliance was 
formed between Chiang‟s GMD and the Green Gang to crush the Communist movement in the 
city. On April 12, the Green Gang assisted by troops from Chiang‟s Nationalist army attacked 
the headquarters of all the city‟s large unions. Many union members suspected of being 
Communists or Communist sympathizers were killed, hundreds more were arrested and 
imprisoned. When shanghai workers staged a mass protest rally the next day, the GMD troops 
fired on them and killed many protesters. More arrests and executions of suspected Communists 
continued in the following weeks. The General Labor Union organizations were declared illegal, 
and all strike activities were forbidden in the city. What would be later known as the “Shanghai 
massacre of 1927” was over and the GMD had consolidated their power over the Chinese city.
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 Chiang Kai-shek had sent a clear message to the Chinese residents of Shanghai. Labor 
unions had long been suspected of being under Chinese Communist Party (CCP) influence. As 
the GMD moved in to strengthen their stronghold over the Chinese sections of the city, the 
events in the spring of 1927 clearly showed that crushing their political opposition and 
solidifying their power over the city was of paramount importance and of the highest priority to 
the GMD regime.  
 The relationship between Chiang and Shanghai‟s capitalists and industrialists had been 
contentious. Chiang needed to raise millions of dollars per month in order to pay his Nationalist 
troops and to ensure the final stage of his Northern Expedition against the warlords would 
succeed. Chiang used the intimidation approach to force the chairman of the Shanghai Chamber 
of Commerce to provide the bulk of a $10 million loan, and confiscated the man‟s property when 
he refused, sending him into exile out of Shanghai. Wealthy businessmen were forced to buy 30 
million yuan of short-term government bonds, with the bigger corporations each assigned quotas 
of 500,000 yuan or more. Children of leading industrialists were often arrested as 
“counterrevolutionaries” or “Communists”, and were only released after their families had given 
significant donations to the GMD. 
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 Chiang had been careful to avoid any conflict with the foreign authorities governing the 
Western concessions. He had discovered that the Shanghai underworld consisted of several 
powerful organizations, most notably the Green Gang that could provide him with the assistance 
he needed to stamp out the Communists. By forging an alliance with the Green Gang, the GMD 
could utilize the Green Gang gangsters to carry out assassinations on suspected Communists, 
even in foreign controlled territories. The Green Gang gained official protection and 
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endorsement from the GMD, and its leaders such as Du Yusheng were able to gain huge profits 
through the drug trade with government approval. 
288
 
 The GMD‟s Minister of Finance was T.V. Soong, an American educated financier and 
Chiang‟s brother-in-law through his second marriage to Soong‟s sister. T.V. Soong had 
extensive commercial and industrial connections in Shanghai and had built close ties with 
Shanghai‟s leading capitalists. Soong renewed his connections with the capitalists by creating 
three advisory commissions: government bonds, budget, and banking & commerce. However, 
Chiang grew suspicious of Soong‟s relationships with the capitalists and had him replaced as 
minister of finance. Chiang put tremendous pressure on the capitalists to make financial 
contributions to the GMD party. Coercion was forced upon the capitalists to purchase new bonds 
issued by the Nanjing government. Beginning in May 1927, the GMD officials under Chiang‟s 
direct orders went from all of Shanghai‟s major commercial, banking, and industrial 
establishments to force them to buy large quantities of government bonds. 
289
 By early 1928, it 
was clear that financial sources from Shanghai provided the bulk of the funding for Chiang‟s 
GMD government. For the Shanghai capitalists, they had felt they had been deceived by 
Chiang‟s GMD. The capitalists had allied with Chiang in order to prevent the Communist-
dominated labor unions from threatening their financial interests. But the Shanghai industrialists 
had not realized that despite being the most powerful economic group in China, they had not 
been able to transform their economic power into political influence. They would now face direct 
political control from the GMD regime beginning in 1927. 
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The Blueprint of the Greater Shanghai Project 
 The idea behind the Greater Shanghai Project was first conceived in 1925 just prior to 
Sun Yat-sen‟s death. In a book Sun published that year called “Strategy of National 
Construction”, Sun defined several goals he had in order for China to modernize and catch up 
with the West. The central idea was to build a metropolis that would be both large and modern, 
in both its structure and functioning in order to make Shanghai become the great port of the East. 
In Sun‟s book, a chapter was focused on “Material Construction”, where Sun suggested the 
building of a major port city in Hangzhou Bay in Zhejiang province, south of Shanghai. Under 
this plan, Sun mentioned that he deliberately recommended a deep-water site where there would 
be no risks of ships being caught in the silt. Shanghai was considered risky because of the 
considerable silt brought in by the Huangpu River and the Yangzi. Sun had planned to dig a 45 
kilometer long canal through Pudong, on the eastern side of the Huangpu River so that deep 
water wharves could be built to protect it from the currents. 
291
 
 After Sun‟s death, the GMD began to greatly emphasize the importance of the strategic 
location of Shanghai as the center of the country‟s modernization plan. Shanghai was becoming 
the most populous and prosperous city in China, but the bulk of the city was under foreign 
control. For the GMD regime to gain credibility and legitimacy, they needed to reconstruct 
Shanghai to not only improve the conditions it had encountered in the Chinese city, but to 
radically transform the face of the city when the modernization campaign was to be fully carried 
out. The Greater Shanghai Project (Da Shanghai Jihua), meaning “Big Shanghai Plans”, was 
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constructed out of both Sun‟s call for national construction, and based on the analysis of the city 
by local municipal leaders. 
 By the early 1920s, several locations around Shanghai had become major commercial 
centers where much of the city‟s trade, shopping, leisure, entertainment, and schools had been 
located. These areas where the primary routes, lines, or stops of public transportation had been 
designated in order to make the commuters‟ travel quicker and more accessible. These areas 
included Jingan Temple (Temple of Peace), Xujiahui, Caojiadu, Beizhan, Tilanqiao, and 
Laoximen. The streets near Jingan Temple were filled with tents and stalls, where an annual 
temple fair was held each year. A two mile long road had been constructed from Nanjing Road to 
the temple, and this became an elegant street in west Shanghai that was home to major shopping 
malls. Xujiahui was at the heart of the French Concession, and home to Shanghai‟s Catholic 
population. The oldest Catholic Church was built in Xujiahui in 1847, and later a Gothic 
Catholic cathedral was added in 1910. Other churches, schools, libraries, museums, presses, 
charities, and an observatory were all located there, making this area the center of Catholicism in 
China. Caojiadu contained cotton mills, flour mills, leather factories, light bulb factories, and 
many other factories. Wholesale firms specializing in agricultural products were opened there to 
take advantage of the convenient location on the banks of Suzhou Creek. Caojiadu had become 
Shanghai‟s industrial center by the 1920s, and new roads were built to connect the area to the 
western part of the International Settlement. In addition in industry and commerce, St. John‟s 
University and Jessfield Park were located within walking distance of Caojiadu. Beizhan, or 
Northern Station was home to the city‟s major railway station. The railway station completed in 
1909, was where the Shanghai-Nanjing and Shanghai-Wusong railroads intersected. This area 
was at the boundary of the northern part of the International Settlement and the Chinese district 
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of Zhabei. Under the GMD, Beizhan and its local vicinity was considered to be the most 
developed area under Chinese administration. Tilanqiao, or Bamboo Basket Bridge was the 
major commercial area in Hongkou in northeast Shanghai. Farmers, peddlers, pilgrims, and 
others set up their markets on the streets near Tilanqiao. The growth of the foreign territories 
south of Tilanqiao made it busier and more crowded than ever because this bridge was the only 
surface route into the city. Laoximen, or Old West Gate was part of the old walled city built in 
1553 to protect the city from pirates. Originally, it served as the boundary between the Chinese 
old city and the French Concession, but in 1912-1914, its wall and gates were torn down, the 
area merged with the French Concession. 
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 With the exception of Beizhan, all the other locations where the most vibrant and 
prosperous commerce, as well as the busiest traffic and flow of people were all under foreign 
control. This had brought considerable shame and frustration to the GMD‟s Shanghai municipal 
officials. The Chinese municipal officials sent an observation team to investigate the major roads 
in the International Settlement to see how the urban planning and road construction projects were 
carried out in order to learn from the British as to how to develop a similar system in the Chinese 
city. Data was compiled on the length and width of major roads in the International Settlement 
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Length and Width of Major Roads in International Settlement (1926) 
Western Territory 
Road Name Length (feet) Width (feet) 
Robison 7,500 + 50 
Kiaochow 1,700 50 
Penang 2,500 50 
Singapore 3,550 60 
Connaught 4,000 60 
Jessfield 14,000 50-60 
West Soochow 1,000 30 
Tifeng 4,000 50 
Kinner 2,300 40 
Yuyuan 8,000 60 
Bubbling Well 2,200 70 
Great Western 19,000 70 
Edinburgh 7,000 50 
Tunsin 5,000 50 
Columbia 7,000 50 
Fawha 5,300 50 
Jordan 5,500 50 
Keswick 11,000 60 
Hungjao 35,000 40 
Fraser 2,300 50 
Jernigan 3,000 50 
Lincoln 14,000 50 
Warren 12,500 50 
Macleod 7,000+ 50 
Rubicon 14,000 50 
Pearce 12,000 50 
Monument 15,000 50 













Road Name Length (feet) Width (feet) 
Wanglo 1,200 30 
Kiangwan 4,500 50 
Scott 2,000 40
 
Darrock 1,700 20 
Barchet 400 20 
North Szechuan 8,000 50 





Road Name Length (feet) Width (feet) 
Urga 1,000 50 







 Besides being better constructed and well-paved, the two busiest commercial streets 
running across Shanghai were Nanjing Road in the International Settlement and Avenue Joffre 
(Huaihai Road) in the French Concession. 
294
 The Chinese authorities had been quite envy of the 
successful development projects in the foreign territories, but had been unable to respond with an 
urban renewal of their own. By the spring of 1927, the GMD had mobilized an authoritarian and 
centralized regime, defeated the regional warlords, and crushed the worker uprising of suspected 
Communist sympathizers in Shanghai. The timing was right for the Greater Shanghai Project to 
take place, and to transform Shanghai into the Chinese metropolis that could rival the prosperous 
and majestic cities of the West. 
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 G. Zay Wood, the former Commissioner of Public Affairs in the International Settlement 
wrote an editorial in The China Weekly Review on October 29, 1927 suggesting that a 
“moderate” redemption of Shanghai would be the best approach. While Wood praised the GMD 
for their ambitious plans, he asked them to set short-term goals that could be achieved before 
progressing to long-term plans. Wood noted that Huang Fu left office after being mayor for only 
three months, and that the new municipal administration needs to set realistic goals for their 
campaign. Wood wrote that the main difficulty for the Chinese administration was that although 
Shanghai is the first commercial port and wealthiest city in China, the bulk of its wealth 
remained in the foreign settlement. Given that the Chinese municipality lacks much of the 
existing infrastructure that the foreign settlements had, he suggested they focus on raising 
sufficient funds and set modest building plans at first. After initial development plans have been 
accomplished, and sufficient funds from revenues have been generated should the municipal 
government tackle the more challenging building projects. Wood emphasized that the success of 
the Greater Shanghai Project would depend on the careful collaboration between Chiang Kai-
shek‟s GMD central leadership and the Shanghai mayoral leadership. 
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The Municipal Officials and Bureaus 
 In April 1927, the GMD officially moved the national capital to Nanjing, and set two 
cities Nanjing and Shanghai as special municipalities. The special municipalities were under 
direct central government control, rather than under any provincial government. Huang Fu was 
appointed as the first mayor of the Shanghai special municipality in May 1927. After discussions 
between the GMD‟s central leadership and Huang, the Shanghai municipality would be governed 
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by a 15 man administrative committee (xingzheng weiyuanhui) presided by mayor Huang. 
However, the members of the committee would be appointed by the central government. 
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 The Shanghai special municipality also changed the territorial boundaries and 
demarcation of Shanghai. The two counties of Shanghai and Baoshan were now combined into a 
single administrative municipality. Shanghai now stretched over a vast territory that consisted far 
beyond just the city proper that had been considered “the Chinese city” to include many 
surrounding villages and hamlets under its jurisdiction. The total area of Shanghai covered 
695,783 mu (464 square km). The area occupied by the International Settlement and the French 
Concession amounted to just 7% of the total figure, with the International Settlement covering 
33,503 mu (22.6 square km) and the French Concession covering 15,250 mu (10.22 square km(. 
The overwhelming majority of the territory was agricultural land that was sparsely populated. 
The new administrative municipality was divided into 17 urban and rural districts (qu). 
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 Huang Fu was appointed mayor by Chiang Kai-shek. Huang had been a close friend of 
Chiang and had worked as China‟s prime minister, education minister, and foreign affairs 
minister. He had little to gain from serving as Shanghai‟s new mayor, and having only the power 
to control the Chinese sector of the city. He was not a member of the GMD and had little interest 
in managing such a difficult and complex situation as in Shanghai. However, given his personal 
friendship to Chiang, Huang accepted the post. 
298
 On July 7, after Huang had organized the 
municipal services, the members of the new municipal government were sworn in before Chiang 
Kai-shek. In his inaugural speech as the new mayor, Huang made cautious remarks and asked for 
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the cooperation of the entire population, both Chinese and foreign. Huang was careful not to 
make any overly ambitious or unrealistic promises. He encouraged the residents of Shanghai to 
feel optimistic about the future of their city. 
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 The municipal government was divided into eight bureaus that reported directly to the 
mayor and the secretariat (second-in-command). These eight bureaus were Public Security and 
Interest, Social Affairs, Education, Finance, Health and Hygiene, Public Utilities, Land, and 
Public Works. The four bureaus considered to be the most important were the Finance, Public 
Security, Social Affairs and Public Works. The mayor would be aided by a secretariat, 
responsible for any administrative tasks and matters that did not come under a particular bureau. 
Two councilors prepared notices, regulations, and other municipal documents that had to be 
presented to the mayor or discussed with the municipal council. The executive arm of the 
municipal was the administrative council. This governing body made all the major decisions and 
drafted all the regulations relating to municipal affairs. The council was led by the mayor, who 
served as the chairman, the bureau directors, the secretariat and councilors, and three to five 
delegates of the council. Important discussions were usually voted on, however, the mayor had 
the power to prevail over the will of the entire council and could overrule any voting decisions if 
he felt necessary. 
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In Christian Henriot‟s analysis of the directors of the bureaus, he found most of these 
chief municipal officials were non-natives of Shanghai.  
Mayor Huang Fu‟s Administration (May-August 1927) 
Bureau Director Home Province 
General Secretariat Wu Rongchang Jiangsu 
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Social Affairs Pan Gongzhan Zhejiang 
Education Zhu Jingnong Zhejiang 
Finance Xu Dingnian Zhejiang 
Health and Hygiene Hu Hongji Jiangsu 
Public Security and Interest Huang Qinglan Jiangsu 
Public Utilities Huang Baiqiao Jiangsu 
Land Zhu Yan Jiangsu 






 The appointment of non-native Shanghai officials to serve as bureau directors could be 
explained by the fact that the core of GMD‟s central political leadership came from Zhejiang and 
Jiangsu provinces. Chiang Kai-shek himself was a native of Zhejiang, and given Zhejiang and 
Jiangsu‟s neighboring geographic proximity to Shanghai, the GMD could appoint officials who 
do not have biased attitudes or personal agenda that perhaps native Shanghai officials would 
have, but that they were still knowledgeable enough about the specific conditions about Shanghai 
to be able to serve as competent officials.  
 The previous experiences and career backgrounds of the municipal officials consisted 
primarily of former military men, politicians, technicians, financiers, and educators. Most had 
worked for the army and police, or for the GMD‟s central or local administration. A few were 
teachers or worked in private enterprise. All of the appointed municipal officials were considered 
to be very loyal to the GMD party. 
302
 When the first municipal government was set up in the 
summer of 1927, there were about 1,150 municipal employees who worked under each bureau. 
Gradually, this figure increased to 1,363 the following year, and reached 1,780 in 1930. The 
number of municipal employees, or public servants continued to increase where by 1933, the 
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municipal staff had numbered 1,900, and in 1935 it reached a maximum of 2,200 before 
dropping to a low of 1,700 by December 1936. 
 Shanghai‟s population was estimated to be around 3.5 million at 1930, with about 1.7 
million residents actually living in areas under Chinese control. A staff of around 2,000 meant an 
average of one government employee per 850 people. The reduction in municipal staff after 1935 
was a result of payroll downsizing that brought the ratio to one government employee per 1,000 
inhabitants. This ratio was mandated by the central government in order to streamline the 
administration throughout the municipality and reduce its working costs. 
303
 In the early years of 
the municipal government, the expansion for government employees was because Shanghai had 
no centralized system of personal management. Each bureau had to recruit its own employees 
and then inform the Bureau of Finance for the financial requirements such as salary for their 
employees. Employees were not able to be transferred from one bureau to another as their staff 
requirements differed.  
 Essentially the bureau director ran his own fiefdom, where he retained control over his 
staff. There was no objective or standardized criteria for recruitment and selection of government 
staff such as bureaucratic exams. The bureau director was able to bring in staff members who 
would be loyal to him and followed his orders. The distributions of municipal staff were 
primarily local Shanghai residents. The technical bureaus such as Land, Education, and Social 
Affairs were overwhelmingly local but the bulk of Shanghai‟s policemen were from northern 
provinces. Most of the staff members were young and fairly well-educated. Young, educated 
men were particularly interested in pursuing a career with the municipal government because of 
the stable and well pay, as well as social respect from affiliation with the government. Women 
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were virtually absent from the municipal administration where they made up of only around 4% 
(62 people total) of the employees. They were usually assigned subordinate positions and 
received lower pay than their male colleagues. 
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 A high percentage of municipal staff had been college-educated, and almost all had 
received secondary (high school) level education. Recruitment at colleges and universities had 
been quite successful as many young educated urban residents found government positions in the 
public sector to be attractive, given the good salaries and benefits. The mayor received a monthly 
salary of about 675 Chinese Yuan per month. The highest paid employees were the bureau 
directors, the secretary general, and the mayor‟s councilors. They received average monthly 
salaries of around 450 Chinese Yuan. Other high paying government employees included 
educated technocrats with post-graduate education. College educated staff members earned 
between 60-450 Yuan per month depending on their seniority, years of experience, and specific 
responsibilities. Middle level staff members received about 50-60 Yuan per month, and low level 
staff with limited education, experience, or expertise received between 20-50 Yuan per month. In 
the police force, the officers received about 30-40 Yuan, the brigade chiefs 16-18 Yuan, and a 
common policeman 13-16 Yuan a month. The lowest paid government employees were the 
janitors and garbage collectors, who received less than 10 Yuan a month. 
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 Huang Fu resigned as mayor in August 1927 and was quickly replaced by Zhang 
Dingpan in September. Zhang had been loyal to Bai Chongxi, Chiang Kai-shek‟s main rival 
within the GMD. Under Zhang, some of the bureau directors were retained while others were 
replaced or resigned.  
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Mayor Zhang Dingpan‟s Administration (September 1927-March 1929) 
Bureau Director 
Harbor Affairs Xi Dingmo 
Social Affairs Pan Gongzhan 
Education Bao Junjian, Lu Jiceng, Wei Que 
Finance Wang He 
Hygiene Hu Hongji 
General Secretariat Zhou Yongneng 
Public Security Dai Shifu, Huang Zhenxing 
Land Zhu Yan 
Public Works Shen Yi 
Public Utilities Huang Baiqiao 
 
 Pan Gongzhan, Hu Hongji, Zhu Yan, Shen Yi, and Huang Baiqiao were retained from 
Huang Fu‟s administration. These bureau directors were considered to be highly competent and 
skilled, and did not affiliated themselves too strongly with any particular GMD faction with the 
central government in Nanjing. Zhang Dingpan needed their experience and could work with 
them. The bureau directors who were replaced or resigned themselves after Huang Fu left office 
were considered to be Huang‟s loyal subordinates who would not fit in well with the new mayor. 
306
 
 Zhang Dingpan was a military man with limited experience in administration. He was 
distrusted by certain GMD factions, and his appointment caused some tensions with the GMD 
party leadership. Once in office, Zhang was considered to have an independent stance in his 
political ideology. He was able to deal effectively with strikes and demonstrations when they 
occurred. The relationship between the GMD‟s central government and the Shanghai 
municipality became tense over the issue of national sovereignty. In Shanghai, where the city 
was divided into three administrative zones, national sovereignty inevitably dealt with the 
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relationship between the Chinese municipal government and foreign authorities. The GMD asked 
the municipal government to forbid civil servants to live in residences belonging to the foreign 
settlements and demanded that all offices of official organizations be moved over to the Chinese 
zones. The irony was many of the leading Chinese officials resided in foreign territories because 
these neighborhoods were wealthier and more convenient. Even Mayor Zhang himself lived in 
the French Settlement. In December 1928, tensions between the GMD‟s central government and 
Zhang Dingpan‟s government resulted in the mayor resigning. 
307
 Zhang had resigned because he 
could sense Chiang Kai-shek‟s power and influence had grown stronger within the GMD‟s 
central leadership, and given his previous alliance with Bai Chongxi and the Guangxi clique, 
Chiang would move to sack him from office.  
 After the Fifth Congress of the GMD‟s Shanghai section in February 1929, Zhang Qun 
was nominated to succeed Zhang Dingpan as mayor. Zhang Qun had come from Sichuan and 
like Zhang Dingpan before him, was a non-native of Shanghai. Zhang Qun continued to carry 
out the first half of the Greater Shanghai Project as dictated by the GMD, and retained much of 
the bureau directors from the previous administration. 
Mayor Zhang Qun‟s Administration (March 1929-December 1931) 
Bureau Director 
Harbor Affairs Xi Dingmo 
Social Affairs Pan Gongzhan 
Education Chen Dezheng, Xu Peihuang 
Finance Wu Xiyong, Xu Fu, Tang Naikang, Cai Zengji 
Hygiene Hu Hongji 
General Secretariat Yuan Liang, Yu Hongjun 
Public Security Yuan Liang, Chen Xizeng 
Land Zhu Yan 
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 Xi Dingmo, Pan Gongzhan, Hu Hongji, Zhu Yan, Shen Yi, and Huang Baiqiao were 
retained from Zhang Dingpan‟s administration, and all by Xi (director of newly created Bureau 
of Harbor Affairs) had been appointed when the Shanghai special municipality was first formed 
in July 1927. These veteran bureau directors had a proven track record of strong performances 
and avoided the political divisions within the GMD party. They had worked under three different 
mayors in just five years, and managed to build up their own power base in Shanghai by 
carefully selecting loyal followers into their respective bureaus. The Bureaus of Land, Public 
Works, and Public Utilities would prove to be the most important to carrying out the Greater 
Shanghai Project. 
The Implementation of the Greater Shanghai Project 
 The three bureaus given the most direct responsibilities of transforming Shanghai‟s 
Chinese city into a modern metropolis were the Bureaus of Land, Public Works, and Public 
Utilities. The Land Bureau was responsible for taking the measure of the city through a general 
and detailed land survey, and determining the lands needed for the planned building works. 
Public Works and Public Utilities were involved in the implementation of the projects.
309
 The 
director of the Public Works Bureau, Shen Yi was considered to be the most skilled bureaucrat 
within the Shanghai municipality. Shen took a detailed tour of the Chinese zones of the city and 
saw that while buildings and housing projects were everywhere, they had been built with no 
plans and lacked public health and safety. He ordered his staff to set up teams to go around 
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Shanghai and register all existing properties and their conditions, by specially checking on all 
public property such as entertainment venues, restaurants, bars, etc. The results collected 
concerned him greatly, as he was shocked at the run-down and unsanitary conditions of many of 
these public buildings. 
 Shen ordered repairs to be made to all defective installations that were found and limited 
the number of people allowed into crowded entertainment areas and restaurants. Those who 
disobeyed orders or refused to have their property be checked would have their establishment be 
closed down. The Public Works Bureau inspected all the major buildings under Chinese control 
and ordered the most dangerous and unsafe ones to be demolished. The police were responsible 
for locating the buildings that were in poor conditions. This measure caused a lot of protests 
among the landlords who were afraid they would lose significant income if their buildings were 
destroyed. The bureau responded by informing the landlords whose property was about to 
demolished beforehand so they would have enough time to make repairs or installations, or 
inform their tenants to move out. If landlords did not obey orders, demolition teams were called 
in to tear down dirty, unsafe, and run-down buildings by force.  
 The officials working for Shen Yi in the Public Works Bureau were mostly young college 
educated men. This bureau was considered to be the model bureau of the municipal government 
because corruption was very rare among Shen‟s staff. The practice of taking bribes, which had 
been much more common in other bureaus did not occur frequently in Public Works. This bureau 
was consistently praised by all three mayors for their efficiency and honesty. Shen Yi expressed 
clearly that anyone on his staff suspected of taking bribes would be fired immediately. 
310
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 Shanghai as a city had been cut into two by the Huangpu River. To the east of the 
Huangpu, the large area of Pudong had been devoted to agriculture and had been sparsely 
populated. Pudong farmers provided the fresh food such as vegetables, fruits, and eggs that were 
sold in the markets west of the Huangpu, where the vast majority of Shanghai‟s population 
resided. However, the banks of the Huangpu were crowded with wharves, factories, and 
warehouses. A substantial amount of traffic in people and goods had to travel between the 
western and eastern parts of the Huangpu River each day. A ferry company was created in 1910 
by the Pudong Dikes Maintenance Office. When the Shanghai special municipality was 
established in 1927, there were only seven ferryboats that could transport traffic across the river, 
of which only one was owned by the government and the other six hired. 
311
 Beginning in 1929, 
he municipal government significantly improved existing facilities by building seven more 
wharves and dredging the riverbed so it could take bigger ships. In July 1930, Shen Yi‟s Public 
Works Bureau obtained from the Municipal Bank a loan of 360,000 Chinese Yuan to buy two 
ships and three ferryboats. The Public Works Bureau also began the construction of five 
additional pontoons that was completed in 1933. 
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 Under Mayor Zhang Qun‟s leadership, the municipal authorities began building a larger 
civilian airport with pressure from the GMD to improve air communications for military reasons. 
The Longhua civilian airport was enlarged from 280 mu (1,867 square km, 1 mu= 6.667 square 
km) to 970 mu (6,470 square km). 
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 The Public Utilities Bureau under the leadership of Huang 
Baiqiao made significant strides in water treatment and the production of electricity. An 
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inspection in August 1927 showed that clean water was a problem. The bureau made the two 
water supply companies in Zhabei and Nanshi to build a water quality control laboratory to 
check on the purity of the water. Reports had to be sent to the Health Bureau, and unclean water 
would not be allowed to be used. Under Huang Baiqiao, the Public Utilities Bureau took over the 
distribution of water in the Chinese areas. By 1929, water rates were unified throughout the 
municipality and a considerable improvement in the quality of water was assured. 
314
 The bureau 
also focused their attention on improving electricity production. Huang ordered the bureau to 
restrict the production of electricity in the city to two large companies (one each in Nanshi and 
Zhabei) from eight electricity companies before in order to rationalize the system and reduce 
costs. The electricity installations were upgraded and modernized in order to increase their 
production capacity. From 1928-1930, the bureau sought to unify the electricity system in the 
entire city. In 1928, a new 20,000 kilowatt power station capable of producing its own electricity 
was built in Zhabei. In Nanshi, three additional turbines were bought to improve efficiency. 
Power stations in each district were connected to each other, linking up Nanshi, Zhabei, and 
Pudong. These works were completed in 1930 and the Public Utilities Bureau announced that the 
entire Chinese city had been linked in a single unified system. 
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 The biggest challenge facing the municipal government was how to shift the Chinese 
population away from the foreign settlements to the areas under Chinese control. Public 
transportation would be absolutely vital for Chinese residents to be resettled. After reviewing the 
possible development of Shanghai under the circumstances of a divided city with foreign control, 
the municipal leaders came up with five conclusions. First, the road system was no longer suited 
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to the increased traffic and would be difficult to transform. Second, the city based on its original 
design could not absorb the increasing number of people who were crowding into the city each 
year. Third, the harbor installations were obsolete and could not cope with the increase in sea and 
river traffic. Fourth, there was no direct link between the harbor installations and the railroads. 
Fifth, the fact that Shanghai was split among three different municipal administrations would not 
allow for it to develop a plan for a unified development for the entire city. 
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 Based on these findings, the municipal government determined that long-term solutions 
to the city‟s problems would have to be addressed through the development of a new city center, 
away from the downtown areas to the outside of the city. A new city center outside of the city 
would allow for the municipal authorities to rebuild the city on the exterior to allow for future 
expansions, and to provide space for the resettlement of the Chinese population. Under the 
municipal project, the critical area of this new building plan would be a civic center (shi 
zhongxin) where all government administrative activities would be located, and all branches of 
the municipal government could be brought together. It was determined that this location would 
be in Jiangwan, a flat region with little population where land was cheap and nothing needed to 
be demolished. Inside the civic center, several zones would be created with specific purposes. 
These zones included administrative (xingzhengqu), business (shangyequ), industrial (gongyequ), 
and residential (zhuzhaiqu). 
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 The administrative and residential areas were to be located close 
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to each other, while the business and industrial areas would be placed further away in order to 
prevent disturbances to the residents. 
 The urban areas of Nanshi and Zhabei would be turned into strictly business zones. The 
underlying goals of the municipal government was the hope that the Greater Shanghai Project 
could effectively push the foreigners out by suffocating them in old Shanghai, while the new city 
center in Jiangwan would blossom and encourage Chinese residents to move there. This grand 
project caused for significant financial funding, with the first stage consisting of expenditure for 
50 million Yuan, of which 20 million Yuan was needed to just to purchase the 27,000 mu 
(180,090 square km) of land in Jiangwan. 
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Figure 6.1: Layout of Shanghai (1934) 
Section A: The new anticipated city center in Jiangwan, where the Greater Shanghai Project had 
hoped would the Chinese population of the city would resettle there. 
Source: Henriot, Christian. Shanghai 1927-1937: Municipal Power, Locality, and 
Modernization. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993: p. 28. 
 
Huang Fu had initiated the Greater Shanghai Project under pressure from Chiang Kai-
shek in July 1927. After he abruptly resigned, Zhang Dingpan was unable to obtain much 
financial support from Shanghai‟s wealthy elites to carry out the plans. It wasn‟t until Zhang Qun 
assumed leadership that the push for urban development picked up speed. In July 1929, Zhang 
Qun chose Jiangwan as the official site as the center of the new Shanghai. He set up two 
committees: the Urban Planning Discussion Committee and the Civic Center Building 
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Committee to schedule for the planning and carrying out of the new Jiangwan city center. 
319
 
When Jiangwan was announced publicly as the location for the new city center, all transactions 
were halted to prevent land speculation. The municipal government purchased a greater area of 
land than necessary for their proposed city center. The excess land was to be sold off at a higher 
price to wealthy real estate developers to finance other urban infrastructure and development 
projects. 
Mayor Zhang Qun ordered the rebuilding of major roads under Chinese jurisdiction 
immediately after he took office. On March 13, 1929, Zhang began the road upgrade project in 
Zhabei. The plans were modeled after the road extensions and widening in the International 
Settlement; where roads were to be lengthened to connect them to each other and the road tracks 
be widened to allow for more traffic flow and parking. Smaller roads near North Sichuan Road 
were ordered to be rebuilt in order to connect them southward from Zhabei to the border of the 
International Settlement. Roads near the railway station were ordered to be lengthened to 90-150 
feet to better connect arriving passengers to the station. The main road leading to the station 
would be 180 feet long. Roads north of the railway station where there was less traffic were 
lengthened to 340-360 feet along. In areas where homes and buildings blocked traffic flow, these 
buildings were to be torn down and tenants notified in advance.  
A few roads that contained heavy traffic flow would be rebuilt first. These included 
Songgongyuan Road, where the width of the road was widened to 24.4 feet across. Sanyang 
Road was also widened to 24.4 feet. Gonghe Road, which connected Zhabei to Jiangwan would 
be repaved. Datong Road, Hongxin Road, Yanjiage Road, Xinmin Road, Zhongxin Road,  
Wuhua Road, and Kulan Road were each widened to 18.3 feet across to allow for bus stops to be 
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placed. Qiujiang Road and East Qiujiang Road were widened to 15.2 feet, and Changchun Road 
was increased to 12.2 feet in width. Smaller roads were torn down or connected as extensions to 
larger roads, and major roads that were the locations of tram, trolley, and bus stops had to be 
repaved for better quality and smoother traction. 
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In December 1930, Zhang Qun‟s government ordered the reconstruction of roads in Huxi 
district. Municipal officials felt urban reconstruction was absolutely necessary to prevent the 
foreign settlements from expanding further and taking more land. The major roads in Huxi must 
be rebuilt and repaved. Caozhen Road would be widened to 25 feet. West Guangfu Road, near 
the southern banks of the Huangpu River would be widened to 18.3 feet. Fanwangdu Road and 
Kaixuan Road were two major roads where numerous routes and stops were located, would be 
widened to 17.5 feet and 18.3 feet respectively. Yongyu Road would be widened to 15 feet, 
Bailinan Road to 20 feet, North Xinji Road to 22 feet, Daxi Road to 21.3 feet, and Hongqiao 
Road to 24.4 feet to allow for more vehicles and pedestrians to pass through. 
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The Chinese municipality paid special attention to improving the public health situation 
among its residents. Within the Public Health Bureau, four major divisions were set up to deal 
with health and sanitation issues facing the population. The Division of Administration & Vital 
Statistics, Division of Sanitation & Street Cleaning, Division of Veterinary Science & Meat 
Hygiene, and Division of Communicable Disease Control & Medical Inspection were formed. 
The Public Health Bureau was a reorganization of the former Department of Public Health that 
was formed in August 1926. For the 1927 fiscal year, a total budget of $178,200 (U.S. Dollar) 
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was allocated to the Public Health Bureau. The distribution of the funds by division per month is 
as follows: 
Table 6.2 
Division Monthly Budget 
Administration, health education $3,500  
Sanitation, street cleaning $500  
Veterinary science, meat hygiene $850  
Communicable disease control $1,000  
Laboratory $1,000  
Total $14,850 (per month)=$178,000 (year) 
 
 In addition, there was a special appropriation of $98,000 a year for the 1927 fiscal year 
for additional spending: 
Table 6.3 
  
Division Yearly Budget 
Public health, nursing $16,000  
Medical inspection $16,600  
Inauguration of rural health work $16,800  








 The Public Health Bureau recruited several foreign educated physicians into their ranks 
including Dr. Hu Kou-ki as Commissioner of Health. Dr. Hu worked closely Dr. C. Noel Davis, 
Commissioner of Public Health in the International Settlement to come up with strategies to deal 
with infectious disease control. From working with Dr. Davis, Dr. Hu insisted that inspections be 
carried out in all major restaurants, grocery stores, and food factories to make sure health 
regulations were satisfied before licenses could be renewed. When unregistered shops or 
factories were found of making deliveries of food, they would be arrested and handed over the 
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municipal authorities for violations of public health and sanitation laws. Dr. Hu also advocated 
for more rigorous training based on the model of medical school education in Western 
universities for Chinese medical schools. 
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 On April 3, 1929, a serious case of meningitis broke out in the Chinese municipality. The 
disease was first discovered in the town of Nanhuihsien, about ten miles southeast of Shanghai. 
The disease spread quickly into the city, and caused serious concern among public health 
officials. Dr. Hu immediately asked the Commission of Public Health of the International 
Settlement for help. British physicians came to the Chinese municipality, provided serum 
treatment for the sick patients, and quarantined the infected. The British physicians diagnosed 
this outbreak as a case of unclean sanitation in the Chinese city, and suggested for more rigorous 
food inspections and improving sanitation conditions. 
324
The Health Department took their 
advice seriously, and immediately implemented more rigorous sanitation standards. Learning 
from the International Settlement proved to be very helpful for the Department of Health, and on 
numerous occasions Chinese and British physicians worked together to combat infectious 
diseases or treated patients. 
 In May 1929, the meningitis epidemic seemed to be under control. The Health 
Department reported that from October 28, 1928 to April 29, 1929, a total of 108,428 persons 
were vaccinated for smallpox. In May 1929, a campaign for free typhoid and cholera 
inoculations had begun. A school health service was established in the Chinese municipality in 
February 1929. The service was given in 14 municipal schools with a student attendance of 
10,000. All students attending these schools were physically examined. A dental clinic and an 
eye-ear-nose-throat clinic were established on May 1, 1929. A physician and nurse would visit 
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each school twice a week for the treatment of minor ailments and for detection of communicable 
diseases. Vaccinations were provided; and public health lectures, exhibits, and first aid classes 
were taught in primary and secondary schools. A Committee for the Promotion of School Health 
was organized by the Bureau of Public Health to carry on the work. 
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 Cholera outbreaks have occurred periodically. In May 1930, the Public Health Bureau 
asked the Commissioners of Health in the International Settlement and the French Concession to 
work together to start an anti-cholera campaign. Each territory would carry out its duties 
independently in the way of supplying clean water, hospitalization, vaccination, and etc. but 
would all adopt a common method of reporting the sick first to the health authority where the 
patient resided, and then to a central cholera bureau established by all three governments. The 
anti-cholera vaccine was shipped to the Chinese laboratory with sufficient vaccine to immunize 
300,000 people. All three municipal governments agreed to put up posters on telegraph poles, 
outside factories, restaurants, food markets, etc. exhorting the masses to take simple precautions 
against cholera by only drinking boiled water, cooked vegetables, and clean fruits by screening 
their food supplies from flies and from inoculation. Thousands of factory workers were 
vaccinated by the Chinese Health Department in a matter of months, and the Chinese Public 
Health Bureau felt confident cholera could be eradicated in the near future. 
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 An article appeared in The China Weekly Review on May 9, 1931 summarizing the 
progress and achievements the Greater Shanghai Project had already accomplished. The article 
reported that Shanghai was certain to become a bigger, prosperous, and more cosmopolitan city 
in the future. Based on its favorable geographic position as the largest sea port for international 
trade and as the center of communication and trade in China, Shanghai has achieved rapid 
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growth not only in population but in various industrial productions, commercial transactions, and 
general prosperity. Mayor Zhang Qun mentioned steps for the gradual constructions of the civic 
center building in Jiangwan, the construction of a harbor at Woosung (Wusong), a bridge to span 
the Whangpoo (Huangpu) River, tenement houses for laborers, and the conversion of the 
Confucian Temple in Nantao into a public park. The mayor quoted that “one of the greatest 
needs of Shanghai is the construction of the waterways to connect the Whangpoo River with rail 
lines. When such connecting waterways are constructed, the commercial and industrial center of 
Shanghai would be moved away from the foreign controlled settlement to the Kiangwan 
(Jiangwan) district.” 
 Recalling what had been built in the past three years, Zhang Qun stated that 46 kilometers 
of roads have been built, 101 kilometers of old streets have been repaved and improved, 37 miles 
of drains have been laid, 45 bridges repaired, and 16 wharves constructed, resulting in a length of 
1,000 feet built. In order to meet the huge expenditure required for the construction work, the 
government had increased the money from $3,130,000 to $15,000,000 (U.S. dollar) each year for 
the cost of building and construction. The plans for the street system for Nantao (Nanshi) and 
Chapei (Zhabei) focused on ways for straightening the streets. The old streets there were not only 
narrow and crooked, but seriously affected traffic and retarded the commercial development of 
the districts. Plans have been completed for the western section of Shanghai, lying east of 
Chungshan (Zhongshan) Road and west of the Settlements to be connected together in a street 
network system.  
 By virtue of population, Shanghai was now the fifth largest city in the world. Population 
census taken of the entire city showed a total population of 3,156,151 in May 1931 with 
3,096,856 Chinese residents and 59.285 foreigners. The Chinese municipality had a total 
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population of 1,703,574 residents, or slightly more than half the population of the entire city. 
Based on current population growths, the government projected that by 1940, Shanghai will have 
a population of between 4 million to 6 million residents. Mayor Zhang Qun‟s scheme for the 
civic center in Jiangwan included a sum of $1 million (U.S. dollar) for the first building unit (the 
mayor‟s building and temporary structure). The total construction, including all necessary 
government buildings will cost approximately $10 million. These costs will be covered by a loan 
issue. The period for carrying out the plan of the whole city would require about ten years. The 
new Jiangwan civic center will embody government buildings, residential quarters, an 
aerodrome, parks, and recreation grounds. 
 Construction of the trunk roads in the civic enter began on December 1, 1931. In July 
1932, construction of the administrative buildings in the civic center started. The cornerstone of 
these buildings was held on July 7, 1932, which marked the fifth anniversary of the 
establishment of the Shanghai special municipality. Future administrative buildings will be 
distant but convenient from the business center. Fifteen minutes of motor car would be sufficient 
to get from the municipal office to the business center. The construction of new municipal 
buildings in Jiangwan would feature designs in Chinese architecture. The structure was to be 
built of reinforced concrete and steel. Its exterior of Chinese style, would contain artificial stone, 
dark red columns, polychrome beams and brackets, and gray tile roof to enrich its charm. The 
administrative building, where the mayor‟s office would be located would have 25,000 square 
feet of ground space with a total floor area of 85,000 square feet. The building was designed for 
four stories for a height of 102 feet tall, a length of 310 feet, and a width of 80 feet. 
 Every possible modern convenience was added to the design of the new government 
buildings. Heating, sanitation, and elevators added to the modern convenience. The ground floor 
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was composed of an entrance hall, writing rooms, offices, safety deposit vault, a dining hall, and 
a kitchen. An auditorium, a library, and conference rooms were located on the second floor. The 
third floor contained the mayor‟s office, reception, and staff offices. Store rooms and servants‟ 
quarters were on the attic floor. In regards to the system of building the roads, the ring method 
used was to aid pedestrians in their traffic. The thoroughfares were planned to intersect at right 
angles. With the exception of the limitation set by the existing main roads, the blocks run east 
and west so the buildings faced either north or south. In the residential districts, ring streets were 
introduced to give a picturesque effect and reduce through traffic. The architects invited by the 
municipal government to design the construction were Dayu Doon, a Chinese architect educated 
in the United States, and three renowned foreign architects: C.E. Grunsky of San Francisco, A.E. 
Phillips of Washington D.C., and Hermann Jansen of Berlin. These foreign architects have all 
had extensive experience in the urban planning of their respective cities. 
 The construction of a good harbor at Woosung was another project that claimed the chief 
attention of the municipal authorities. Because there was no direct connection between the harbor 
and the railway, transportation of goods appeared to be inconvenient and uneconomical. Due to a 
lack of a large harbor, a lot of ships were anchored in the mid-stream of the Whangpoo or even at 
the mouth of the Yangtsze. Small boats and lighters were used in order to carry cargo between 
ships and the port. There was a great lack of harbor facilities by way of meeting the demands of 
increased tonnage of sea-going vessels. To maintain Shanghai‟s position as an important port for 
international commerce and trade, the municipal government deemed necessary to construct a 
new harbor capable of accommodating the largest vessels. Woosung is located a little over 10 
kilometers from Shanghai, and plans were made to link them together. The new harbor at 
Woosung would be able to handle every possible facility to shipping. 
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 Along with the harbor project, the construction of a steel bridge to span the Whangpoo 
River became an important scheme of the Chinese authorities in order to develop the areas 
around the river into a prosperous industrial center. The government met with a group of 
prominent Chinese businessmen on November 22, 1930 to discuss the steel bridge building 
project. After gaining the businessmen‟s financial support, the construction of the bridge, set to 
1,800 feet in length at a cost of about $5 million (U.S. dollar), to be located in the Nantao section 
began.  
 The Public Utilities Bureau pushed for the creation of the Shanghai-Pootung (Pudong) 
ferry services, which was approved by the municipal government. Large ferry boats, created for 
the purposes of comfort and safety for passengers travelling between the two sides of the river 
were being operated on service between Shanghai and Pudong. The first steamboat was launched 
on November 10, 1929 and fleets of ferries followed afterwards. There was a full schedule of 12 
round trips daily. The large steamers were capable of accommodating cargo and motor trucks or 
other vehicles. These new ferry boats were much larger than the old style steam ferries, and can 
accommodate more passengers. With the bodies painted in yellow and upper portions in brown, 
each ferry had a bridge of Chinese pagoda design and was fitted with enough lifebelts. They 
were well lit and have ample arrangements for air. Each could carry a passenger capacity of 20 in 
the special class, 120 in the first class, and 180 in the second class.  
 In terms of housing, the government began building tenement houses to house the poor. 
In the slums and shantytowns, many bamboo and straw huts were set up to house poor migrants 
and refugees. These huts often suffered from constant fires, and caused danger in the 
shantytowns of Zhabei and Nanshi. Since they were built so closely to each other, they were 
good places for breeding contagious diseases. In a report compiled by the Bureau of Public 
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Safety, there existed more than 21,000 such huts in 1928 with increases expected due to more 
refugee inflows. These huts could not pass sanitation standards and needed to be torn down. The 
municipal government raised a sum of about $20,000 to build a block of tenement houses of 
Chuan Chian An Road. Plans for these buildings were prepared by the Bureau of Public Works 
and the land necessary was purchased through arrangements made by the Bureau of Land. 
Construction work was completed in 1929, and some 90 clean and well ventilated houses with a 
large recreation ground, an assembly hall, and an artesian well were provided for the poor. The 
rent for each of these houses were subsidized by the government at only about $2 a month, which 
was even lower than the rent of the bamboo huts occupied by rickshaw coolies. Plans for the 
second block of these tenement houses were approved and construction underway. The 
municipal government allocated about $100,000 and raised another $500,000 from various 
charities and donations to fund the construction of 5,000 tenement houses in Chinese controlled 
territories. An estimated cost of $1.3 million would be needed for this housing project with funds 
to be raised later. The tenement houses would be built in various locations among poor Chinese 
neighborhoods including 1,500 at Tan Tz Wan in Zhabei, 500 off Paoshing Road in Zhabei, 500 
at Lan Nee Doo in Pudong, 300 at Shih Hui Kong in Nanshi, and 200 off Chuan Chia An Road 
in the western district. 
 The last thing on the government‟s agenda was the reconstruction work taken to convert 
the Confucian temple and its extensive grounds near the West Gate (Laoximen) into a public 
park. The purpose was to provide more recreation facilities for the people living in the district. A 
special regard was given to all the buildings of historic interest within the grounds to preserve 
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these buildings. The temple ground comprised an area of 82 mu (547 square km), and was 




 The two major financial institutions of the municipal government were the Finance 
Bureau, which managed financial affairs and drafted fiscal policy; and the Municipal Treasury, 
which handled funds. Taxes were collected by several bureaus including Finance, Land, health, 
and Public Security.  By 1929, the municipal government was already facing financial 
difficulties due to the high costs involved in the building projects. The Jiangwan city center 
project was financed entirely by the issue of municipal loans. 
328
  
 The municipal government had three major sources of revenue from tax collections. 
Direct taxes including house and land taxes, licenses such as vehicle tax, boat tax, business tax, 
and property tax from municipal property and services. The biggest source of revenue as the 
house tax, which was based on rent rates. Since rent was increasing each year in Shanghai due to 
demand, this allowed the government to collect more house tax. Land tax was collected in the 
rural areas such as Pudong, where land values were fairly low. The license taxes were collected 
on vehicle and boat fees. This was the second largest source of income where all vehicles on the 
road including rickshaws, hand-drawn carts, automobiles, trucks, buses, etc. had to pay for a 
current license plate. These fees had to be paid annually in order to have their license plate 
renewed. As more vehicles appeared on the road, revenue collected from vehicles also increased. 
Boat taxes were collected from merchants who owned boats along the Huangpu and Wusong 
rivers. Other license taxes were collected from the racetracks and from harbor fees. The third 
major source of revenue was from property taxes such as government owned buildings, houses, 
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and landmarks; government enterprises such as the ferryboat companies, the Municipal Bank; 
and administrative receipts from money collected for services such as processing fees, collection 
services, and schools. 
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 The Greater Shanghai Project‟s high annual expenditures began to become financially 
difficult to sustain. Government revenues and expenditures from 1927-1928 to 1931-1932 
showed the increasing costs of the Jiangwan development project: 
Table 6.4 
Shanghai Municipal Government Revenues and Receipts (Chinese Yuan) 
Source 1927-28 1928-29 1929-30 1930-31 1931-32 
House tax 558,077 1,011,034 2,169,393 2,095,858 1,909,017 
Property tax 22,467 184,099 510,503 590,132 421,583 
Sales fees 37,368 281,881 421,252 770,740 874,305 
Vehicle tax 530,519 826,248 994,627 1,118,749 1,158,230 
Boat tax 81,022 146,916 214,167 335,958 348,976 
Harbor fees 8,211 10,000 7,500   636,770 
Municipal incomes 46,621 178,500 162,484 237,197 131,072 
Administrative fees 146,750 285,251 481,330 622,001 656,872 
Municipal properties 68,011 61,236 151,139   526,467 
Repayment of aid funds  656,893 278,128 122,247 11,000 1,090 
Business tax 1,600 8,440 7,084 26,074 131,000 
Building works         165,282 
Other revenues 1,251,803 1,123,620 1,011,679 904,874 1,239,910 






Overall, government revenue more than doubled from 3.4 million Yuan to over 7.5 
million Yuan in those five years. The biggest boost in revenue could be attributed to the 
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increases in house and vehicle taxes, which constituted the two biggest shares of revenue. The 
house tax typically represented a quarter of the revenues, the license fees on vehicles and boats 
about a fifth of the total. The land tax and transfer fees, and government properties and 
enterprises were the next largest sources, each contributing around 15%. However, expenditure 
also grew significantly during those five years. 
Table 6.5 
Shanghai Municipal Government Expenditures (Chinese Yuan) 
Expenditure 1927-28 1928-29 1929-30 1930-31 1931-32 
General administration  186,112 234,838 285,921 1,308,035 628,984 
Finance Bureau 164,505 208,373 307,464 412,427 406,391 
Public Security Bureau  770,687 947,656 1,326,355 1,974,918 2,241,406 
Education Bureau 293,276 883,888 996,131 1,156,595 986,286 
Social Affairs Bureau 104,586 140,572 194,014 261,821 332,385 
Public Works Bureau 593,750 667,757 664,276 2,332,274 2,288,349 
Health Bureau 159,830 182,638 239,009 259,250 325,482 
Public Utilities Bureau  155,951 177,048 242,983   418,559 
Land Bureau 134,067 191,223 251,386   325,765 
Allocations to GMD   61,600 52,800 72,105 177,417 
Debt serving     114,885 462,000 665,571 
Aid funds 78,366 233,967 191,985 141,182 321,217 
Retirement pensions   1,468 5,456 5,264 59,850 
Harbor Affairs Bureau   26,232 66,144     
Additional expenditures  545,998 402,853 936,230     
Miscellaneous 5,000 28,923 181,353   165,282 
Other 168,802 70,708 125,754 119,418 119,599 
Total 3,360,830 4,396,676 6,009,003 8.503,739 9,237,411
331 
 
 The total expenditures almost tripled in five years from 3.36 million Yuan to over 9.23 
million Yuan. The huge increase in costs could be attributed to rapid increases in the Public 
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Security Bureau and the Public Works Bureau, which were the two largest sources of costs. 
Other costs that increased significantly included the Education, Finance, Social Affairs, Health, 
and Public Utilities bureaus as well as general administration. The municipal government 
certainly discovered that a massive urban reconstruction project was indeed very expensive! The 
highest costs were in public security, which was crucial to implementing and maintaining 
political control over the Chinese city. The public security costs were even higher than the 
Jiangwan project itself. 
Table 6.6 
Government Revenues vs. Government Expenditures (Chinese Yuan) 
    
  1927-28 1928-29 1929-30 1930-31 1931-32 
Total Revenues 3,431,547 4,424,328 6,251,365 7,183,673 7,563,494 
Total Expenditures 3,360,830 4,396,676 6,009,003 8,505,739 9,237,411 
Surplus or Deficit 70,717 27,652 242,362 -1,322,066 -1,673,917 
 
 
 From 1927-28 to 1929-30, there was enough money to cover the costs of the Greater 
Shanghai Project. However, from 1930-31 onwards, the costs of the new Jiangwan city center 
project caused expenditures to skyrocket. Although revenues increased significantly each year 
due to increase tax collections, the government‟s budget simply could not sustain such an 
expensive and large-scale building project in Jiangwan. Mayor Zhang Qun, who eagerly 
spearheaded the Greater Shanghai Project, faced a serious financial crisis beginning in 1930.  
The Land Bureau purchased the land in Jiangwan November 1929 at prices varying from 
200 to 800 Yuan per mu. 
332
 The initial stages had required the acquisition of 27,000 mu of land 
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at a cost of 20 million Yuan. To sell off excess land to developers for profit, on July 21, 1931, 
the first lot of 772 mu were put up for sale. The land was divided into plots at 2,000-2,500 Yuan 
per mu based on their location. The Bank of China and the Bank of Shanghai purchased most of 
the land. A second sale in December 17, 1933 had few takers for the additional 180 to 575 mu 
offered. Municipal employees bought a total of 162 mu of land. 
333
 
 The municipal government should have gained enough profit from the land sales to 
finance the first stages of the construction works for the new civic center. However, it had 
difficulty collecting the money from land sales. Those who had purchased the land did not pay 
up immediately because they wanted to see the administration build new infrastructure first. 
After continuously waiting for payments to arrive, the Finance Bureau threatened to suspend the 
validity of the sales to the buyers unless money would arrive to the government by a certain date 
or else the land would be confiscated and resold. By 1933, the government was still demanding 
buyers to pay up. 
334
 
 Despite financial delays, the government had to keep their promises and order the initial 
works on building new infrastructure to take place. The Public Works Bureau began digging and 
laying water pipes in Jiangwan. By the end of 1930, the administrative council concluded that 
the first stage of the building had been completed. Major avenues and a number of secondary 
roads had been built. However, they were only about half as wide as planned because of the need 
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to reduce costs. 
335
 New funding was needed to finance the continuing of the Jiangwan project. 




Zhang Qun was replaced as mayor by Wu Tiecheng in January 1932. Just as Wu took 
over as mayor, the Sino-Japanese tensions would dramatically alter any future plans for the 
Greater Shanghai Project. Japanese troops had invaded and taken over the northern provinces of 
Manchuria in 1931, and installed a puppet government with the last emperor of the Qing dynasty 
being crowned emperor of Manchukuo. Simmering tensions between China and Japan had led to 
a series of anti-Japanese demonstrations and riots in Shanghai. On January 28, 1932, Japanese 
forces bombed the Chinese sections of Zhabei. The Japanese bombing permanently ruined the 
plans for the building of the new civic center, as the Chinese government had to respond to the 
fighting in the areas of Zhabei, Jiangwan, and Wusong, which was under Chinese control. 
337
 
Just as Wu Tiecheng assumed leadership, he was faced with a major crisis. Even after a 
cease fire was signed, Shanghai had to finance its own defense after 1932. The damages done by 
Japanese bombing, especially in Zhabei where the railroad station was located, caused the 
municipal authorities to reshuffle its priorities. Rebuilding had to be done in Zhabei, and the 
Jiangwan city center project faced serious financial shortfalls. There were two major factors that 
contributed to the municipal government‟s budget deficit even before the Japanese attack: 
working expenditure and investments. Despite careful planning, the working expenditure needed 
to construct a new city center exceeded the availability of funds. Expensive investments in 
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building projects required a large construction labor force, raw materials, and new roads to 
transport supplies into the previously undeveloped and rural Jiangwan area. The relatively high 
salaries of many municipal staff members and the maintenance of a large police force also 
exceeded initial calculations for payroll costs. 
338
 Even without the Japanese attack, the 
municipal government was drowning in substantial deficit beginning in 1930. The Greater 
Shanghai Project looked more and more like it was simply unfeasible and unrealistic to achieve. 
Compounding the financial problem was that the GMD central government began to 
evade their financial responsibilities to the city as the GMD had other problems to deal with: 
most notably fighting the Communist guerrilla forces in the countryside. Without the promised 
financial support from the GMD, the Shanghai municipal authorities faced a daunting task of 
salvaging the initial goals and plans of the Greater Shanghai Project. From 1932 onward, it 
became apparent that despite the hard work of Mayor Wu Tiecheng, the Greater Shanghai 
Project was simply not going to be realized.  
Manifestation of State Control  
 From the onset, the purpose of the Greater Shanghai Project was a direct attempt by the 
GMD to impose its authority over this special administrative municipality. Zheng Zuan outlined 
four major areas of reconstruction in which this project would allow for direct state control over 
the city: 1) the central core of the city, 2) the seaport and railways nearby, 3) separation of the 
city into different districts, and 4) the road system over the entire city. 
339
 Each plan would focus 
on solidifying state power through improving and upgrading facilities and infrastructure under 
the banner of economic development and urban renewal. 
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 The central core of the city had to be divided into government and administrative region, 
commercial and business region, and civilian residential region. The government‟s 
administrative region would include each administrative office, the GMD party headquarters, the 
municipal legislative building, libraries, museums, and other key public infrastructure. The 
commercial center would be located near the Wusong port, where the railroads were. The 
residential area would be separated into first and second zones: the first zone would contain more 
forests and open areas, but the size would be smaller; while the second zone contained more 
housing and buildings for a more compact population with a larger geographic size.  
The seaport and railways had to be modified to accommodate the growing number of 
passengers and increasing supply of goods arriving in the city. Repairs were made at 
Qiujiangkou dock, which had been badly neglected in the past. The Qiujiang dock, located near 
the eastern end of the center of the city was about 1,400 meters long, and had a total surface area 
of about 800 mu (5,336 square km). For the railroads, it was decided that the stops for passengers 
and for goods had to be separated for more efficiency. Passengers boarded the trains at the 
station located in the northeastern part of Jiangwan district at North Zhongshan Road while the 
station for transporting goods was located at Zhenru. By separating the two train stations, and 
building a separate boarding location for passengers and goods, this greatly reduced the schedule 
conflicts of the trains.  
The city was separated into five major zones for governance and administration, industry, 
commercial port, business and shopping, and residential areas. The center of the city would be 
used for administrative functions, while the areas of Zhenru and Dachang were reserved for 
industrial development. The Wusong port and the train stations were assigned for commercial 
port transportations, while the city center and the old city would be turned into commercial 
282 
 
markets. Finally, Zhenru, Fanhuangdu, Fahuazhen, Longhuazhen, Caojiangjin districts became 
the new residential neighborhoods. 
340
 
“The Law of Extraterritoriality” had been designed where residents, both foreign and 
Chinese living in the International Settlement and French Concession were not subjected to 
Chinese law. This was the biggest challenge for the GMD in its quest to impose greater control 
over the Chinese population of the city. To get around this law, Chiang Kai-shek formed an 
alliance with the Green Gang, the leading underworld mobster group that controlled much of the 
drugs, narcotics, and prostitution trades in Shanghai. The Green Gang had assisted Chiang in 
crushing the labor riots of April 1927 by identifying and killing Communist sympathizers in the 
labor movement. Chiang and Green Gang leader Du Yusheng found their alliance to be mutually 
beneficial. Du‟s Green Gang gained official GMD support, and thus was able to dominate the 
drugs and prostitution industry. Green Gang leaders made enormous profits from government 
protection in their criminal activities. Chiang‟s GMD was able to use the Green Gang to carry 
out assassinations and kidnappings of suspected Communists. Since the Green Gang was a 
mobster organization and not affiliated with the government, they were able to penetrate various 
neighborhoods within the International Settlement and French Concession to identify and locate 
suspected Communists, or anyone else considered a threat to the GMD regime. 
The Green Gang became Chiang‟s personal spies in that they sent gangsters to places of 
public gatherings such as restaurants, bars, teahouses, department stores, shopping centers, 
railway and train stations, barbershops, etc. to gather information on suspected Communist 
activities. When suspected Communists were identified and located, the Green Gang either killed 
or captured them. The captured were brought to the GMD for interrogation, which resulted in 
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either execution or prison sentence.
341
 The Green Gang gained a lot of respect from their 
protection by the GMD in that they could effectively eliminate their potential rival gangs in the 
drugs, prostitution, and racketeering businesses. With official backing from the GMD, the Green 
Gang controlled the streets of Shanghai, and was considered the most notorious and feared 
underworld mobsters in Chinese neighborhoods.  
While the Green Gang served as the underground spies for the GMD, the official bureau 
in charge of strengthening control and order was the Bureau of Public Security. On July 22, 1927 
three weeks after Shanghai special municipality was formed, the Public Security Bureau was 
created with the purpose of reorganizing police administration. Public Security absorbed the 
policemen, patrol force, and other militia. Most of the police force consisted of non-native 
Shanghai backgrounds, with the majority coming from the northern provinces. It was assumed 
that the majority of the policemen were northerners because people from the northern provinces 
were taller and stronger than those from the southern provinces. As a result, the GMD actively 
recruited tall and muscular young men from the northern provinces to join the police force in 
Shanghai. The Public Security Bureau made all new recruits go through a physically rigorous 
and demanding training regiment where they were taught discipline and obedience. This was the 
GMD‟s attempt to create a professional police force that could not only maintain order and 
stability, but could crush any political dissent.  
In order to send a clear message to the Chinese citizens of Shanghai, the police arrested 
and rounded up any suspected criminals such as petty thieves, gangsters (other than the Green 
Gang), and anyone accused of disturbing the peace. Executions were carried out for serious 
crimes such as murder, rape, and robbery. Martial law was declared immediately after the worker 
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riots of 1927, and was not lifted until the GMD could be assured all potential threats were 
arrested. Public executions for those committing the most violent crimes such as murder were 
used to scare off any future criminals. The GMD adopted a strict code of punishment for crimes, 
and made the public become very aware that anti-government activities would not be tolerated. 
342
 
A major source of tension had been between the Chinese municipal government and the 
International Settlement‟s Municipal Council over who has the sovereignty to control the extra-
settlement roads that bordered the Settlement and the Chinese territories. These extra-settlement 
roads had been built by the British outside of the regular boundaries of the foreign concessions 
With real estate property increasing in value these extra-settlement roads represented a major 
source of potential revenue to the Chinese. The Chinese Ratepayers Association and the Chinese 
Chamber of Commerce, representing the interests of Shanghai‟s Chinese wealthy elites urged the 
municipal government to not back down from “blatant imperialist expansion” and demanded the 
government do something about the question of “road sovereignty”. On September 26, 1929, the 
Shanghai Land Bureau issued a decree that forbid any Chinese citizen from selling any land to 
the foreigners for any purpose, and threatened to confiscate the property of anyone who 
collaborated with foreigners. After months of negotiations, on January 16, 1930 Director General 
Stirling Fessenden and Commissioner of Public Works J.E. Needham agreed not to buy any 
more land for extra-settlement roads from the Chinese. 
343
 
The police force had placed many of their best policemen on the streets as Shanghai‟s 
roads became more dangerous during the 1920s. As motorcars increased in number, and 
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members of the foreign elite as well as a growing number of wealthy Chinese businessmen 
preferred riding in automobiles, traffic congestion resulted in numerous accidents. In the month 
of June 1929, there were 803 recorded street accidents in the International Settlement, which 
resulted in 10 people getting killed and 252 injured.  
344
 The Public Security Bureau sent more 
policemen to the particularly dangerous crossings of six major roads (Zhonghua, Minguo, 
Guangfu, Daton, Gonghe, and Hengfeng). These roads were cleared of stalls and peddler‟s 
stands on the sidewalk that endangered drivers and pedestrians. Much stricter regulations were 
enforced during the first half of 1928. Traffic violators who were involved in road impediments, 
speeding cars, or boats blocking river traffic were prosecuted with serious fines and license 
revocations to discourage others from engaging in dangerous behavior in heavy traffic. 
345
 
Yuan Liang, the former police chief was appointed as the Public Security Bureau director 
under Mayor Zhang Qun. Yuan was considered extremely loyal to the GMD, and harbored deep 
resentment toward the foreigners who controlled the prime real estates of Shanghai. Unable to 
take back the foreign territories, Yuan eagerly followed GMD orders to strengthen control to a 
more grassroots level in the Chinese municipality. Yuan ordered more policemen to be hired, and 
increased the monthly salaries of experienced police. Under Yuan‟s leadership, the Public 
Security Bureau employed a total of about 4,000 policemen throughout Shanghai. Yuan also 
pushed for longer and more rigorous training for new police, and demanded loyalty among his 
staff. Being restricted by the “Law of Extraterritoriality”, Yuan assigned precinct commanders 
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for each district, and demanded that they report back to him immediately if they experience any 
issues with extra-settlement roads over the question of “road sovereignty”. 
346
 
While the Public Security Bureau had success in reducing crime, they had difficulty in 
dealing with an increasing number of refugees and vagabonds that flocked to Shanghai during 
the late 1920s to the early 1930s. Most of the refugees and vagabonds had fled war, famine, or 
natural disasters in their rural villages in search of a better life in Shanghai. However, these 
refugees and vagabonds became a major eye-sore for the GMD as they set up shacks in 
shantytowns on the outskirts of the city. As these refugees could not find employment, they often 
resorted to begging, stealing, or other criminal activities in order to survive. Refugees often 
became addicted to drugs and gambling, or resorted to thievery and prostitution. Many of them 
became homeless panhandlers who annoyed urban residents with their begging. The Public 
Security Bureau sent police to arrest these beggars on charges of disturbing public order and 
safety. Beggars were sent to hospices or reformatory schools. Another jail was opened to house 
beggars in order to keep them off the streets. 
347
 Despite these measures, the increasing number 
of refugees and beggars caused severe problems for the police force, and became a major 
dilemma for the municipal government as they continue to try to portray an image of the Greater 
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Successes and Achievements Accomplished During the First Half of the Greater Shanghai 
Project 
 
 Despite numerous challenges and shortcomings from both internal and external forces, 
the first half of the Greater Shanghai Project from 1927-1932, on the eve of the Japanese 
bombing in January 28 could be considered a success. There were significant accomplishments 
that were very notable, especially in the construction of new roads, buildings, and other urban 
infrastructure; as well as in education and public health. In 1927, before the start of the Greater 
Shanghai Project, there were only 172 kilometers of roads in the Chinese territories. 
348
 By about 
1933, 54 kilometers of roads (about 40% of the previously existing figure) had been rebuilt, 
along with 12 kilometers of canals (about 33% of previous figure). 
349
 
 In 1927, only one private tramway company (Huashang Dianche Gongsi) and two bus 
companies were in operation in Nanshi. In Zhabei, there were no public transportation facilities. 
The tramways in the foreign settlements were not linked to the one in Nanshi. The Public 
Utilities Bureau had to extend the public transportation system to the entire city by creating new 
routes, lines, and stops. In order to bring uniformity to the city, the Chinese officials were able to 
negotiate to link up three different tramway lines from Nanshi to the International Settlement. In 
Zhabei, an overseas Chinese person proposed to the government that he could create a bus 
company similar to the one he had set up in Hong Kong. This Chinese owned bus company was 
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launched in 1927 with three routes, and later increased to five routes to accommodate more 
riders. Even after the Japanese attack on Zhabei, the bus company continued to operate. 
350
 
 The most significant changes in the restructuring of the public transportation of city were 
redesigning the city‟s major roads and streets. In the Hunan district, new roads were paved where 
in the northeast: Tongyi Road, Zhaozhou Road, Waima Road, and Lima Road were connected as 
the north-south line. Fangbing Road and Heping Road formed the east-west line. In the center 
and the south, Luban Road and Tianyaoqiao Road formed the north-south line, while Kangzhai 
Road and Xietu Road formed the east-west line. In Zhabei district, Songgongyuan Road, Datong 
Road, Baoxi Road, and Baoshan Road were linked together to form the north-south line; and 
Zhongxin Road, Yanjiage Road, Qiujian Road and East Qiujiang Road formed the east-west line. 
In Huxi district, a new road was built to connect it to the main road frequently used by 
foreigners. In Pudong district, where there had been few roads, new ones were paved to form the 
Yangsiqu Shangnan Road to the north, Luxinqu Dongdu Road to the south, Huangpu River Road 
to the east, and Pudong Road to the west. 
351
 
 In the center of the city, new streets were built to link up the existing infrastructure to 
speed up transportation. These included North Zhongshan Road, with a distance of 13 kilometers 
built in May 1930, connecting Zhabei in the north and Longhuazhen in the south. Qimei Road 
was constructed in December 1930, with a distance of 5 kilometers to link the city center to 
Zhabei. Huangxin Road was built in the same month to connect it to the settlements. Sanming 
Road and Wuquan Road were also built at the end of 1930, with a total length of 5 kilometers 
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each to link them to the train stations. Pudong Road with a total length of 17.5 kilometers was 
the longest road constructed at the time. Initial construction began in 1930, although the road 
was not completed until October 1935. This road was able to link all of Pudong district. 
352
 The 
purpose of the construction of new roads was to allow for larger vehicles such as automobiles, 
buses, trams, and trolleys to be able to navigate through these streets. Some of these roads were 
not previously well-paved, and larger vehicles had a hard time driving through. These new roads 
increased the size of the lanes and made it wider for vehicles to drive and park, which led to 
more vehicles to appear in the Chinese sections of the city. 
 The Education Bureau began pushing for increased literacy among the population, and 
pushed for children from all socioeconomic backgrounds to attend primary schools. Many new 
schools were built, more teachers were hired, and a significant increase in the number of children 
enrolled in primary and secondary schools.  
Table 6.7 
Development of Municipal Public Schools 
School 1927-28 1928-29 1929-30 1930-31 1931-32 
Kindergarten           
Schools 2 8 9 12 13 
Students   310 250 601 639 
Teachers 2 8 10 24 31 
Primary Schools           
Schools 47 179 179 184 186 
Students 14,180 29,760 30,519 31,539 32,760 
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 The number of private schools also increased, and private schools were encouraged as 
long as their curriculum was approved by the Education Bureau. To reduce illiteracy, the 
Education Bureau paid special attention to the establishment of “people‟s schools” (minzhong 
xuexiao), which provided free education, textbooks, and other study materials to the poorest 
neighborhoods. Children living in the poorest neighborhoods had access to attend these people‟s 
schools for free. 
Table 6.8 
Development of People‟s Schools 
Year Schools Pupils 
1927-28 20 354 
1928-29 30 2,452 
1929-30 35 2,985 







 The Health and Hygiene Bureau was very active in promoting public health and 
sanitation throughout the city, especially in poor neighborhoods. The Health Bureau set up a 
system of compulsory vaccination for all school age children, and made students go through 
medical checks at the beginning of each school year.
355
 In April 1928, Health and Hygiene 
Bureau director Hu Hongji launched a “movement for hygiene” (weisheng yundong) that forced 
residents to remove garbage from the streets, clean the walls, and sweep the pavements of their 
neighborhoods. This anti-dirtiness campaign was followed by cleaning inspections of old and 
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crowded neighborhoods to make sure hygiene standards were met. 
356
 A garbage collection 
services staff was organized to collect disposed garbage and waste from the Chinese city each 
day. 
357
 The Health and Hygiene Bureau continued to ask the GMD for more funding to hire 
more garbage collectors, who director Hu felt were critical to maintaining public health and 
sanitation.  
 The Public Health Bureau pushed for more hospitals to be built; and more doctors, 
dentists, nurses, and other health care professionals to be trained. Many poor residents had little 
or no access to health care, and there were not enough hospitals or clinics to deal with so many 
patients. To resolve this problem, the Public Health Bureau gradually set up a series of health 
stations (weisheng shiwusuo) throughout the Chinese territories of Zhabei, Jiangwan, and Nanshi 
beginning in 1929. Drug abuse, particularly opium had been a major social and health problem. 
Under Hu Hongji‟s leadership, the bureau cracked down on opium smoking dens by closing 
them down and arresting drug dealers. Clinics were set up to treat drug users and opium smokers 
for rehabilitation. Given the budget limitations and the lack of health care infrastructure before 




 The achievements made in public works and utilities, security, education, and health care 
could be attributed to the strong leadership of the bureau directors of Land, Public Works, Public 
Utilities, Public Security, Education, and Health & Hygiene. Shen Yi, the director of Public 
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Works Bureau for the entire Greater Shanghai Project served as the primary force behind the 
construction of new roads, better access to transportation, and improved mobility in the city. 
Shen‟s staff made thorough and detailed investigations of each Chinese neighborhood, and came 
up with an urban construction plan that could effectively link up or connect major roads to each 
other across different districts. Land Bureau director Zhu Yan was instrumental in insisting on 
the purchase of land in Jiangwan, which allowed for future development on a large, undeveloped 
piece of land. Huang Baiqiao, director of Public Utilities, worked with Shen Yi in creating and 
providing better urban infrastructure such as new government buildings and services in 
Jiangwan, the designated city center.  
Yuan Liang and the Public Security Bureau used fear and intimidation tactics to reduce 
crimes and solidify control over the Chinese municipality. More policemen were hired and 
stricter laws for punishments were enforced to make people feel safer, as well as to send a clear 
message that crimes would not be tolerated. Chen Dezheng, Education Bureau director was 
credited with the establishment of more public schools, especially primary schools to improve 
literacy rates. Hu Hongji‟s health and hygiene campaign aimed at improving public health for the 
masses received widespread praise from both the GMD and among Chinese civilians. Many of 
these bureau directors such as Shen, Zhu, Huang, and Hu had worked under three different 
mayors from Huang Fu to Zhang Dingpan to Zhang Qun during the first five years of the Greater 
Shanghai Project. Their experience, knowledge, and leadership were crucial to the improvements 






Facing Challenges and Uncertainties 
 Despite the hard work of the mayors, bureau directors, and municipal staff, the Greater 
Shanghai Project faced severe difficulties and uncertainties when Wu Tiecheng took over mayor 
in January 1932. Both external and internal factors contributed to the inability of the municipal 
government to reach the goals set by the GMD at the beginning of the Greater Shanghai Project 
in 1927. As Wu assumed office in the winter of 1932, the Shanghai municipal government faced 
more urgent and daunting tasks than ever before to complete the second half of the Greater 
Shanghai Project.  
 From an internal standpoint, the GMD had underestimated the costs of this grand urban 
construction campaign by miscalculating the various sub-costs. While initially, the GMD had 
sufficient funding for the first two years of the project, the massive building project in Jiangwan, 
where a new city center consisting of administrative, industrial, commercial, and residential 
areas were to be constructed from scratch on a large, undeveloped, and unsettled piece of land 
was far too costly for the municipal authorities. Municipal finances generated from various taxes 
collected could not keep up with annual escalating expenses. Besides construction and rebuilding 
costs, the relatively high salaries offered to government employees and the rising number of civil 
servants such as policemen, school teachers, services professionals, etc. hired each year 
amounted to a rapidly increasing payroll. To make matters worse, by the early 1930s, the GMD 
central government reduced direct financial support to the Shanghai municipal authorities 
because of other critical needs the GMD faced such as building the national capital in Nanjing 
and military expenditures. The reduction in GMD financial support forced the Shanghai 
municipal authorities to depend on their own revenues to finance the GSP expenditure, which 
proved to be an even more enormous burden. 
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 External forces beyond the municipal authorities‟ control only worsened the financial 
situation. Even before the Japanese bombing of Zhabei, refugees had flooded the outskirts of 
Shanghai. These refugees caused major housing and public health problems for the municipal 
officials. Unable to accommodate refugees with government housing projects, the refugees were 
forced to live in shantytowns. Combating public health and sanitation concerns became a major 
headache for the municipal government. Given the limited financial budget, public health, 
education, and social welfare services programs may have prevented more money being spent on 
the city center construction in Jiangwan. The anti-Japanese sentiments over Japanese military 
aggression, and the GMD‟s inability to resist the Japanese following the attack on Shanghai 
forced the GMD to rethink their priorities. The Japanese bombing left much of Zhabei destroyed, 
and the rebuilding of Zhabei put additional financial strains on the over-stretched municipal 
government. Mayor Wu Tiecheng did his best to try to continue the Greater Shanghai Project, 
but faced with overwhelming difficulties caused by both internal and external factors, it was 
obvious when he assumed the leadership of the city in January 1932, that the original goals of the 





































 Mayor Wu Tiecheng‟s government faced a serious crisis as the Japanese launched an 
aerial bombing assault on the Chinese controlled Zhabei in January 1932. The second half of the 
Greater Shanghai Project faced major challenges from both financial and political standpoints. 
While Wu and his municipal government did their best to try to carry on the initial plans of the 
Greater Shanghai Project, it was clear that those goals could not be reached. This chapter 
examines the second half of the Greater Shanghai Project from 1932-1937, and analyzes the 
reasons behind the unfulfilled expectations of the campaign. The questions addressed include 
whether the Japanese attack and subsequent invasion that triggered the Sino-Japanese War was 
the primary factor in the demise of the Greater Shanghai Project, or were financial limitations 
and the lack of public revenue for the funding of large scale public works the main reasons for 
the downfall of the project? While the Greater Shanghai Project did not achieve the ambitious 
goals that the GMD had envisioned, can this campaign be considered a failure? Why was the 
legacy of the Greater Shanghai Project? Was it an overambitious plan that achieved partial rather 
than full success or was it an embarrassing modernization campaign that revealed the 
weaknesses in the financial resources and political leadership of the GMD? Who should have 
been more responsible for the disappointing conclusion of the project: the GMD or the Shanghai 
municipal government? 
 The second half of the Greater Shanghai Project was defined by the leadership of Wu 
Tiecheng as mayor. Unlike the tumultuous first five years as a special administrative 
municipality where three different mayors led the Chinese city, and where attrition and turnover 
of key municipal staff were high; Wu Tiecheng and his bureau directors brought about a sense of 
stability to the city. Wu served as mayor from January 1932 to April 1937; and under his tenure 
his key advisors were all his trusted protégés who pledged their loyalty to his leadership. 
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Compared to the first half of the special administrative municipality, Wu‟s government was quite 
effective in dealing with the bureaucracy of the GMD political hierarchy in Nanjing. 
1.28: The Japanese Attack 
 Tensions with Japan were apparent in January 1932 where the threat of Japanese military 
expansionism in Asia brought about anti-Japanese sentiments in China. On January 18, 1932, a 
group of young Chinese fought with a group of Japanese monks, causing the death of one of 
them. Two days on later, a group of Japanese residents burned down a textile factory where they 
claimed the monks‟ assailants were from. 
359
 Those incidents triggered a serious of explosive 
confrontations between the growing number of the Japanese community living in Shanghai and 
the Chinese. The Japanese consul general demanded severe reparations from Wu Tiecheng, 
punishments for the guilty party, and a public personal apology from the mayor with the promise 
that all anti-Japanese activities would be banned. On the afternoon of January 28, 1932, Wu 
informed the Japanese consul general that his government would accept the Japanese demands. 
The consul general was satisfied with the conditions but the Japanese military was not ready to 
accept just an apology. High ranking Japanese military officials demanded an armed intervention 
in Shanghai under the disguised name of protecting Japanese citizens. However, the real 
intentions of the Japanese army was to take over a part of Shanghai and to carve out a Japanese 





 The Japanese had believed that their strong military capabilities would be able to 
overwhelm any opposition in Asia, and their imperialistic ambitions had set their sights on 
conquest and colonization of their Asian neighbors, just like the Europeans have done. The anti-
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Japanese riots and the insecurity of Japanese residents in Shanghai gave the Japanese military the 
perfect excuse to attack and take over a part of Shanghai. Without warning on the evening of 
January 28, the Japanese troops attack the Chinese section of Zhabei. The Japanese military 
claimed that troops entered Zhabei to ensure the safety and protection of Japanese citizens from 
the Chinese mobs. The Chinese 19
th
 Army, in defense of Zhabei put up a fierce resistance but 
was quickly overwhelmed by the superior weapons of the Japanese forces. Fighting was initially 
limited to Zhabei but quickly spread to the rest of Chinese controlled Shanghai, including 
Jiangwan and Wusong. The Japanese called in their air force for the aerial bombardment of 
Zhabei, which had been where much of the Chinese troops had been stationed. Chinese civilians 
were specifically targeted to punish them for inciting anti-Japanese riots.  
 Wu‟s government had to deal with this emergency crisis by forming refugee aid 
organizations for the civilians displaced or left homeless by the Japanese bombing. Wu 
attempted to put the city‟s financial and human resources to good use by asking Shanghai‟s 
wealthy elites to form an association for maintaining business activities in the city and to collect 
aid funds. Wu appealed to the elites‟ social association to create temporary assistance to refugees 
in the war zones. 
361
 
 Wu‟s vigorous leadership in the face of combat and his successful appeals to the city‟s 
wealthy elites allowed the municipal government to provide substantial aid to the war victims. 
The authorities set up thousands of beds in the city‟s hospitals to treat wounded Chinese soldiers 
and civilians. The Social Affairs Bureau distributed food and supplies to the refugees and 
homeless. The Public Security Bureau attempted to restore order by organizing fire-fighting 
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services to put down the raging fires in Zhabei. The municipal government‟s quick responses 
prevented further chaos from happening in the city. 
 The Japanese did not attack the International Settlement but as soon as emergency was 
declared, the International Settlement closed all entry into their borders to avoid being 
overwhelmed by a flood of refugees from Zhabei. Instead makeshift camps were set up 
throughout the city to provide food and shelter to the refugees. The Social Affairs Bureau 
responded the best it could to the emergency relief. The bureau took over responsibilities such as 
the collecting and distribution of clothing, blankets, kitchen utensils, and other items. Statistics 
were compiled on population movements, the location of makeshift camps, and the distribution 
of food and medicine. Each camp was provided with a care center with a nurse to provide basic 
health services such as vaccinations against diseases. This huge humanitarian effort was met with 
assistance from active social organizations in Shanghai such as chambers of commerce, guilds, 
native-place associations and foreign organizations such as the Red Cross that helped provide 
emergence relief to the municipal government. 
362
 
 Finally on March 5, 1932, a cease fire was agreed where the Japanese demanded Chinese 
troops withdraw from Shanghai. This agreement was deeply humiliating to the Chinese, 
particularly to the GMD. The most humiliating clause in the cease fire agreement was one 
stipulating the Chinese government could not station troops inside Shanghai or within a radius of 
30 kilometers. Even after the humiliating agreement was signed in May, the municipal 
government faced a considerable task of reconstruction. Wu Tiecheng‟s administration had to 
resume control over the city and rebuilt the damages caused by the Japanese attacks. In Zhabei, 
the Public Security Bureau set up a special office to provide for the protection of its inhabitants 
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and to prevent further conflicts with the Japanese. The Japanese troops did not leave until July. 
363
 
Wu Tiecheng’s Municipal Government (1932-1937) 
 When Wu Tiecheng was appointed mayor, he installed a new set of municipal leadership 
based on his familiarity with their loyalty.  
Mayor Wu Tiecheng‟s Administration (January 1932-April 1937) 
Bureau    Director    
Social Affairs   Mai Chaoshu 
    Wu Xingya 
    Pan Gongzhan 
Education   Pan Gongzhan 
Finance   Cai Zengji 
Hygiene   Li Tingan 
Peacekeeping   Yang Hu 
General Secretariat  Yu Hongjun 
Public Security  Wen Yingxing 
    Wen Hongen 
    Cai Jingjun 
Land    Jin Liren 
Public Works   Shen Yi 




 Wu created the new Bureau of Peacekeeping in the aftermath of the Japanese attack to 
restore order and prevent further tensions with the Japanese. Pan Gongzhan and Shen Yi were 
maintained from the previous mayoral administrations, although Pan was moved from Social 
Affairs to Education. Shen Yi‟s talents were widely recognized and his skills praised by 
everyone in the municipal government. Wu needed Shen‟s expertise on Public Works in order to 
continue the Greater Shanghai Project‟s development plans. 
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 Wu‟s new appointments were primarily based on native-place or provincial loyalty. Wu 
himself was a native of Guangdong province. His municipal staff clearly showed his preference 
for his fellow Guangdong protégés, whom he could be assured of their loyalty and obedience to 
his commands. 
Official   Home Province 
Wu Tiecheng (Mayor) Guangdong 
Yu Hongjun   Guangdong 
Cai Zengji   Guangdong 
Wen Yingxiang  Guangdong 
Wen Hongen   Guangdong 
Cai Jingjun   Guangdong 
Li Tingan   Guangdong 
Pan Gongzhan   Zhejiang 
Shen Yi   Zhejiang 
Wu Xingya   Hubei 
Jin Liren   Anhui 




 Wu‟s bureau directors came primarily from his home province of Guangdong in south 
China. Previously, Huang Fu, Zhang Qun, and Zhang Dingpan‟s bureau directors were primarily 
from neighboring Zhejiang or Jiangsu provinces. Native-place associations (tongxiang) had been 
in place in Shanghai since the mid 19
th
 century, as people from the same hometown or province 
formed networks and alliances to assist each other with jobs, connections, and inside information 
in the city. 
366
 Native-place loyalty was clearly what Wu Tiecheng wanted to form his key 
leadership circle. His loyal followers would publicly support his policies and decisions 
regardless of the outcomes. 
 The reconstruction of Zhabei and Wusong was the first crucial test to Wu‟s 
administration. Wu had ordered the Social Affairs Bureau, the General Chamber of Commerce, 
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and the Association of Chartered Accountants to collect as much information as possible on the 
human and material damages caused by the fighting. A municipal report estimated the total 
amount of damages caused to the city to be about 1.5 billion Chinese Yuan. An estimated 
800,000 people were affected by the attack, with 6,000 killed, 2,000 wounded, and 10,000 
missing among Chinese civilians. Furthermore, more than 12,000 buildings, 4,000 shops, 240 
schools, and 600 factories had been destroyed by the Japanese bombings. Zhabei and Wusong 
had suffered severe destruction that resulted in a large number of government infrastructure, 
including newly built buildings being destroyed. 
367
 
 Wu ordered his bureaus to get down to business immediately with the reconstruction 
plans. The Public Works Bureau led by Shen Yi organized workers to clear the roads, demolish 
the fortifications, fill the trenches, and rebuilt the bridges. The Public Utilities Bureau installed 
more than 2,000 street lamps. Municipal officials were assigned to the areas that had suffered the 
most damages, and fire hydrants and electric lines were repaired immediately. 
368
 The Health 
Bureau was able to organize large scale operations of disinfection in the badly damaged areas of 
Zhabei to bury dead corpses and prevent epidemic diseases from spreading. Roads were 
disinfected with lime to prevent contamination and mobile health care centers provided active 
vaccination campaigns for the sick. 
369
  
 After the fighting, the municipal government faced financial problems. The fiscal budget 
had been worsened by the loss of 70 percent of land tax from the rural areas of the municipality 
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because of flooding on the Yangzi River. Receipts had fallen to only around one sixth of the 
prewar revenues, while the municipal budget faced a deficit of 3 million Yuan. 
370
 The municipal 
government could not rely just on emergency measures but it had to plan for the future and 
prepare a long term project for reconstruction and development to the destroyed districts.  
 A committee was set up for the reconstruction of the Shanghai-Wusong war zones. 
Committee members comprised of both bureau directors as well as wealthy and prominent 
Shanghai financiers. 
371
 Wu Tiecheng knew that he needed the support of the local elites for the 
reconstruction of the city because without their financial support, large scale projects would not 
be financially possible. The Social Affairs Bureau came up with a three year reconstruction plan, 
assessed at 5 million Yuan. The agenda in this plan included swift construction of new homes, 
the rehabilitation of rural zones, and the financing of social assistance through people‟s credit 
institutions. The Public Works Bureau was assigned to continue the extension of the Greater 
Shanghai plan in Jiangwan implemented before the start of the attack. Provisions included the 
construction of roads and railways connecting the planned civic center in Jiangwan to Zhabei, 
the shifting of the northern station out of the city because it hampered the expansion of the 
district, and the installation of new wharves near Wusong. 
372
 The municipal government had 
hoped the extension of this project would lead to the development of a civic center that would 
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benefit Zhabei and other devastated areas by encouraging more business activities and attracting 
a larger population. The municipal authorities had given up the rebuilding of Zhabei through 
government expenses because of the budget deficits, and had hoped private sectors could assume 
the responsibility for it. Wu‟s government felt the money for rebuilding Zhabei would be better 
spent on a more ambitious project to transform the city in Jiangwan. 
373
 
 Wu realized that in the aftermath of the Japanese attack, his government needed to win 
over the people. To reduce the financial burden on the population, the municipal government 
decided to reduce taxes in areas that had been directly affected. Taxes were also lowered in other 
areas under Chinese control. In the official news report on June 21, 1932, the house tax was 
canceled for the first six months of the year. The payment of vehicle tax was postponed to June. 
All other taxes such as ships, markets, etc., were to be paid when activities resumed. A generous 
reduction in land tax in the rural outskirts of the city was also granted. 
374
 While Wu‟s tax 
reduction policy was a wise move, it significantly reduced the amount of public revenues 
available for the 1932 fiscal year. It was likely that the inhabitants of the city, especially those 
who had their homes and property destroyed by the Japanese attack would have been unable to 
pay any taxes. Wu‟s gestures showed that he was a caring and compassionate mayor who could 
relate to the people. But the financial deficits associated from both the high costs of 
reconstruction and the loss of tax revenue would put the municipal government in even more dire 
financial constraints. 
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Keeping the Greater Shanghai Project Going 
 Wu knew that if he wanted to gain the support of the GMD central government in 
Nanjing, he needed to carry out the original plans of the Greater Shanghai Project to completion. 
Despite the financial difficulties that lay ahead, Wu ordered his staff to press forward. Public 
health and sanitation had been a key agenda in the urban development of a modern city. On 
October 1, 1932, the municipal council approved the resolution of a meeting held on September 
14 to adopt the recommendation made by the Public Works Committee that all unauthorized huts 
should be demolished after one month‟s notice. These unauthorized huts that had appeared in the 
shantytowns had been an embarrassment for the municipal government. The occupants were 
usually beggars or the homeless. In reports submitted to the Works Committee on September 6, 
the acting commissioner of public works emphasized that squatter huts should not be permitted. 
There was an estimated 1,000 unauthorized huts that had been erected that needed to be 
demolished. This resolution was supported by the commissioner of public health who stated that 
there was no doubt that the existence of this large number of unauthorized structures was 
subversive to the interests of public health, and that they helped spread infectious and contagious 
diseases. Immediately after the council approved the resolution, demolition teams moved to 
demolish these squatter huts. 
375
 
 An announcement was made on November 26, 1932 that the construction of roads and a 
new administrative building of the city government of Greater Shanghai in the proposed civic 
center between Jiangwan, Yangtszepoo, and the northern district of the International Settlement 
was expected to be completed by the end of June 1933 so that the city government could move to 
its new office by July 1933. This news greatly delighted Wu Tiecheng. The report indicated that 
more than 2,000 laborers were engaged in the building work in the civic center, which covered 
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about 1,000 acres. Some of the principal thoroughfares in the section had already been 
completed. At the northwest section of the civic center, a large municipal cemetery was being 
laid out. A magnificent building to be used as the “main hall” of the cemetery had been 
constructed. A park occupying an area of over four hundred mow and with recreation ground 
was also being laid out to the north of Chen Tung Road and the south of Wu Chuang Road, while 
the building of six bridges, all of reinforced concrete, will start in December 1932 over Jukong 
Creek, which passed through the civic center. 
376
 
 On October 10, 1933, the new municipal building was dedicated with great pomp and 
circumstance. The new building where the Greater Shanghai municipal administration relocated 
to at the civic center in Jiangwan was officially dedicated on the occasion of the 22
nd
 anniversary 
of the founding of the Republic of China. Mayor Wu Tiecheng officiated at the inauguration 
ceremony and the event was attended by upwards of 20,000 people. The ceremony was initiated 
at 10 o‟clock in the morning with music played by the Public Safety Bureau band and the raising 
of the national and GMD party colors, followed by fireworks and airplanes encircling the 
building from above. Mayor Wu performed the ceremony of opening the main doors to the 
building and the unveiling of the memorial tablet to Sun Yat-sen, followed by GMD rites. Wu 
delivered the inaugural address where he outlined the scheme of construction for the Greater 
Shanghai Municipality. The Shanghai Peace Preservation Corps, the police force, and fire 
brigades paraded in file before the mayor and other senior officials. 
 The new municipal structure was built after the pattern of the former imperial palaces and 
its exterior is typical Chinese in architectural design, from the great sweep of the grand stairway 
leading to the main doors to the beautifully carved and colored upper walls and tiled and up-
curving roof. Inside the building, Chinese decoration was combined with Western utility. In the 
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center of the main hall, the memorial tablet to Sun Yat-sen was placed. From a distance, the new 
municipal building presented a gorgeous appearance and its vivid color combinations made it 
stand out in the center of open green fields of Jiangwan, as yet occupied. The new structure was 
four story in height. On the two sides of the administration building, two plain new buildings had 
also been completed, which housed the various bureaus of the Greater Shanghai Municipality. 
 Wu Tiecheng made sure he paid tributes to the cooperation and assistance of local 
Chinese leaders and foreign leaders in restoring peace and order in Shanghai after the Japanese 
attack, which enabled the resumption of construction work on the new municipal building. He 
reminded the attendants of the painful experiences of the past year, mindful of his heavy 
responsibilities in the planned rehabilitation of war-devastated areas. He explained the origin of 
the new building, saying the development of a Greater Shanghai had been effected by the 
program of national reconstruction laid down by Sun Yat-sen. The creation of the civic center 
would be the first step towards the realization of the plans for the establishment of a Greater 
Shanghai. He thanked the previous three mayors: Huang Fu, Zhang Dingpan, and Zhang Qun for 
their services and contributions leading up to the present stage. Wu emphasized that the in the 
comprehensive plans for the development of Greater Shanghai, the new structures could only be 
regarded as a modest beginning. Bordered as it by Wusong to the north, the foreign settlements 
to the south, the Huangpu River in the west; the new city of Jiangwan occupied an excellent 
central location and has great future in store for it. Wu appealed to the people of Greater 
Shanghai for continued faith and cooperation, where he promised that the planned program of 
reconstruction “in making Greater Shanghai the preeminent city that man and nature have 
destined it to be.” 
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 The dedication of the ceremony was the highlight of Wu‟s mayoral tenure. The ceremony 
was attended by not a large number of Chinese officials and business leaders, but also by a 
representative gathering of foreigners. Practically all foreign consulates in Shanghai were 
represented as well as a large attendance of foreign naval and military officers. 
377
 
 As population continued to expand, affordable housing had become a major concern for 
the majority of residents. An editorial appeared in The China Weekly Review suggested that the 
government should do more to make rent more affordable. The article stated that the rent 
problem in Shanghai concerned nearly every resident in the community and needed an amicable 
solution. While the amount paid for a house in Shanghai in terms of gold (gold currency) was 
rather low compared to that paid in other metropolises of the West, the economic conditions in 
China made rent extremely high and unaffordable for a great number of people. Rents were 
extremely high, particularly in downtown areas convenient for public transport. Immediately 
after the Japanese attack, thousands of business establishments located in or near the war zone 
faced bankruptcy, due to the suspension of trade. During the Japanese hostilities, more than nine 
thousand houses in Zhabei and the Hongkou districts were destroyed, and as a result the demand 
for housing had become more urgent than ever before. Many landlords whose houses were not 
destroyed had raised the rent as high as 100% compared to that of 1932 before the attack. Mainly 
due to economic depression, many of these houses have not been fully occupied, but the 
landlords perhaps waiting for business revival are unwilling to let rent to their houses be 
lowered. 
 Tenants had faced the difficult situation of not being able to afford to pay their rents. An 
estimated 5,000 mercantile houses all over Shanghai have not paid rent for several years, or are 
behind on their monthly payments. In normal times, they would have been ordered to close by 
                                                          
377
 The China Weekly Review, October 14, 1933, p. 800. 
309 
 
the court, but because of the economic depression, the government has withheld from closing 
down these stores late on payments. An estimated seventy business establishments located along 
Nanking Road, the most prosperous business section in Shanghai may close their doors baring 
unforeseen forces. In the face of acute economic depression, combined with an unusually low 
index number of commodity prices, the people of Shanghai have to pay a higher rent than in the 
past. While it was true many landlords bought land at a peak price and constructed premises 
during the past years where building materials and wages were high, the editorial considered the 
high rent to be unjust and unreasonable. The articles suggested the government should step in 
and resolve this problem before tensions between landlords and tenants break out. In conclusion, 
the editorial asked the initiative to come from the government to work out a practical plan 
between the landlords, tenants, labor unions, and chambers of commerce to solve this housing 
problem so that social order and stability could be maintained. 
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 Wu knew his administration had to focus on the housing problems facing in the city. On 
August 10, 1935, the municipal government laid out plans for the housing situation in Shanghai 
by addressing these concerns. The major issue had been rural migrant who have flocked to the 
city. Framers in the interior of the country had continuously moved in droves to Shanghai in 
search of a better life. They have become the unskilled laborers such as rickshaw pullers, wharf 
coolies, etc. that have fueled Shanghai‟s growth. They lived in grass huts numbering about 
30,000 scattered all over Shanghai. A survey by the city government found that that the number 
of dwellers in these huts to be 94,222, or 3.1 percent of the total population of about three 
million living in Shanghai. They live in these huts under the most unsanitary conditions. Wu 
Tiecheng understood the importance of resolving the housing problem and organized the Labor 
Welfare Commission of Greater Shanghai to specifically focus on housing for the poor. 
                                                          
378
 The China Weekly Review, March 17, 1934, p. 106-107. 
310 
 
 The Labor Commission, chaired by Wu himself, consisted of General Secretary Y.L  Lee 
and all the commissioners of the city government along with about twenty foreign leading 
experts as members. The government set aside about 1.5 million (U.S. dollars) for the 
commission to carry out is projects. Since the organization of this commission, there were three 
sub-committees: one for building and planning, one for training social workers, and one for the 
rickshaw administration. The immediate projects the commission worked on were the 
construction of six or more model villages to meet the needs of the poor, the training of social 
workers, and to aid rickshaw pullers. To reduce the suffering of hut dwellers, steps were taken to 
build workers‟ villages. Six or more model villages were planned to be built to house migrant 
laborers with one at Chi Mei Road, one at Chungshan Road, one at Tai Mo Bridge, and one at Po 
Sin Road. Beside these villages, the commission planned to build two or three villages for 
rickshaw pullers, which had been advocated by the rickshaw administration. 
 Each model village consisted of between two and three hundred houses, grouped together 
with five or six houses in each row. Each house had a living room, kitchen, toilet, and up stair 
sleeping accommodation. All these houses were built to be fireproof and waterproof. Since many 
migrants were single, the plans also include two large dormitories: one for single men and the 
other for single women. Each village contained a large playground for children as well as a 
school building, a cooperative store, a tea house, a nursery, public toilets and bath houses. Dayu 
Doon, the architect in charge of the civic center and the Bureau of Public Works were assigned 
to handle the construction. 
 The commission selected about forty students for a training program of approximately 
five months. After training they were to be assigned for welfare work among these new villages. 
The teachers for this training program were high school graduates, with some even being college 
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graduates. The Chinese YMCA cooperated with the commission to let welfare and teacher 
training programs use their facilities. The rickshaw administration planned to introduce better 
quality rickshaws into shanghai to uplift the pullers. Two or three villages were built to house 
these pullers and the welfare work for them would be centralized within these villages. The 
commission set aside about $500,000 out of $1.5 million for the rickshaw administration and the 
welfare work of the pullers. 
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 In December 1935, Dayu Doon, architect-in-chief in charge of the new city center project 
in Jiangwan published an account of the progress made in the Greater Shanghai Project in The 
China Quarterly magazine. Doon praised the leadership of Mayor Wu and his own teams for the 
visionary schemes for the development of a new Shanghai. Doon reported that only a few years 
after announcements were made, a new city was arising from the open fields of Jiangwan. The 
area now known as the civic center had been nothing but a great expanse of flat low land for 
farming. By 1935, visitors could immediately notice the carefully laid out, spacious, and well-
paved roads. In Jiangwan, construction work was on going for an athletic stadium, gymnasium, 
and swimming pool. The mayor‟s building and the gate towers of the museum and library was a 
short distance away. There were many public and semi-public building such as a up-to-date 
hospital. Construction of the Jukong Wharves would relive the congestion at the old waterfront, 
two aerodromes: one for military and one for commercial use, had been enlarged and improved. 
Four model villages for the poor had been completed to improve the living conditions among the 
poor, health stations had been erected at different parts of the city so more people could have 
access to health care. A primary school and two high schools: one for boys and one for girls were 
scheduled to be completed in early 1936. Doon emphasized that all these projects were carried 
under stringent financial conditions. 
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 Doon continued by addressing future plans beside increasing efficiency and preserving 
health. Public appearances were crucial for a modern metropolis, and Shanghai needed to appeal 
to the eyes of visitors. Roads, gardens, and open public spaces should be ample without being 
wasteful; public buildings should be imposing without being extravagant; houses should be 
artistic without being gaudy. The new schemes would support the Greater Shanghai Project to 
even higher expectations. The main roads in Jiangwan were planned to link up with the principal 
roads of the old areas in order to afford facilities with an outlet of traffic congestion. The 
foundation stone was laid for the mayor‟s building by Mayor Zhang Qun on July 7, 1931 on the 
fourth anniversary of the founding of the Shanghai special municipality. The mayor‟s building, 
modeled after the city hall of many Western cities became the hallmark of the Jiangwan new city 
center project. 
 The mayor‟s building; one of nine proposed buildings to house the city government‟s 
offices was completed in 1933. The building was built rectangular in shape with the central 
portion slightly larger. It measured 310 feet long and 100 feet wide in the middle. It has four 
floors, with the top floor being the space under the middle. The total floor area is over 90,000 
square feet. The exterior is an adaptation of the traditional Peking palace style with a balustrade 
base, vermillion columns, highly decorated beams and eaves, and the whole covered by a glazed 
tile roof in green. The ridges and decorations consisted of yellow tile. The ridge at the central 
portion is higher than the two wings, where the highest point measures 100 feet from the ground. 
The exterior wall is of artificial granite with parts delicately carved. Certain modifications were 
made the meet requirements of modern planning and construction. The interiors of the principal 
halls consisted of massive cylindrical pillars and highly decorated beams and ceilings to give an 
impression of dignity and elegance. The building has proper heating and ventilation, and is 
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equipped with two elevators. An important feature is the grand stairway leading from the ground 
to the massive bronze doors of the auditorium on the second floor. The distinction of the 
structure is not its sheer size or the use of expensive materials but by the creation of a new style 
which contained the best features of Chinese architecture and modern design. 
 Temporary buildings for the bureaus: flanking the rear of the mayor‟s building are two 
smaller buildings to use the Bureaus of Public Works, Land, Education, Health, and Social 
Affairs. These buildings are two storied structures, each built around a large court yard in the 
middle. Each bureau has its independent entrance. These temporary buildings, completed in 
1933, were occupied by the various bureaus until the completion of the city government group. 
 The staff‟s dormitories: a group of five buildings with sweeping Chinese roofs and 
decorated eaves located at the south bank of Jukong Creek to the southeast of the mayor‟s 
building served as dormitories for municipal staff. These buildings provided lodging for several 
hundred municipal staff members. There are single room, double room, and room with kitchen 
accommodations. In the central building, there are public dining halls, reception and recreation 
rooms, offices, etc. These buildings are located within walking distance from the municipal 
buildings. 
 The police station: a gray two storied building a short distance from the civic center 
served as the sub-station of the Bureau of Public Safety. This building is situated at a strategic 
point as it became the converging point of the three main roads leading from the International 
Settlement. The building was designed for further extension and for the inclusion of a future fire 
station. 
 The primary school: the school building consisted of reinforced concrete marked 
horizontally by rows of continuous steel windows. The middle portion is three storied and the 
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wings step down from two to one story. The school can accommodate 200 children of municipal 
staff under the supervision of the Bureau of Education. 
 Wireless station: a wireless station was completed by the Bureau of Public Utilities. 
Situated directly north of the mayor‟s building, this station can send daily broadcasts. 
 The city library: the library is located in the civic center, south of the mayor‟s building, 
and directly opposite of the city museum occupying a building area of 18,000 square feet. The 
library has a total floor area of 33,000 feet. It is a two story reinforced structure with a gate tower 
over the central portion of the front façade. The ground floor contains an entrance hall, periodical 
room, offices of administration at the left, and a lecture hall at the right. The upper floor is 
devoted entirely to reading. A stock room is attached to the rear end of the building with enough 
height to accommodate five floors of shelves totaling 50,000 linear feet, or approximately 
400,000 volumes of books. Over the main entrance is an exhibition hall.  The architecture was a 
combination of modern and Chinese designs. The gate tower, covered with yellow glazed tiles 
and elaborately decorated under the eaves can be considered the traditional Chinese style. The 
tower, enclosed by a terrace decorated with Chinese balustrade granite and exterior walls made 
of artificial stone. The entrance hall, main delivery room, and the exhibition hall were richly 
decorated with conventional Chinese polychrome design with vermillion columns. Doon stated 
that the new library will be open for use on January 1, 1936. 
 The city museum: the museum, located directly opposite of the library occupied an area 
of about 16,000 square feet. The total floor area consisted of 34,000 square feet. The building 
was designed to have an entrance hall, offices of administration, a library, a lecture hall, and 
exhibition halls of various sizes and shapes. Only the main portion of the building has two 
stories, with the rest being one storied. Located directly from the entrance hall, the main 
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exhibition hall with two stories and covered with a glass room provided a great view of the 
immediately surroundings. The exterior and interior of the museum were similar to that of the 
library. Adequate ventilation was provided, and a system of air-conditioning ducts was installed 
to provide warm air in winter and cool air in summer. 
 The city hospital group: the hospital group included two medical units, two surgical units, 
one for gynecology and obstetrics, one for pediatrics, one for out-patients, and one for nurses. 
The hospitals were to be dedicated and open to the public on January 1, 1936. The first unit 
served as a general hospital, where the main administration and medical school buildings were 
placed. The “fan-shaped” grouping of the buildings allowed for maximum amount of air and 
sunshine to all sides of the radiating buildings. The main entrance located on the north side of a 
lot comprising of 80 mow, was bounded by the Jukong Creek on the south sides and main streets 
on the other three sides. All wards were contained in the six radiating units. Each ward unit had 
its longer sides facing approximately east and west, with the south side reserved for day rooms. 
The resulting trapezoid-shaped areas between the buildings were made into gardens where 
convalescent patients could walk or be wheeled around. The services quarters were located at the 
southwest corner of the lot. As the prevailing wind travel from southeast to northwest, the smoke 
nuisance could be eliminated. The residential quarters were located at the southeast corner near 
the river. 
 The first hospital unit: the building formed the first and central unit of the hospital group. 
This building measured 264 feet long and 52 feet wide, occupied an area of 11,400 square feet 
with a floor area of 48,600 square feet. The central portion had five floors and two wings, 
equipped with two large elevators. The building could accommodate from 150-200 beds. The 
exterior walls of the building were built with granite and artificial stone. The exterior conformed 
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in character with the number of other buildings built by the city government at the civic center. 
The materials used wee in line with those used in the best hospitals in the world. The building 
was planned with the least waste of space and provided adequate space for all essential functions. 
It was heated with the Durham Differential System, a new application of the engineering 
principle, which assured economical and comfortable heating. 
 The pathological research laboratory: the laboratory was similar in its appearance to the 
hospital but smaller in size. It measure 134 feet by 50 feet with a total floor area of 20,000 square 
feet with four stories high. The building was equipped with gas, compressed air, vacuum, direct 
and alternating current, high voltage, high pressure steam, and electrically operated refrigerators. 
Three separate buildings, especially well-ventilated were provided for the care of animals used in 
experiments. 
 The city stadium: the stadium was built with a seating capacity for 60,000 persons 
required for national or international athletic events. There were 50,000 permanent seats with 
space for additional 20,000 if necessary. The total capacity of the stadium, depending on the 
event could be set at 70,000. The structure of the stadium was designed primarily for track and 
field events. The center of the stadium was the football field, with tennis and basketball courts at 
the end. The oval track measured 500 meters with a 200 meter straight track on each long side. In 
most cases, maximum standard dimensions were adopted. The tracks were covered with cinder 
and the rest of the area covered with turf. The oval-shaped plan was selected instead of the U-
shaped or the bowl plan, because track events required two 200 meter straight tracks; making it 
necessary to have straight sides. The public stadium where thousands of spectators enter and 
leave built two lines of circulation-horizontal and vertical. One horizontal line was designed for 
tickets to be taken. In case of traffic congestion, a thirty feet driveway was added to the 
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circulation. There were two grand-stands, one opposite the other. Below the grand-stands was 
space for shops, public toilets, ticket booths, etc. The structure was made of reinforced concrete 
throughout. The decision to use red brick with artificial stone for base and copings for exterior 
wall was reached after careful study of the cost and durability of relative materials. The model 
was designed after many American and European stadiums, which used the same materials. The 
main feature of the stadium centered on the main entrance, which was made of entirely pre-cast 
artificial stone with Chinese architectural motifs. 
 The city gymnasium: along with the stadium, the indoor gymnasium formed the sports 
center of Greater Shanghai. The purpose of the building the gymnasium was not only to hold 
various indoor sports but also to provide a large assembly hall for the people of Shanghai. The 
large floor space could be used for exhibitions and displays. The permanent seating capacity was 
3,500 with 1,500 temporary seats. The main floor measured 131 feet by 76 feet, which was large 
enough to accommodate three ordinary basketball courts laid out side by side. The highest point 
of the ceiling was 63 feet from the main floor. The overall length of the building was 270 feet, 
while its overall width was 150 feet. The balconies were supported by heavy concrete beams on 
brick walls. There were 13 rows of decks, each measuring 26 inches wife and 14-16 inches high. 
The main façade of the building suggested a combination of modern form and Chinese style. 
Three richly carved arched portals form the main entrance to the building. The remaining three 
sides of building were of red brick trimmed with artificial stone at the top and bottom. The 
construction was made of structural steel and reinforced concrete. Wood was used only for the 
main floor and all doors. The building had enclosed walls of brick with pre-cast artificial stone 
coping and base.  
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 The city swimming pool: the third of the group of structures completed at the sports 
center complex was the swimming pool. The open air pool surrounded on four sides by concrete 
stands could seat 4,000 persons. Collaboration with local athletic authorities brought the decision 
to adopt a pool size of 20 meters by 50 meters, the dimensions required for international 
swimming competitions. The construction of the pool was a reinforced concrete shell with 
through waterproofing. The shell was designed to both withstand unbalanced hydraulic pressure 
when the pool was full of water as well as earth pressure from the outside when the pool was 
empty. The curb and the bottom of the pool were lined with white mosaics and the sides with 
white enameled tiles. 
 Parks and monuments: the area reserved for the city park was approximately 300 mow. A 
great part of the area had been used for the sports center, which included a stadium, a 
gymnasium, and a swimming pool. The remaining area on the south bank of Jukong Creek was a 
well laid-out park with pools and hills. It had been open to the public since 1934. At the rear of 
the mayor‟s building stood the statue of Sun Yat-sen. It was located in front of the future 
memorial auditorium to be built at a later date. The statue was a double life size bronze figure in 
standing posture, supported by a heavy pedestal and a circular terrace of granite. The pedestal 
was decorated with carved Chinese design. 
 The Jukong wharf: a huge deep water wharf had been under construction near the mouth 
of Jukong Creek along the Huangpu River. The location was at the termination of Wuchuan 
Road, with the east and west axis of the street system in the new area. The new wharf was 
expected to draw part of the shipping from the overcrowded Yangtsepoo and Pudong wharves. A 
railway was extended to the wharf from the Shanghai-Wusong line, which was an advantage not 
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enjoyed by the existing wharves. The new wharf marked the start of the main port development 
scheme at Wusong, which was one of the ultimate aims of the City Planning Commission. 
 Workers‟ villages: an extensive housing plan was underway for the city government to 
improve the living conditions of the mud hut dwellers. Groups of low rent houses were built at 
different locations where such groups were needed most. The first group, already completed, was 
situated off Chimei Road between the International Settlement and the civic center. It consisted 
of 250 houses and covered an area of 40 mow of land. Each house consisted of two rooms with a 
kitchen and a toilet. In the center was the social center, which included a school, a clinic, an 
assembly hall, a cooperative store, public baths, and a tea house. The entire group was divided 
into three units, each being provided with a laundry and a toilet. Electricity and running water 
were also provided. Plans for three more groups were under way at different locations in the city. 
 The city cemetery: the first city cemetery located at the northwestern part of the civic 
center was completed in 1931. It had an imposing entrance and a large ceremonial hall. The 
ground covered a total of 150 mow. The cemetery was supervised by the Bureau of Health. 
 Airdromes: Shanghai boasted two airdromes. They were enlarged and their facilities 
improved. The Hungjao (Hongqiao) Airdrome, located at the western part of Shanghai was used 
for military purposes. It covered an area of 1,400 mow. The runway was 800 meters long and 50 
meters wide. The Lunghwa (Longhua) Airdrome on the bank of the Huangpu River to the south 
was a commercial port for both land and seaplanes. The total area was 800 mow. Two runways 
cross each other, totaling 2,000 meters in length and 30 meters in width. 
 Road building: roads leading up to the civic center were revamped for a systematically 
laid out street system and well-paved road surface welcoming visitors to Jiangwan. To date, 
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approximately 40,000 meters of pavement had been laid ranging from 15 meters to 60 meters 
wide. 
 Other important public buildings that had already been completed or were in progress 
included the Telephone Exchange, The Testing Laboratory for Chinese Engineering Society, the 
Headquarters of the China Aeronautic Association, and the National Conservatory of Music; all 
located in the civic center area or nearby vicinity. Doon concluded that the building boom would 
eventually fill all unoccupied property in the Jiangwan area. 
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 On April 3, 1937, the Shanghai housing report paid tribute to the city government‟s 
model villages in replacing the former mud and straw huts, and provide healthy and clean living 
conditions for the working poor. Efforts were made by the Public Works Bureau to encourage 




 Under Shen Yi‟s leadership, the Public Works Bureau continued to expand the lengths of 
routes and increased the number of lines and stops for buses, trams, and trolleys. By 1937, the 
routes, lines, and stops for each form of public transportation vehicle had increased significantly. 
Passengers could commute from the suburbs to the downtown areas, and vice versa faster. More 
lines and routes were added to the downtown areas where shopping and commerce had been the 
most vibrant, and traffic congestion had been the most severe. These additions made the 
commuters‟ travel much more accessible and convenient as passengers had a plethora of choices 
for public transport. 
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Figure 7.1: Tram Routes in April 1937 
Tram routes had been expanded and connected the downtown area to the suburbs.  
Source: Shanghai Municipal Library Press. The Album of Shanghai during the Past 150 Years. 
Lao Shanghai Di Tu (Old Shanghai Maps). Shanghai Huabao Chubanshe, 2001: p. 123. 
 
 
Figure 7.2: Trolley Routes in April 1937 
Trolley routes covered the roads where tram tracks were not laid since trolleys did not need 
tracks. 
Source: Shanghai Municipal Library Press. The Album of Shanghai during the Past 150 Years. 






Figure 7.3: Bus Routes in April 1937 
Bus routes were primarily located in downtown areas with many stops along the way. 
Source: Shanghai Municipal Library Press. The Album of Shanghai during the Past 150 Years. 
Lao Shanghai Di Tu (Old Shanghai Maps). Shanghai Huabao Chubanshe, 2001: p. 122.  
 
Achievements of the Greater Shanghai Project 
 Despite the financial difficulties that prevented the Greater Shanghai Project from 
reaching its potential, there were numerous achievements and significant progress made. Public 
health and mass education were the two areas where many significant improvements had been 
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accomplished. In the road systems, the boulevards built in front of the civic center connected 
with to the new harbor, the new railway station, and the main roads of the neighboring districts 
as well as the main roads of the International Settlement. Other roads were expanded or 
lengthened for maximum convenience to people of the business and residential districts. The 
total mileage of roads under construction by the early 1930s was about 170 kilometers. In certain 
sections, the roads crossed each other at right angles. Shanghai‟s climate required houses to have 
a southern exposure to the sun. To make this possible, roads running east to west were longer 
than those running from north to south. To reduce the number of crossings, which may interfere 
with the traffic of the main roads, secondary roads with sufficient lengths were built running 
parallel to the boulevards. Parks and recreation grounds provided for exercise and running 
around the creeks had been built.  
 A network of main arteries had been carefully laid out to provide for the relief of 
overloaded routes and a free movement of traffic between various districts. The general flow of 
traffic was between north and south. There were five principal roads running north and south to 
take care of traffic flow. A belt highway system was planned to link all neighboring towns and 
villages on both sides of the Huangpu River. The streets were planned so that they insect mostly 
at right angles. With the exception of the limitation set to existing main roads, the street blocks 
run east and west so that the buildings faced mostly either north or south. This minimized the 
intensive summer sunlight. In the residential districts, circumferential or ring streets were 
introduced. They reduced the through traffic and noise in residential neighborhoods. Open public 
spaces were designed at the intersection of major streets. 
 The most impressive feature of the new city in Jiangwan was the civic center adorned 
with Chinese architecture. Taking the shape of a cross and covering an area of approximately 
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2,000 mow (333 acres), the civic center of Greater Shanghai was located at the intersection of 
two cross-axes. The three tracked boulevard known as Sanmin (Three Principles) Road was 
linked to Wuchuan (Five Rights) Road. The civic center began at the main station and terminated 
at the Huangpu River. The center of Shanghai was marked by a 50 meter pagoda, which could be 
seen from all directions. The mayor‟s building was built north of the pagoda, flanked by eight 
buildings comprising the eight bureaus of the city government. Another 1,000 mow (170 acres) 
of ground were built as public space. Approximately 120 mow (20 acres) were devoted to a plaza 
where public meetings could be held. A huge reflecting pool, about 600 meters long, with 
double-tracked boulevards on both sides, marked the southern approach to the civic center. Two 
smaller pools were placed to mark the east and west entrances. 
 Immediately behind the mayor‟s building stood the municipal auditorium, which could 
accommodate 3,000 people. Clustered around the civic center were the library, museum, art 
gallery, court houses, and other public buildings. An existing waterway of approximately 20 
meters wide supplied the water the pools. Several bridges were added to the waterway for 
aesthetic appeal. At the south end of the long pool was a five arched memorial representing the 
gateway to the civic center. The existing main thoroughfare, Hsiang Ying Road crossed 
diagonally at the extreme south of the civic center. The grounds were embellished with gardens, 
monuments, pools, fountains, bridges, etc. to form with future planned buildings a monumental 
area of significance. 
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 At the end of 1933, some two thirds of the entire scheme of 500 kilometers of trunk roads 
had been completed. Between 1927 and 1933, the Public Works Bureau made significant 
investments in urban infrastructure: 
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  US Dollars 
Bridges and culverts $624,000.00 
Jetties and embankments $211,816.30 
Municipal buildings $740,000.00 
Improving the water system $153,777.96 
Repairing wharves $114,436.46 
Public parks and playgrounds $150,000.00 
 
 At the end of 1932, there were 8,514 street lamps, totaling 592,305 watts. Twelve months 
later the corresponding figures increased to 9.589 lamps and 663,670 watts. In 1927, the 
combined supply of the two waterworks at Nanshi and Zhabei was 65,200 cubic meters. By 
1933, it had increased to 165,200 cubic meters. Previously, there were six electric power 
companies operating within the Chinese jurisdiction. At the suggestion of the Bureau of Public 
Utilities, the four smaller companies were amalgamated with the larger ones, for greater 
efficiency. The combined capital of electric power companies and waterworks was estimated at 
$12,390,000 (U.S. dollars). 
 Six omnibus companies handled the problem of cheap long distance transportation 
between the city and suburbs such as Minghong, Sungkiang, Tachang, Taitsang, Liuho, and 
Yanghang, as well as Choupuchen and Chuanshahsien on the Pudong side. Within the limits of 
Nanshi and Zhabei, passenger traffic was operated by one omnibus company and one tramway 
company. Tramway traffic was confined to Nanshi at the southern section, along 19.4 kilometers 
of rails. The capitalization of the long distance and city omnibus companies combined for 
$3,332,500 and the aggregate traffic mileage covered 200 kilometers. 
 To solve the problem of safe and rapid transportation between Shanghai and Pudong, a 
public ferry service was inaugurated in 1928 by the city government. In 1933, eleven large boats 
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running daily on scheduled time carried 7,320,000 persons that year to the points on the east 
bank of the Huangpu River as far as Kaochiao and Wusong. Wharves located at the left bank of 
the Huangpu River that had been formerly operated by private companies were taken over by the 
city government and put under the administration of the Bureau of Public Utilities in 1931. After 
taking control, the bureau immediately carried out an improvement program. In order to facilitate 
the docking of ships, this portion of waterfront of about 1,500 meters long was dredged twice, 
with a sum of about $100,000 for the costs. The pontoons and part of the bulkhead walls not in 
good condition were immediately repaired and rebuilt. All work was completed before May 
1933, costing over $160,000. The bureau not only repaired old wharves but also built new ones. 
In addition to the thirteen old wharves, three new ones were built and two more were under 
construction. For the sake of convenience and safety of passengers, the bureau paid special 
attention to the maintenance of wharves. The results of the improvement works attracted more 
ships to the wharves. From the beginning of July 1932 to the end of June 1933, the number of 
ships using the wharves was 3,896 with an aggregate of 2,961,128 net registered tons. 
 A private omnibus company, operated in Nanshi went bankrupt after the Japanese attack 
in 1932. The Bureau of Public Utilities inaugurated a bus service in Nanshi on April 1, 1934 on 
the line of municipal ownership. Sixteen cars were in service. The carrying capacity of each was 
three and a half tons. The design of the body was by every means to provide the passengers with 
as much comfort as possible. There were three new routes: first between West Gate and 
Longhua, second across the city, and third around the city circle. 
 To help develop Pudong, which had become increasingly populated, an artesian well was 
bored by the city government as an immediate solution to the problem of water supply. Plans 
were under way to construct a reservoir at a cost of about $300,000 capable of furnishing 364 
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liters a minute for ten years. Before a vehicle or boat can ply within the limits of the city 
government‟s jurisdiction, it must apply first to the Bureau of Public Utilities for registration. 
Licenses were approved after the bureau has approved its traffic worthiness. The Bureau of 
Finance must receive the appropriate fees before a license was awarded. Up until the end of 
1933, a total of 93,287 vehicles and 45,611 boats were officially registered. Of the vehicles 
registered in 1933, 8.670 came under the category of motor vehicles. Consequently 16,518 
chauffeurs and drivers, 53 motor car companies and car hire garages, and 158 gasoline stations 
were similarly registered with the Bureau of Public Utilities.  
 To eliminate the dangers attendant upon the supply of water and electricity, registration 
was also required. The registration figures for 1933 included: 
Table 7.2 
Dealers in water pipes  154 
Well-drilling firms 26 
Water-pipe installing laborers 1,553 
Dealers in electrical supplies and installations 374 
Electric fitters 2,334 
 
 According to the electric installations of a theater, hotel, school, hospital, or any 
institution for the accommodation of large crowds, inspections must be rigorously examined 
before a permit could be issued for the supply of electric current. 
 Pending the settlement of the problem of policing and administrating Settlement 
Extension Roads, the matter of installing telephones in residencies situated on these roads had 
been settled by temporary negotiations between the Shanghai Telephone Company and the city 
government. The city government had been determined not to permit further encroachment by 
either the International Settlement or French Concession on additional Chinese territories. At the 
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end of 1933, nineteen public clocks had been installed in important thoroughfares by the Bureau 
of Public Utilities, with thirteen in Nanshi and six in Zhabei. 
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 As of January 1, 1934, the city government of Great Shanghai functioned from its new 
buildings in the civic center. The removal of the city government‟s administrative offices to the 
new civic center in Jiangwan was the result of nearly seven years of careful planning and 
execution. On January 1, 1935, Wu Tiecheng released a statement outlining plans for Greater 
Shanghai by focusing on several specific agenda: 
 Anti-illiteracy movement- the government had made special efforts to provide adult 
education for those between the ages of 15 to 30 to reduce illiteracy and promote mass 
education. 
 School construction- plans were made for the establishment of one vocational middle 
school and our agricultural schools in Jiangwan. Special attention was paid to primary and 
secondary education to strengthen the foundation of civic training. Two model middle schools 
were established in the civic center, with fifteen additional primary schools opened in the central 
and outlying areas of Greater Shanghai. 
 Social reconstruction-the establishment of children‟s nurseries became an important part 
of municipal reconstruction. In the commercial and industrial centers, numerous factories were 
established. Other projects such as improvements of living conditions for rickshaw pullers, more 
public housing, etc. were on the agenda to be carried out as financial resources permit. 
 Water conservancy- appropriations had been made to repair sea walls. However, due to 
financial limitations, the situation had not been completely resolved. 
 Communications improvement- the facilities for commercial aviation had been upgraded 
with Longhua airport being the largest airport in China.  
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 Social welfare programs- the municipal government planned to continue construction of 
model villages to accommodate the working poor, as well as to provide affordable housing for 
migrant workers such as rickshaw pullers. 
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 Three major generating plants: the Zhabei Waterworks and Electricity Company, the 
Chinese Power Company, and the Pudong Power Company generated 124,901,114 units in 1935. 
Water was supplied by the Inland Waterworks Company and the Zhabei Waterworks and 
Electricity Company, which in 1935 supplied 43,260,401 liters in the Greater Shanghai area. 
Five omnibus were in operation in the Chinese jurisdiction: the Chinese Omnibus Company, the 
Shanghai-Minghong Omnibus Company, the Shanghai-Taitsang Omnibus Company, and the 
City Government Omnibus Administration. These five omnibus companies carried a total of 
37,786,098 passengers in 1935. A public ferry service operated twelve ferry boats and thirteen 
calling stations, and transported 11,989,672 passengers in 1935. 
 Statistics for vehicle licenses granted in 1936 were: 
Table 7.3 
  
  Licenses 
Boats 36,090 
Private motor cars 6,518 
Hire cars 891 
Motor trucks 1,579 
Motor bicycles 467 
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 On New Year‟s Day 1936, Wu Tiecheng reviewed the progress of the Greater Shanghai 
municipality and outlined future plans. He noted that in the first four years, the following steps in 
reconstruction were achieved: 
 1932: rehabilitation of devastated areas 
 1933: establishment of civic center 
 1934: cultural restoration 
 1935: social reconstruction 
 
 Immediately after the 1.28 crisis, steps were taken to provide relief to people in the 
devastated areas in the form of loans for building, seeds for sowing, and capital for resumption of 
business. The municipal government focused on rebuilding the destroyed or damaged roads, 
bridges and drainage works in the principal roads of Zhabei, including Paoshan Road, Hunghsing 
Road, Paoshing Road, Paochang Road, and Jukiang Road. Approximately ten million U.S. 
dollars were spent on building new roads and bridges, repairing sea dykes and the construction of 
public buildings. The rebuilt municipal wharf at Nanshi could enable steamers of the length of 
300 feet and a draught of 14 feet to berth with comparative ease. 
 For the improvement of public health, new health centers, opium centers, and additional 
hospitals were built. In education, much had been done to raise the standard of the curriculum of 
public schools in the promotion of compulsory education. Plans were underway for the 
continuation of more public housing and the extension of Hongqiao airfield as well as the 
enlargement of Longhua airport. Wu had been hopeful that more workers‟ villages could 
alleviate housing problems and that the facilities for travel and communications between the 
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 The high costs of maintaining the Greater Shanghai Project put the municipal budget in 
increasing debt by the 1930s. Eventually, many of the more expensive projects that had been 
planned at the onset of the campaign had to be scrapped.  
Table 7.4 
Shanghai Municipal Government Revenues and Receipts (Chinese Yuan) 
Source 1932-33 1933-34 1934-35 1935-36 1936-37 
House tax 2,261,472 2,470,189 2,708,852 2,643,185 2,939,000 
Property tax 456,900 758,756 1,225,099 1,283,590 1,495,715 
Sales fees 622,381 472,136 420,185 313,101 339,900 
Vehicle tax 1,210,893 1,468,159 1,749,707 1,725,925 1,726,934 
Boat tax 401,943 439,938 401,800 371,990 373,128 
Harbor fees 644,260 700,276 519,259     
Municipal incomes 203,198 214,470 301,754 511,349 403,564 
Administrative fees 738,103 731,297 810,401 820,679 835,552 
Municipal properties 941,889 962,522 2,167,599 1,115,502 1,295,126 
Repayment of aid funds  500 1,000 67,483 158,757 131,796 
Business tax 172,341 337,188 315,416 302,259 304,300 
Building works 165,231 266,549 318,557 269,310   
Other revenues 1,614,745 1,343,695 1,319,533 828,192 839,913 
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Table 7.4 Continued 
Shanghai Municipal Government Expenditures (Chinese Yuan) 
Expenditure 1932-33 1933-34 1934-35 1935-36 1936-37 
General administration  687,541 803,814 1,308,250 1,181,018 1,126,423 
Finance Bureau 378,785 495,368 648,260 436,255 378,363 
Public Security Bureau  3,496,606 3,435,076 3,656,252 3,234,600 3,463,671 
Education Bureau 1,245,017 1,503,965 1,682,798 2,092,935 957,596 
Social Affairs Bureau 284,451 356,787 306,925 247,438 129,195 
Public Works Bureau 1,903,913 2,751,627 4,423,755 2,309,917 792,542 
Health Bureau 333,907 367,986 451,952 532,610 406,829 
Public Utilities Bureau  374,700 392,523       
Land Bureau 362,295         
Allocations to GMD 158,753 170,753 173,640 163,753 133,980 
Debt serving 909,769 1,307,210 1,597,788 1,574,929 1,462,760 
Aid funds 295,225 376,610 534,681 535,449 350,640 
Retirement pensions 19,465 25,872 21,950 17,119 24,341 
Miscellaneous 165,231 266,549 318,557 269,310 193,953 
Other 195,790 155,092 202,915 312,277 378,202 
Total 10,811,548 12,409,232 15,327,743 12,907,610 9,693,495
387 
 
Government Revenues vs. Government Expenditures (Chinese Yuan) 
  
  1932-33 1933-34 1934-35 1935-36 1936-37 
Total Revenues 8,789,585 9,465,899 11,806,386 10,343,339 10,684,928 
Total Expenditures 10,811,548 12,409,232 15,327,743 12,907,610 9,693,495 
Surplus or Deficit -2,021,963 -2,943,333 -3,521,357 -2,564,271 991,433 
 
While municipal revenues increased, the annual expenditures increased even faster. This 
caused the annual deficit to widen. The financial difficulties of supporting so many large scale 
reconstruction and development projects made it impossible for the municipal government to 
sustain the pace of projected progress. Wu Tiecheng‟s government had no choice but to cut many 
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proposed projects and the Greater Shanghai Project faltered. The biggest costs were in public 
security, public works, and debt serving. These areas were crucial to the GMD‟s consolidation of 
power, and the inability to continue planned initiatives were embarrassing for the municipal 
government to face. 
 The government had been increasing allocations to the public force to ensure law and 
order would be maintained. The reason for the large police force was political. The GMD central 
government needed to keep peace in a city from which the regime drew a large proportion of its 
resources. Given the experiences of April 1927, the GMD was fearful of political demonstrations 
or riots by worker unions, students, and mostly Communist sympathizers. Underground 
Communist activities, especially those that took place in the foreign settlements gave 
justification to the GMD to maintain a substantial police force in Shanghai. 
 After 1932, the Shanghai municipality had to finance its own defense. Under the cease 
fire agreement with the Japanese at the end of 1932, Chinese national troops could no longer 
remain in Shanghai, to the east and west of the settlements. Wu Tiecheng‟s administration had to 
build up a peacekeeping local police force. Expensive construction projects were the second area 
in which the municipal government invested a lot of money. The high costs of recovery and 
reconstruction of heavily damaged areas after the Japanese attack, and the grandiose building 
plans in Jiangwan were simply too expensive to sustain. Since Shanghai was the wealthiest city 
in China, the municipal government also had to allocate funds to the GMD‟s central government 
in Nanjing. Annual funds to the GMD also amounted to a fairly substantial portion of the budget. 
The major imbalances between annual revenue and annual expenditure proved to be too difficult 
for Wu Tiecheng‟s administration to continue. While progress was made in urban planning, it 
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was achieved at the cost of severe indebtedness and deficits that would drag the municipal 
government to financial bankruptcy. 
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The New Life Movement 
 Besides building a new city center, the GMD‟s other primary agenda was the 
consolidation of power and solidification of control of the Chinese population to a more 
grassroots level. The New Life Movement was launched on Chiang Kai-shek‟s orders in April 
1934 to achieve this purpose. The New Life Movement was disguised as a program of proper 
moral thought and personal behavior. The initiative attacked evil customs such as extravagance, 
greed, laziness, deception, treachery, gambling, lust, etc., that were considered part of the “feudal 
gentry”. The GMD used the concept of national revival and national patriotism to attempt to win 
over people‟s hearts and minds through this “renew life” campaign. Other measures of the New 
Life Movement included restrictions on smoking, prostitution, and indecent Western behaviors. 
The New Life Movement attempted to link immoral or indecent behavior with Westerners, and 
hoped such an association would force Chinese citizens, especially those living in foreign 
settlements to abandon Western ways. The push for traditional Chinese moral values was geared 
toward encouraging the Chinese to accept the GMD as the legitimate rulers of China.  
 The GMD focused on Jiangwan and Wusong as experimental districts where the New 
Life Movement could be enforced. The symbolic setting of this movement was the new civic 
center in Jiangwan. It was from the civic center that speeches were made by the leaders of the 
Public Security Bureau to ask the citizens of Shanghai to reject immorality and accept the ethics 
of the New Life Movement. Propaganda campaigns targeted the Chinese by convincing them 
that foreigners considered the Chinese to be inferior, and that it was absolutely paramount that 
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the Chinese stand strong and show foreigners that they were capable of running their own 
country. 
389
The New Life Movement pumped much funding into the Public Security and 
Education bureaus, as these branches of the municipal government became key components of 
the campaign. 
 Chiang Kai-shek created a secret police known as the Blue Shirts to identify and punish 
anyone considered a threat to the GMD regime. Chiang had lashed out at the supposed 
weaknesses of Chinese society, such as undisciplined, selfishness, and moral corruption. If China 
would ever recover from foreign aggression, then it was necessary to instill a sense of 
revolutionary spirit within the Chinese population. The Blue Shirts were designated to bring out 
a sense of nationalistic fervor and patriotic zeal. The GMD linked Confucianism with their 
political agenda by using Confucian values as hallmarks of GMD political ideology. The real 
purposes were to find any suspected Communists or other dangerous elements of Shanghai‟s 
Chinese society, and have them eliminated. The GMD adopted the New Life Movement after the 
fascists in Italy and the Nazis in Germany after Chiang had witnessed the successes these 
regimes had in generating nationalism within their citizens. 
390
 
What is the Legacy of the Greater Shanghai Project? 
 Despite the enormous investments put into the Greater Shanghai Project, no major 
movement of the population into Jiangwan took place. While Jiangwan was created from scratch, 
and a new city center was constructed; the infrastructure as well as employment opportunities, 
entertainment, education, etc. were still not enough to entice large segments of Chinese citizens 
to relocate there. There were several reasons behind this. First, the Japanese attack on Zhabei in 
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1932 had left the Chinese residents there feeling unsafe and fearful of another attack. The 
Japanese did not dare to attack the International Settlement or the French Concession. The 
Chinese residents living in the foreign settlements felt much more safe and secure knowing that 
they would be protected by the foreigners controlling their jurisdiction in case of warfare with 
the Japanese. Second, the residential neighborhoods, entertainment and leisure areas for 
shopping and commerce (such as Nanjing Road and Avenue Joffre) were much better developed 
and convenient than the new Chinese city center. While Jiangwan had established residential and 
commercial zones, they were poorer and less developed than the settlements. There were less 
entertainment, shopping, and leisure opportunities. Third, the distance of Jiangwan was another 
barrier. While new roads were built, and new routes and stops were placed, traveling to Jiangwan 
was still much more inconvenient than it was in the settlements. The longer distances needed to 
travel to Jiangwan discouraged many Chinese professionals and middle class to move there 
because of the inconveniences of commuting from home to work.  
 On July 7, 1937, the Japanese launched their full fledged invasion of China after the 
Marco Polo bridge incident. The ensuing Sino-Japanese war ended any attempts to continue the 
Greater Shanghai Project. Ten years after it began, the Greater Shanghai Project was 
remembered for its unfulfilled promises. The GMD had not achieved their two primary goals: to 
build a new city center to show foreigners that a Chinese regime could effectively govern a 
modern metropolis, and to strengthen and solidify their control over the Chinese population of 
the city. To the disappointment of the GMD, the vast majority of the Chinese population did not 
relocate to Jiangwan, the heart of Shanghai‟s commerce and industry remained in the foreign 
concessions, and the Japanese attack on Zhabei humiliated the Chinese military.  
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 While the Greater Shanghai Project did not achieve its primary goals and objectives, this 
campaign cannot be considered a failure. Numerous accomplishments and significant progress 
were made in public infrastructure, transportation, urban planning, public health, education, etc. 
that should not be ignored. While the Japanese attack certainly severely affected the development 
of the Greater Shanghai Project, it could be argued that perhaps even without the Japanese 
destruction in 1932, the financial difficulties would not allow the Greater Shanghai Project to be 
carried out to its original plans. In the first half of the Greater Shanghai Project, it became 
evident that the high costs involved in the expenditures would be very difficult for the municipal 
government to maintain the momentum of the planned progress. The second half of the Greater 
Shanghai Project further intensified the financial limitations that ultimately doomed the 
campaign. Without the Japanese attack, perhaps more infrastructures could have been built; but it 
would not have been feasible to achieve the entire blueprint of the goals set in 1927. Sooner or 
later, the financial restrictions would have forced the municipal government to abandon 
important development projects and slow down the campaign. 
 It took the British and French decades to build up a modern city. The Westerners had 
both the technical know-how and expertise, as well as the financial capabilities that the Chinese 
lacked. Even then, the British and French had to slowly build and develop the International 
Settlement and French Concession to a level similar to that of European cities. It would have 
been impossible and simply unachievable for a Chinese government to expect to catch up with 
the foreign concessions in terms of infrastructure, accessibility, and quality of life in a matter of a 
decade. The Greater Shanghai Project was simply too ambitious and too grandiose of a plan to be 
carried out realistically. The legacy of the Greater Shanghai Project was that of a nationalistic 
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modernization campaign that had the right intentions, but was doomed by bad timing and its 

















































What is the relationship between technology and society? Does technology determine the 
outcome of a society‟s institutional or social structure or does a society‟s values and needs 
determine what kind of technology is developed? This overarching question links technology and 
society together and ask about their relationship to each other, and how one affects the other. 
Understanding their mutual interdependence on each other, and how technology and society are 
inseparably linked is crucial to the study of the history of technology. Two major viewpoints 
attempted to explain this relationship between society and technology: technological 
determinism and social constructivism. 
Technological determinism argues that a society‟s technology determines its cultural 
values, social structure, and people‟s lifestyles. The trend or trajectory that proponents of 
technological determinists argue for is that technology will develop in a predictable pattern 
beyond cultural, political or social factors. Determinists believe that technology will impact 
society in such a way that society will be socially conditioned or be forced to reorganize and 
restructure itself to accommodate and support technological development and influences. Within 
the technological determinist camp, there are two types: the hard determinism and soft 
determinism groups. Hard determinism describes technology as developing and affecting society 
without any social factors dictating its trajectory, or that technology will develop independently 
of any outside forces. This concept argues that technology itself is the single most powerful and 
influential force in determining and regulating society‟s changes, where people must adapt 
themselves and make themselves fit the outcomes of new technologies. Soft determinism is not 
so rigid in its explanation on the impact of technology on people, as it argues that technology is 
the guiding force or the primary factor behind changes in society, but that people still have a 
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chance to make decisions on the implementation of technology early on when it is first 
introduced.  
Social constructivism, on the other hand argues that people and society determines what 
types of technology will be developed and used according to society‟s needs and cultural values. 
The specific conditions and demands of a particular society will dictate what kinds of 
technologies will be developed, how those technologies will be utilized, as well as the size and 
scale of new technologies used. Social constructivists are on the opposite side of the spectrum 
from technological determinists, and argue against the notion that technology is the driver of 
society‟s changes.  
Philip Scranton is an advocate of social constructivism and presented the concept of 
“local determinism”, where technology is construed as part of a larger socio-cultural process. In 
this concept, the deterministic descriptions are reduced to the local level, where the particular 
conditions or environments of a specific location, region, or area determines the technological 
trajectories or paths taken there locally. 
391
 Langdon Winner argued that technology is not merely 
instruments to human activity but that they are powerful forces that give meaning and direction 
to people‟s lifestyles. Winner‟s arguments are based on his assertion that artifacts contain 
political properties and carry with them certain political agenda. He noted that “first are instances 
in which the invention, design, or arrangement of a specific technical device or system becomes 
a way of settling an issue in the affairs of a particular community. Second are cases of what can 
be called “inherently political technologies”, which are man-made systems that appear to require 
or to be strongly compatible with particular kinds of relationships.” 
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 Winner examined the use 
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of technology in the context of who gets to decide which types of technologies will be designed 
and utilized, and the political motives of those in power that want to use technology as a 
mechanism for social control. His analysis of the use of certain technologies in architecture, city 
planning, and public works revealed that those in power, such as government officials, powerful 
lobbyists, wealthy capitalists, etc. wanted to use certain technologies to achieve their own 
political or economic agendas, and that technology becomes an instrument for their power and 
domination. He concluded that technology cannot be free from political influence, and that it is 
the political nature of a particular society that shapes and defines which technologies will be 
useful, and how those “useful” technologies will be advanced to promote certain political or 
social causes.  
The social construction of technology described the development process of a 
technological artifact as an alternation of variation and selection. Trevor Pinch and Wiebe Bijker 
noted that in deciding which problems are relevant, the social groups involved with the artifact 
and the meanings of the artifact play a significant role when they define that a problem arises. 
They argue that the relevant social groups are institutions or organizations such as the 
government, the military, an industrial company or groups of influential individuals who have a 
personal stake in the outcome of new technologies and problems they intend to solve. These 
relevant social groups are attached to a specific artifact because this artifact has certain meanings 
for them, and they want to use their own personal connections or influence to determine how 
specific artifacts are used, which problems or issues these artifacts can be used to address or 
solve, and how these artifacts will be incorporated into the larger society. 
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So was Shanghai‟s public transportation history a case of technological determinism or 
social constructivism? In looking at this question, it is important to look at the impact of very 
rapid population increases that occurred from the mid 19th to the early 20
th
 century. In 1852, a 
little over half a million people lived in Shanghai. By 1930, more than three million people lived 
in the three jurisdictions of Greater Shanghai, and by 1949 more than five million residents 
called Shanghai home. 
394
 This huge population increase put tremendous pressure to come up 
with a modern and efficient public transportation system that can accommodate the population 
growth and deal with high population density. 
Population density increased significantly from 1865 to 1942, with much higher density 
in the foreign settlements: 
Table 8.1 
Shanghai Population Density: People Per Square Kilometer (1865-1942) 





1865-1866 1,240 980 37,758   
1914-1915 3,600 2,236 30,262   
1930 5,943 3,441 44,596 42,544 
1935 7,000 4,134 51,317 47,747 
1940-1942 5,453 2,991 70,162 83,599
395 
 
 Population density had risen over four times for the entire city from 1865 to 1942. The 
foreign settlements had far higher population density than the Chinese city. Because of the high 
density, it became imperative for the International Settlement and French Concession to develop 
the modern roads and public transport necessary to make travel and commute more efficient. 
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Traffic congestions, especially in crowded downtown areas became a major headache that had to 
be solved. The high population density and continuous population growth were social forces that 
prompted technological developments to be made to deal with society‟s demands and needs. Yet, 
technology had also shaped the urban layout of the city. In the International Settlement and 
French Concession, besides foreigners, the wealthy and even middle class Chinese population 
wanted to live there because of better infrastructure, roads, and transportation access. As a result, 
the more technologically advanced foreign territories had far higher population densities, and 
became home to Shanghai‟s wealthy Chinese citizens. The outbreak of World War II saw 
Chinese citizens leave the Chinese municipality to flock to the concessions for safety and 
protection, as well as a huge influx of European Jews and Russians settling in the French 
Concession because of cheaper rent than the International Settlement. The number of foreigners 
of all nationalities increased significantly from 1843 to the early 20
th
 century as they could live a 
similar lifestyle that they had enjoyed back home, but also capitalize on the opportunities a semi-
colony like Shanghai offered in terms of personal finance, freedom, safety, and protection. Better 
urban infrastructure meant a higher standard of living, and that was what attracted over millions 
of Chinese migrants from other provinces to come to Shanghai to seek out a better life. 
 Looking specifically at the International Settlement, population density differed in the 









Population Density in the International Settlement: People Per Square Kilometer (1900-1935) 
Year Central District 
Northern 
District Eastern District Western District 
1900 61,364 44,053 5651.9 4864.6 
1905 64,075 66,545 6908.3 8717.5 
1910 65,449 67,825 8269.9 9260.1 
1915 75,301 78,046 12981.4 14226.5 
1920 79,461 92,267 18,798.60 20215.9 
1925 64,619 81,191 24,322.90 24,524.10 
1930 69,608 84,935 32,351.50 35,299.50 






 The Municipal Council of the International Settlement began building new roads and 
buildings when it became apparent that overcrowding had become a major issue in the central 
district. As a result of new road constructions, extensions, widening; and housing built in the 
northern, eastern, and western districts to alleviate the overcrowded and congested central 
district. The central district was the most densely populated before 1900 because it was the 
earliest area to be developed. Population pressures forced the Municipal Council to expand their 
territories and shift the population away from the central district to the surrounding areas. The 
northern district saw the biggest upgrades in urban infrastructure, and as a result became the 
most densely populated area of the International Settlement by the early 20
th
 century. Both 
technological developments and society‟s needs contributed to the growth of the city‟s 
population as well as a better quality of living for the residents. 
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Do the forces of technological determinism and social constructivism absolutely have to 
oppose each other? Can there be a medium between these two theories?  Thomas Hughes 
considered himself to be an intermediary who can bridge the gap between technological 
determinism and social constructivism through his concept of technology momentum. Hughes‟s 
introduction of technological momentum was the most convincing theory that can connect the 
arguments for technological determinism and social constructivism. His central argument was 
that technological systems, after they had been consolidated acquire momentum. They have 
already amassed the technical and organizational components, and they possess the directions 
and goals in which they will progress in the future. Mature technological systems are very much 
like inertia, when they have built up momentum, it will be very difficult if not impossible to 
reverse their trend once they have been solidified. Hughes explained that once a large mass of 
technological system has been developed, the organizations and people committed to it would 
help propel it forward in a motion of great momentum. Inventors, engineers, scientists, 
managers, investors, civil servants, and politicians all have a personal stake involved in the 
growth and durability of these technological systems. Communities of practitioners, networks of 
producers and suppliers all added to system momentum because vested interests, fixed assets, 
and sunk costs forced everyone involved in these technological systems to make sure that these 
systems will be successful for their own sake. 
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Thomas Hughes reiterated his argument for technological momentum in American 
Genesis where he concluded that large technological systems represent powerful vested 
interested of numerous important people with specialized skills and knowledge appropriate for 
these systems in which they are a part of. These people and their investors in technological 
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systems have constructed a bulwark of organizational structures, ideological commitments, and 
political power to protect themselves and their systems. 
398
 This explanation perhaps best 
answered the history of public transportation in Shanghai. In the foreign settlements, Europeans 
needed to build and implement a modern public transport system to accommodate the growing 
demands of an increasing population. They utilized the blueprint and technical expertise from 
Western cities that had already successfully implemented these practices to construct a new city 
in Shanghai that can meet their standards of living. In order to encourage more Europeans to 
come settle in Shanghai, the International Settlement and French Concession needed to build up 
a modern metropolis in the East that would be attractive in terms of commerce, comfort, and 
convenience. The major players involved included politicians on the British and French 
municipal councils, prominent financiers, and engineers who all had enormous personal stakes 
vested in building new infrastructure such as public transportation. 
The Chinese had been deeply envious and resentful of the power, wealth, and privileges 
that Westerners had established in their city. However, the Chinese were also pragmatic and 
practical. When it became obvious that Western technology such as machine-powered vehicles 
and road constructions could bring modern convenience and a better way of life, the Chinese 
quickly adopted these foreign technologies and integrated them into their own society. First, 
Western technologies were imposed on Shanghai by foreigners who had seen its successful 
implementation at home. Next, knowledge had to be diffused and modified to fit the specific 
conditions and confines of Shanghai‟s geographic and natural environments. At first, there had 
been concerns and suspicions about where these foreign technologies could be successfully 
implemented or installed in Shanghai. When safety could be assured, convenience and efficiency 
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could be achieved, there were no doubts that everyone in Shanghai accepted the arrival of 
modern technology as the new ways of life. 
Public transportation, just like food, clothing, and shelter was a form of self-identification 
and became a public display of one‟s class or socio-economic status. A major reason why the 
“traditional” and the “modern” forms of transport could co-exist together was because each form 
of transport identified with and came to symbolize a different clientele. Westerners needed to 
travel in comfort, and personal automobiles, taxis, first class seats on the trams and trolleys, as 
well as the rickshaw provided them with various options. Wealthy as well as up-and-coming 
Chinese wanted to emulate foreigners and they too identified with the more expensive and 
comfortable transport options. For the upper class Chinese such as government officials and 
well-to-do businessmen, identifying themselves with the Westerners became a mark of 
distinction that separated them from the rest of the Chinese population. To be able to live like 
foreigners indicated that a Chinese was more cosmopolitan and sophisticated than his fellow 
countrymen. As a result, Shanghai‟s Chinese elites vigorously sought to live the “Western 
lifestyle”, and to travel like Westerners by means of personal automobiles, taxis, first class seats, 
or having one‟s very own rickshaw puller were all goals wealthy and prominent Chinese actively 
pursued. For the middle class, options such as third class standing on the trams and trolleys, as 
well as the buses provided affordable and time-saving ways to commute. The poor could travel 
by wheelbarrow to navigate the close-quartered neighborhoods and alleyways. Public 
transportation was much more than just the mass transport of people from place to place. It 




State-society relations were intertwined in the expansion and development of modern 
Shanghai. In both the foreign concessions and the Chinese city, a public and private partnership 
was formed to facilitate the expansion and improvement of access to public transport. The 
government set safety standards and issued licenses, as well as designated and approved specific 
areas for construction. The private sector supplied the resources such as private transportation 
companies in order to satisfy consumer demands. This partnership became crucial to both the 
successes of the public and the private, and this working relationship proved to be mutually 
beneficial to both sides. The government needed to utilize economic development to gain support 
among the people, and the private sector could gain significant financial profits from supplying 
the consumers‟ needs. Both sides had much to gain from this collaboration. 
Technology has inherent political agenda attached to it as technology itself is politically 
embedded; as what technology is used, how it is used, and where it is used are all directly tied to 
politics. In Shanghai‟s case, this was no exception. Public transportation technology were used to 
not only justify and legitimize political authority, but it also defined which areas of the city 
would become more commercial vibrant and financial prosperous than others. The uneven 
development of public transportation accessibility meant that certain parts of the city would 
become more desirable and prosperous, and other less developed parts of the city would lag 
behind. The selection of locations or areas where new roads where built, and where public 
transportation routes, lines, or stops were not accidental. They were intentionally selected in 
order to serve or fulfill specific political or economic purposes. In the International Settlement, 
the northern, eastern, and western districts saw road extensions, widening, and new buildings 
built in order to expand the boundaries of the territory to previously Chinese held areas. By 
encouraging more foreigners to settle in Shanghai, and to invest in Shanghai‟s financial market, 
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the International Settlement could be turned into an oasis for British control in the Far East. 
Likewise, the French turned the Xujiahui area into a Catholic haven with the construction of the 
Catholic Cathedral there. As a result of heavy financial investments, the two busiest and most 
commercially vibrant streets were Nanjing Road in the International Settlement and Avenue 
Joffre in the French Concession. 
After witnessing the successes of the foreign settlements, Chinese political leaders and 
leading businessmen began to copy the Western model because they too can sense the 
opportunities that these foreign technologies can bring to their own personal interests. The GMD 
needed economic development to legitimize their political rule, and Chinese businessmen saw 
opportunities for profit. They viewed Western technological inventions such as machine-
powered vehicles, and road building technologies as crucial to achieve their own agenda: 
whether it was to strengthen political control or amass financial gain. Once these powerful 
players had invested their own personal agenda, technological momentum became impossible to 
turn back.  
Jiangwan was designated as the experimental testing ground for the new Chinese city 
center. This designation was based on the availability of large amounts of unsettled land. But the 
distant location of Jiangwan proved to be inconvenient in terms of commute and travel. Despite 
constructing new roads and building a new civic center, along with designated administrative, 
commercial, industrial, and residential zones, the mass movement of people did not occur. 
Among the wealthy Chinese, the newly designated area of Jiangwan simply did not feel 
attractive to them. They had been used to living in the foreign controlled concessions where they 
had access to modern conveniences such as entertainment, leisure, and education at nearby 
disposal. To them, Jiangwan was like another faraway city. The Greater Shanghai Project was 
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simply not realistically feasible to be achieved in such a short time period. Even without the 
Japanese attack in January 1932 and the subsequent Japanese invasion in 1937, it would not have 
been possible for the Chinese municipal government to be able to compete with the financial 
resources and technical expertise that had been long available in the International Settlement and 
French Concession. 
Given the reality that Shanghai was indeed governed by three separate political 
jurisdictions, it would have been impossible for the GMD to be able to build a unified Shanghai 
with Jiangwan as its city center. Although Jiangwan was built from scratch and tremendous 
investments were made, the fact was Jiangwan remained a peripheral part of Shanghai‟s urban 
landscape. The core of Shanghai remained in the International Settlement and the French 
Concession, and with the safety and protection these concessions afforded, it made no sense for 
the Chinese residents of the foreign settlements to leave for the uncharted territory of Jiangwan. 
The inability of the GMD to encourage the mass movement and resettlement of the Chinese 
population away from the foreign territories into Jiangwan was the biggest obstacle to the GMD 
regime‟s objective of consolidating and solidifying power in Shanghai. With limited control over 
the city and the Laws of Extraterritoriality in the foreign settlements, the GMD was unable to 
strengthen their control to a more grassroots level like they had envisioned when they launched 
the Greater Shanghai Project. 
Could the Greater Shanghai Project have succeeded with more time, and perhaps peace 
and stability? Even with peace and stability, it would have been difficult, if not impossible for 
the GMD to generate the same type of public revenues needed for such a colossal reconstruction 
project. From the municipal financial standpoint, the Chinese municipal administration paled in 
comparison to the public revenues generated by the International Settlement and French 
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Concession. Massive urban renovation required huge financial investments from both the public 
and private sectors. Without the availability of continuous funding, even the best designed 
blueprint could not be built or completed to fruition.  
The Japanese invasion of China in 1937 brought about the darkest period in Shanghai‟s 
modern history. On August 13, 1937, Japanese forces attacked Shanghai and launched what 
would become known as the Battle of Shanghai. 
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For nearly three months, intense fighting 
broke out throughout the Chinese city. On November 8, Chinese troops began withdrawing from 
Shanghai. It was clear that the Chinese would not be able to fight off the better equipped 
Japanese forces, and the GMD planned to save their best troops by withdrawing them to the 
hinterland. By November 12, the Japanese had occupied Shanghai. 
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The foreign concessions became known as the isolated island of China. The Japanese 
forces could not occupy the foreign territories, and thus waves of refugees flocked to the 
International Settlement and French Concession in search of shelter and protection. Many of the 
Chinese residents fled their homes after their neighborhoods were bombarded by the Japanese 
and sought refuge in the foreign concessions. The outbreak of World War II in Europe and the 
persecution of Jews brought tens of thousands of Jews to settle in Shanghai. As an international 
port city with no passport requirements, European Jews found sanctity and refuge in Shanghai. 
Stalin‟s purges in the late 1930s also brought waves of Russians fleeing their homeland into 
Shanghai. The foreign concessions became known as the “isolated island” of China because it 
was protected from Japanese military occupation as a result of its international status. 
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 and the subsequent 
declaration of war by the United States, Great Britain, and France on Japan the following day 
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changed the status of the “isolated island”. On December 8, Japanese forces moved in to occupy 
the foreign concessions since the British and French were now enemies of war. Shanghai was 
now entirely occupied by the Japanese. 
401
 To rule Shanghai, the Japanese installed a puppet 
regime under the leadership of the pro-Japanese Wang Jingwei. China‟s relationship with the 
British and the Americans changed with the outbreak of World War II. Chiang Kai-shek‟s 
Republic of China was now a key British and American ally in Asia in the war against 
imperialist Japan. The Sino-British and Sino-American Friendship Treaties signed on February 
23, 1943 allowed the International Settlement to return to Chinese sovereignty at the end of the 
war. 
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The Japanese surrender in August 1945 was followed by Japanese withdraw from 
occupied territories throughout Asia. By September 1945, Chiang Kai-shek‟s GMD had once 
again control of China.  
After the International Settlement was returned to China, Chiang began negotiating with 
the French for the return of the French Concession. On February 28, 1946, an agreement was 
signed between Chiang and French Prime Minister Charles De Gaulle that returned the French 
Concession to Chinese control. 
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 The return of both foreign concessions was a major triumph 
for Chiang as he had regained the colonial possessions that had been a humiliating experience for 
the Chinese for almost a century. 
While the GMD had controlled all of Shanghai by 1946, the civil war with the 
Communists erupted immediately after the end of World War II. The GMD could not control 
runaway inflation, which turned the Chinese currency into almost worthless banknotes. From 
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January 1, 1946 to August 1948, the Chinese currency continued to lose value in exchange to the 
gold currency. Initially, the Chinese currency was pegged to gold, but uncontrolled inflation had 
crippled the Chinese economy. 
Table 8.3 
Chinese Currency Exchange to Gold (January 1946-August 1948) 
  1.1946 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Chinese 
Currency 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Gold 100 165 186 182 206 222 226 237 249 
            10.1946 11 12 1.195 2 3 4 5 6 
Chinese 
Currency 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Gold 260 299 370 446 713 727 874 1,534 2,239 
            7.1947 8 9 10 11 12 1.195 2 3 
Chinese 
Currency 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Gold 2,779 2,876 3,332 5,199 7,396 9,920 12,177 16,485 31,085 
 
  4.1948 5 6 7 8 
Chinese 
Currency 100 100 100 100 100 






 Inflation had caused widespread anger and frustration toward the GMD. By 1948, the 
GMD had lost the trust of most of the people due to corruption and ineffective governance. 
Meanwhile, the Communists led by Mao Zedong had gained widespread support from the 
peasants and was poised to defeat Chiang‟s GMD. On May 27, 1949, Communist forces entered 
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Shanghai and officially ended GMD rule in the city. On October 1, Mao proclaimed the founding 
of the new People‟s Republic of China in the capital of Beijing. Shanghai‟s “old society” was 
now over. In 1949, a new era had begun. 
 The history of modern Shanghai was in large part linked to the development of public 
transportation. The arrival of modern public transportation, machine-powered vehicles, and the 
construction of new improved roads facilitated the growth and expansion of the city. Public 
transportation transformed Shanghai from a treaty port of about half a million in 1843 to a mega 
metropolis of international prominence by the early 20
th
 century. This dissertation examined the 
roles and impact of public transportation on the history of Shanghai through the concepts of 
“tradition and modernity”, and the relationships between state and society, and between 
technology and society. These notions helped explain how public transportation systems were 
able to transform Shanghai, and how the technologies of public transport shaped Shanghai‟s 
urban identity by looking at the historical development and differences in each of Shanghai‟s 
three political jurisdictions. Hopefully this dissertation has added to the scholarship of the history 
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